We have an ambitious plan – we want to discuss how international relations will shape up in the next 10-20 years and where the frequent calls for armament that we hear today will lead us. Recently, an interview with Professor Tomasz Grosse, a political scientist and Europeanist, was published on our blog. In his opinion, an agreement dividing Ukraine with Russia could be reached in the near future, but this will not satisfy Russia, and in a few years, it will come back for more. Do you think this is a possible scenario?
There are many scenarios for ending the war, and this one should be considered, but we should work to prevent it. From historical experience, we know that for any potential peace to be stable, it must be based on a certain balance of power on one hand, and on the other hand, it must also have legitimacy, meaning acceptance by both the societies and elites in the warring states, as well as a significant part of the so-called international community. At the moment, it is difficult to imagine such a peace.
Russia demands the recognition of territorial losses by Ukraine, its disarmament, the declaration of neutrality, the recognition of Russian as an official language, and the free movement of people between Russia and Ukraine. In this way, it could officially absorb part of Ukraine and create a weak statelet out of the rest, which would be completely at the mercy of Russia. It would be able to intimidate Ukraine and pursue a policy of de-nationalizing Ukraine, which in the long run would create conditions for its absorption. So far, Russia has not been able to achieve these goals. Thanks to Ukraine’s determination and the support it has received from many NATO countries, Ukraine has regained a significant portion of its territories. It has threatened the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and unblocked maritime communication routes that are essential for the export of grain and Ukraine’s economic survival.
At the same time, Russia has switched to war production and is receiving support from China, North Korea, and Iran. It is attempting to resume its offensive and is destroying energy infrastructure to break the morale of Ukrainians and hinder the functioning of the state. Among other things, due to problems with approving the financial aid package for Ukraine from the USA, delays in the delivery of equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, and the slower pace of increasing ammunition production in the West compared to Russia, Ukraine is in a very difficult situation.
In Poland, due to our historical experience, we are naturally concerned that Ukraine might be forced to accept terms that would be a defeat from both their and our perspective, and a victory for Russia. Since Russia’s goals include not only subjugating Ukraine but also undermining the credibility of the USA and NATO and imposing a zone of reduced security guarantees in the area of the eastern flank states of the Alliance, a sense of victory and exposing the West’s weakness could indeed encourage Russia to attempt to achieve these broader strategic goals. Russia has put so much effort into justifying the war with Ukraine and portraying it as a defense against an aggressive West that there is an ideological, political, and social basis for a war with NATO. Under certain circumstances, such as a lack of determination to strengthen the defensive capabilities of NATO states and U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pacific, Russia might consider provoking a conflict with the Alliance as a rational way to achieve its goals.
On the other hand, the $61 billion package to strengthen American capabilities to support Ukraine has been finally approved. The West, despite various problems, is increasing the production of ammunition and armaments. In 2022, the USA and EU countries were able to produce about 500,000 rounds of artillery ammunition annually; next year, this production capacity will reach about 3 million rounds. Ukraine has received candidate status for the European Union. There is no consensus on its admission to NATO, and Ukraine’s security status may still be subject to negotiations, but 32 countries have announced and 16 have already signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. These agreements will increase the chances that support will continue for years to come. When Russia resumed its offensive around Kharkiv, the USA, Germany, and France announced that they allow the possibility of attacking military targets on Russian territory around Belgorod, where there is logistical support for the Kharkiv offensive. Russia is incurring huge losses. According to British estimates, it has over 450,000 killed and wounded. On average, it loses about 1,000 soldiers a day. Even if it can replenish these losses, circumvent sanctions, and has more resources than Ukraine, the costs of waging war are enormous. It can replenish its losses in the short term, but it is not very capable of strengthening its potential for a war with NATO. The Alliance is not idle; it has changed its strategy, is adapting its structures to the threat from Russia, and member states, even if reluctantly and slower than we would like, are adjusting their military capabilities to this threat. Unless there is a fundamental change in U.S. policy towards Ukraine and Russia, for example, as a result of Donald Trump’s return to power, over time, Russia will have to recognize that a war of attrition does not pay off and should negotiate based on more rational terms. Then the scenario in which the Russians leave the war feeling victorious, convinced that aggression ultimately paid off, significantly increasing the threat to NATO, would become less likely. In the event of Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election, the situation could of course become more complicated. This is precisely what Putin is counting on; therefore, he is not interested in negotiations at the moment.
However, forcing Ukraine to accept Russian terms without also giving it credible security guarantees is unlikely. Instead, there is a risk of a so-called “frozen conflict” along the current front lines. The Korean scenario, i.e. no formal peace and some sort of ceasefire, would allow Russia to rebuild its potential. Then it could play with the threat of escalation and de-escalation, escalating attacks and offering to stop them to achieve its goals
Is Russian aggression a result of the changes occurring in the global balance of power?
Russia wants to regain its status as a superpower, and for this, it needs to take control of Ukraine and obtain a buffer zone that would allow it to influence the policies of neighboring countries. Putin publicly signaled his intentions, among other times, in 2007 in Munich. Russia was not provoked by NATO expansion; rather, it was encouraged to attempt to regain its superpower status because it perceived the West as weak. The 2008 NATO declaration on the future membership of Ukraine and Georgia in the Alliance was an attempt to bridge divisions within the Alliance over the lack of agreement on taking practical steps toward Ukraine’s accession. For Russia, this was a signal that the West was divided and lacked consensus on policy toward the former Soviet Union. Ukraine itself was not striving for NATO membership, it was a neutral state, and most citizens did not support membership. Putin saw that the USA was reducing its military presence in Europe, the West was focused on the war on terror, and it was keen on building partnerships with Russia and economic cooperation, especially in energy. Right after the declaration regarding Ukraine’s future membership in NATO, Germany and France began deepening cooperation with Russia, which reached a military level. Germany’s Rheinmetall started building a training center for the Russian ground forces, and France decided to sell Russia two powerful amphibious assault ships and the technology to produce them. The relative decline of U.S. power was also evident. China had become the world’s second-largest economy and was rapidly increasing its military potential, while the USA announced that it would focus its strategic attention on the Indo-Pacific. Today, China and Russia no longer hide their intentions. They openly declare that they want to change the international order and replace what they perceive as a U.S.-dominated world with a multipolar one. The path to this leads through showing the world that the USA cannot stop the actions of Russia and China if they decide to change the current status quo, such as changing borders by force and breaking the fundamental principle of international law that deems such actions unacceptable.
The rise of Chinese power and the goals of China and Russia pose a serious challenge to the USA and the broadly defined West. The main challenge for the USA is China, which indeed has the potential to force a change in the international system, compelling other countries to submit. We have seen how they have applied this in recent years to Australia, Norway, and Lithuania. Between the USA and China, there are conflicting interests, especially concerning the status of maritime communication routes in the South China Sea, which China claims as its territorial waters. Gaining the ability to control routes through which most of the world’s maritime trade passes would drastically increase China’s ability to influence the stability of global trade and the economy. The most volatile point, however, is Taiwan, which is formally part of China but practically an independent, democratic political entity. The USA decided in the 1970s to normalize and cooperate with China on the condition that any reintegration of Taiwan would occur through political means and not by force. Therefore, we have a war in Europe and the risk of escalation into a NATO-Russia conflict, as well as a significant risk of war in the Indo-Pacific. We must assume that the USA would not be able to handle full-scale wars simultaneously. Japan, South Korea, and Australia fear that if there is a war in Europe, the USA will not be able to support them. We, on the other hand, fear that if there is a conflict there, Americans will not have the capacity and will to provide the necessary support to Europe.
Fortunately, this awareness is mobilizing many countries to strengthen their own capabilities. NATO is also adapting to this threat. At the level of agreed strategy, threat perception, and planning, the Alliance takes into account the military threat from Russia and the political threats related to the USA treating China as its main rival. Of course, much remains to be done in terms of strengthening the capabilities of individual countries to ensure effective deterrence of Russia, but also in strengthening security in the Indo-Pacific
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Is a war over Taiwan a real threat? The year 2027 is often mentioned in this context as a certain boundary.
This date is mentioned because Chinese leader Xi Jinping has announced that the People’s Liberation Army should be ready for a military solution to the Taiwan issue by then. However, various statements by Xi indicate that China should take control of Taiwan before 2049, when the PRC will celebrate its centenary. Using different dates is meant to mobilize the Chinese state and armed forces to strengthen their capabilities. It also exerts military pressure on Taiwan and its allies to make concessions to China without resorting to war. At the same time, it creates internal political pressure, increasing the risk of war. The credibility of the leader or party could be threatened if the set goals are not achieved.
For China, the attempt to take control of Taiwan would be extremely costly and there is no guarantee it would succeed. Even with China’s capabilities, conducting an amphibious landing on the island to bring in troops and overthrow the democratic government would not be easy. The Russian attack on Ukraine, the enormous Russian losses, and the difficulty in achieving the intended goals should serve as a sobering lesson for the communist regime. Moreover, China’s development depends on the stability of the global economy and how China is perceived by much of the world. Provoking a war could seriously harm these interests. Therefore, a war over Taiwan does not necessarily have to happen. However, to reduce the risk, active deterrent measures must be taken, influencing China’s calculations of potential gains and losses. The USA is currently trying to do just that.
Will NATO be involved in the event of a conflict over Taiwan?
It is in the interest of the USA and European countries to increase their ability to deter China through cooperation with key partners in the Indo-Pacific, namely Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. NATO is a regional alliance. The treaty clearly defines the geographic scope of security guarantees, which include Europe and North America. In the event of aggression against a member state, allies are obligated to defend it. In practice, this means maintaining the territorial integrity and independence of the attacked ally.
However, it is important to remember that the Alliance was created in completely different times and strategic situations. The USA perceived the USSR as the main threat. Their interest was in deterring the USSR from aggression in Europe, weakening Soviet ability to use the threat of such aggression, strengthening Europe’s sense of security, and its economic recovery. Today, China is seen as the main rival of the USA, and there have long been accusations in the American debate that Europe is doing too little for its own security and does not adequately support the security of the USA. Therefore, a new division of responsibilities for global security must be developed between the USA and Europe to maintain strong transatlantic ties.
Europe must strengthen its conventional capabilities and focus on deterring Russia. The USA must maintain its troops in Europe and ensure credible nuclear deterrence. NATO, on the other hand, must support deterring China and demonstrate that it can influence security in the Indo-Pacific, which does not necessarily mean sending troops there. NATO has adopted a new strategy indicating China as a challenge. Cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries—Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand—is being deepened. France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and even Germany are sending ships to the region, signaling their readiness to defend freedom of navigation, which is crucial for their economic security. Some European countries also participate in exercises, such as air force exercises in the region. These and other actions are meant to influence China’s calculations, suggesting that if a war over Taiwan were to occur, the interests of European countries could be so threatened that some might side with Taiwan and try to hinder China’s war efforts.
However, it is more likely that a coalition of the willing, such as for protecting maritime communication routes, would form rather than using NATO resources for this purpose.
Some commentators argue that since China is currently experiencing an economic crisis, the USA may seek to exploit this situation and provoke a military confrontation to prevent being surpassed. There are experts who emphasize that the United States’ vigilance over world security has always been accompanied by force and coercion—mentioning Afghanistan and especially Iraq, for example.
The USA is focusing on strengthening its capabilities to deter China and implementing the strategy of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In military terms, the strategy is based on enhancing US capabilities to ensure technological superiority needed to offset the quantitative differences in capabilities between China and the USA. Indeed, China’s rapid development of capabilities is concerning. China is enhancing its space capabilities, developing hypersonic weapons, expanding its navy, and rapidly increasing its nuclear potential. This may indicate that China no longer aims solely for nuclear deterrence through the threat of retaliation in the event of a nuclear strike on its territory. A larger number of nuclear-tipped missiles would increase the credibility of using these weapons, even if China itself has not been attacked with nuclear weapons. This, in turn, will influence the US assessment of the risks associated with engaging in war with China. On one hand, during a war, this would make it difficult for the USA to compel China to make concessions; on the other hand, it may encourage China to intensify its aggressive policies. However, it would be more in China’s interest to provoke a war. In the United States, there is a discussion whether American capabilities and alliance networks are sufficient to prevent war. In the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the goal of the USA would likely be to repel the attack and maintain the status quo. This goal would be understandable and achievable. I don’t see what the USA would gain from provoking a war with China. How would they win the war, force China to surrender? What would victory entail? In a war with China, the USA’s goal would not be the long-term weakening and defeat of China, forcing them to accept new realities. Simply put, the USA does not have that capability, even with greater nuclear potential. Therefore, I don’t see the logic in the theory that starting a war to prevent further Chinese power growth would be in the USA’s interest.
As for the role of the USA in stabilizing the international system, like many countries, I prefer a system based on American power rather than a multipolar system where authoritarian powers do as they please, especially since the UN is unable to prevent it due to China and Russia’s permanent membership and veto power in the Security Council. Although the USA is not a perfect state, its democratic system allows for control of power and demands policy corrections, unlike in authoritarian regimes.
After World War II, American power was essential for effectively deterring the USSR and ensuring the security of allies. Thanks to the sense of security provided by the United States, Europe was rebuilt and conditions were created for European integration. Thanks to American security guarantees, Japan and South Korea also became economic powers. After the collapse of the USSR, there was a brief period when American power seemed unmatched. It provided stability to the world and paved the way for globalization. The benefit was economic growth, but at the cost of deindustrialization in the West and the rapid development of China, at the expense of many other countries. New threats intensified, such as terrorism and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the USA had to consider that the next attack could involve weapons of mass destruction. The attack on Afghanistan, where the leader of al-Qaeda was hiding, was in line with UN resolutions. After killing bin Laden and weakening al-Qaeda, the USA achieved its goal and withdrew from Afghanistan. The attack on Iraq, however, was an abuse of force and is used as a propaganda tool to weaken the position and influence of the USA. However, the USA does not occupy Iraq. Anti-American sentiments exist not only in so-called global South countries but also in some Western countries. Therefore, it is necessary to explain that although the USA, like any country, is not perfect, the values on which it is based create a community of interests with other democratic countries. When the USA abuses its power, allies can criticize it. At most, Americans will pour French wine into the canals for a week. When you criticize China, the country declares economic war on you. In the common interest of democratic countries, especially small and medium-sized countries, defending an international system based on law and agreed principles is essential. It is also in their interest to maintain USA leadership based on American military superiority, economic power, and technological prowess. Even if American potential is smaller than before, during a war, it could be mobilized to such an extent that no other Western power or the European Union is capable of doing. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and China’s actions during the Covid pandemic have fortunately reduced Western tendencies to relativize and equate the USA with China or Russia.
If a conflict over Taiwan were to actually occur, the situation in Poland and Europe would undergo significant changes. How much would sabotage and disinformation activities, which we already observe on a large scale today, intensify?
Russia and China share similar strategic goals when it comes to weakening the position of the USA and the credibility of alliances, especially NATO, and have been deepening their military cooperation for years. In early February 2022, just before Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, they announced an unrestricted partnership. Russia is waging war in Ukraine with political, informational, and military support from China. In the event of a war in the Indo-Pacific, they would also support and coordinate actions. They would conduct propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at convincing societies and decision-makers that the USA is responsible for provoking the conflict, and that Europe’s interest lies in staying on the sidelines. China could resort to economic blackmail and might suspend deliveries of rare earth metals or various industrial components essential for production across Europe. Issues with loading and unloading goods could arise in several ports in Europe, such as those in Greece, Spain, Belgium, or Germany, which are to varying degrees controlled by Chinese companies. Naturally, Russia would need to repay China for the support it receives in the war with Ukraine, so Russian and Belarusian services could intensify sabotage actions in Europe. It should also be assumed that Russian forces would be mobilized near NATO borders under any pretext, possibly leading to Russian-Chinese joint exercises. China has already conducted joint maneuvers with Russia in the Baltic Sea. This would focus the Alliance’s attention on the threat in Europe and make it difficult for individual countries to support US actions in the Indo-Pacific.
It is November 2024, let’s assume Donald Trump wins the elections. What does this mean for the world?
First and foremost, tensions between the USA and the European Union, as well as countries like Germany, could renew. Just as we fear that Trump will force Ukraine to accept unfavorable ceasefire terms, our partners in the Indo-Pacific fear that he will sell out Taiwan. In each region, the worst-case scenarios are being considered today – and this is exactly where the risks associated with Trump’s presidency lie. On the one hand, it should be assumed that he has a tendency to exaggerate, but once negotiations begin and he starts to see the consequences, he becomes somewhat more rational. On the other hand, we must reckon with uncertainty, both in terms of European and Pacific security. One could argue that Trump’s presidency might encourage Russia and China to escalate aggression, or conversely, that Trump’s unpredictability might deter them from actions that could lead to a confrontation with the USA. However, unpredictability creates more problems than benefits. Weakening American leadership at this time would certainly be disadvantageous for NATO and the EU, while strengthening China and Russia and facilitating their pursuit of their goals. Regardless of who the American president is, it is in Poland’s interest to maintain good relations with the USA. Poland must strengthen its own potential to the maximum extent possible, but the ability to deter Russia will always be greater if it is based on the threat of US involvement in the conflict. Therefore, even if Trump decided to withdraw the USA from NATO military structures, our priority should be to minimize losses by deepening bilateral relations with the USA and, of course, leveraging the potential for cooperation within the EU.