A Bit of the Theory…
Robert Gilpin, a distinguished American political scientist, argued that the international system is shaped by the underlying distribution of power among states. Over time, this balance inevitably shifts. Some countries lose strength and prosperity, while others grow more powerful and affluent. These changes often lead to tensions and fractures in the system — not only in material terms, but also in the realm of values and ideas.
This process typically culminates in a hegemonic war — a large-scale conflict over dominance between the leading powers. When such a war ends, a new international system takes shape. It tends to be more stable because it reflects the new realities of power. The new hegemon, or a coalition of victorious states, sets out the rules for how the system will function. This includes establishing key institutions, legal norms, and legitimizing ideas — those that help define and justify the new global order.
The stability of the international system, then, depends on the strength of the dominant power or group of powers. These actors aim to maintain a balance among themselves, often described as a “concert of powers.” That is why many scholars of international relations view either a hegemonic order or one based on a balance of power as the most stable forms of global governance.
Crucially, the international order also produces values and ideas that reinforce its legitimacy, helping to make it even more resilient. Still, the true foundation of any durable order lies in power and balance — with ideology serving more as a reflection of that reality. As the old saying goes, “history is written by the victors.”
In the 21st century, the international system has become exceptionally unstable. This is primarily due to the weakening of the former hegemon—the United States of America (USA). Some experts even question whether Washington still maintains primacy, and thus agency, in
international order. Evidence of this can be seen in the U.S. withdrawal from Europe and its delegation of security responsibilities to the Europeans themselves, a strategy referred to as “offshore balancing.” This shift results from the declining capacity of the United States, which is no longer able to engage on a large scale simultaneously in both Europe and Asia.
Another example is the initial difficulty in restraining Moscow’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, followed by the ongoing failure to bring both sides of the conflict to a peaceful resolution. This is not only a sign of weakness but of a loss of primacy. Moscow has neither been punished nor even restrained, despite having violated the European security system to the greatest extent since the end of World War II.
Compounding this situation is the destructive policy of Donald Trump, who, shortly after taking office in 2025, undermined the international system and its values—values that had been built by the Americans themselves since the 1940s. An additional sign of the decline of the formerly dominant Western powers is the structural problems facing the European Union (EU) and the growing number of divisions among allies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
Moscow has sought to exploit the West’s weakness by attacking Ukraine. It turned out that Russia did not suffer a crushing defeat there but, despite significant difficulties, managed to conduct territorial expansion, evade Western sanctions, and even grow its military capacity beyond pre-2022 levels. Thus, Russia was not defeated; on the contrary, it poses an increasing threat to both the EU and NATO. A frozen conflict in Ukraine—let alone a lasting peace—is realistically possible only on Moscow’s terms, a stance effectively confirmed in Donald Trump’s policy, which primarily demanded concessions from Kyiv. It is hard to find clearer evidence of the erosion of American primacy. A direct consequence of this is the dramatic deterioration of EU security. This demonstrates a significant imbalance within the regional system in Europe and is a clear example of instability in international order.
However, an even greater challenge to American dominance on a global scale—beyond just the regional level in Europe—is China. The country has matched, and in many respects surpassed, the United States in economic power. This is most evident in its capital accumulation. The People’s Republic of China, thanks to its vast financial reserves ($3.2 trillion (about $9,800 per person in the US) in 2025) and moderate external debt ($2.4 trillion (about $7,400 per person
in the US)400 per person in the US) at the end of 2024), has effectively become the center of a new geo-economic order—a new version of globalization. This has geopolitical consequences, which is precisely why Beijing poses the greatest challenge to the weakening primacy of the United States. Furthermore, in 2025, the United States recorded a staggering national debt of $36.22 trillion (about $110,000 per person in the US) (about $110,000 per person in the US) (about $110,000 per person in the US).
trillions of dollars in liabilities, backed by just $35.2 billion in currency reserves.
That’s why Donald Trump’s efforts to undermine the dollar’s role as the world’s primary trade currency are potentially catastrophic for Washington.
China, by contrast, has a far more advanced industrial base than the U.S., is on par technologically—and in some areas, even ahead—and is far better positioned to weather the fallout of a trade war. In fact, if such a conflict were to break out, China holds key advantages and leverage points that could put the U.S. in serious trouble. We are talking about control over global supply chains, critical raw materials, and the production of industrial goods that American consumers—and even the U.S. government—depend on.
Radical moves backfire…
That is why Trump ended up losing his first major geoeconomic showdown with Beijing early in his second term in 2025. He was forced to quickly walk back to his trade war strategy: slashing punitive tariffs and carving out countless exemptions to his own sanctions. The financial markets pushed back hard, investors began pulling out of dollar-based assets, and the U.S. suddenly faced the threat of a major fiscal and economic crisis.
The pressure was not just from Wall Street. Top American business leaders—led by Elon Musk, whose companies have deep ties to China—urged Trump to change course. But by then, the damage was done. The world has already begun turning away from the U.S. dollar as the default global currency. All of this exposes a deeper, structural weakness in the American economy—one that Trump’s actions have only made worse.
If current trends continue, China could solidify its position as the heart of a new global economic order. The old model—American-led globalization—may soon be outdated. And ironically, the person most responsible for dismantling it may be none other than America’s 47th president.
The U.S. will continue to place restrictions on China, which Beijing will see as open hostility. But it is becoming increasingly clear that Trump’s trade war strategy is not delivering any decisive victories. If anything, it is steering the U.S. toward serious economic challengesand potentially setting off a broader crisis in the global economic system.
This increases the asymmetry of the entire system globally in favor of Beijing. It is also a source of instability for the existing order, which has been dominated by the United States (and its geopolitical and economic interests). Additionally, the erosion of this American-led international system is being deepened by the delegitimization of liberal values and ideas, which have until now been promoted by the West. These values are openly challenged by the main rivals of American leadership—namely Moscow and Beijing—at least in terms of political values and the promotion of democracy as a universal political system.
These values—especially in their progressive-liberal form—are also being questioned at the very core of the geopolitical center, including by Donald Trump himself, as well as within the European Union. This illustrates the extent of the destabilization of the international order established after World War II and—one might have thought—reinforced after the end of the Cold War. According to Francis Fukuyama, it was supposed to be the “end of history,” meaning the triumph of the liberal order dominated by the United States. Instead, it has turned out to be a prelude to radical destabilization, which is already associated with the largest conflict in Europe since World War II. This signals an escalation of tensions within the international system, including the possibility of a hegemonic war.
Is a multipolar world possible?
One must agree with Henry Kissinger that we are currently not dealing with a multipolar order, but rather with a deeply unbalanced and unstable system. There is little chance that the
global order will return to equilibrium based on multipolarity, as the EU—and at least a sizable portion of Western European elites—hopes.
The fundamental challenge on a global scale is the growing imbalance between the United States and China. Beijing is increasingly becoming the center of global economic exchange—in other words, globalization. The trade war tactics pursued by the United States since Trump’s first presidency in 2018, and subsequently continued by Joe Biden, have largely failed. They have not halted the rise of China’s central role in the international system. The attempt at “decoupling”—severing China from Western markets, technologies, and capital—has also failed. Beijing has learned how to cope with such hostile actions. Above all, it has stimulated domestic demand, further developed markets in countries outside the broadly defined West and has more actively begun to It has taken control of production chains and made Western countries dependent on many raw materials, goods, or even components. It has also developed its own technological and innovative capabilities, amassed substantial capital resources, and increased its ability to attract external capital—among other things, through the gradual internationalization of the renminbi. Importantly, it has managed to effectively circumvent U.S. sanctions, including by maintaining access to the American market through intensive cooperation with Canada and Mexico.
In line with its long-term strategy, China seeks to push the United States out of its own region. It does not accept that the American fleet controls key trade routes, especially those off the Chinese coast. Moreover, it is preparing for global dominance—not just economically, which is already largely the case, but also geopolitically. This aligns with a Chinese saying: “Just as there cannot be two suns in the sky, there cannot be two equal emperors.” According to Chinese tradition, Beijing rules “everything under heaven.” This is a vision of hierarchical order centered around China—the so-called “Middle Kingdom.” In this vision of international order, other countries occupy a subordinate position, which effectively assumes Chinese dominance both regionally and globally.
It is difficult to believe that the American elite would be willing to surrender primacy to the Chinese and voluntarily move to a secondary position. From a psychological point of view, it will be hard for them to accept the loss of primacy—that is, their hegemonic position in the
international system. After all, they have held that role for at least the past 70 years. Americans are accustomed to leadership, to the missionary role of spreading ideas and values on a global scale, to the primacy of the dollar, and to the strength of American financial markets. In line with their political culture, they often resort to military instruments to restore systemic balance—or at least to reaffirm their own hegemony.
At present, they are increasingly losing dominance in the economic sphere. It will be difficult for them to maintain political control over powerful but destabilization-prone financial markets. They are also likely to lose the dollar’s dominant role in the global economy, which would seal the loss of their central position in globalization. America will still retain powerful military tools. But will it be willing to engage in direct military confrontation with China in order to reverse the unfavorable shifts in the international order? Especially since, for example, the chances of Washington winning a war to defend Taiwan are diminishing with each passing year.
In summary, the center of the global economy is shifting to China, and the U.S.’s strategy to halt this process has largely failed. In fact, Trump’s recent actions have only accelerated this trend. Therefore, we should expect economic shocks, as it is unlikely that America will abandon geo-economic competition. At the same time, Washington’s primacy in the geopolitical sphere has been challenged, primarily by Vladimir Putin. Many signs suggest that Trump will not be able to resolve this conflict—and if he does, it will likely be on Putin’s terms and only temporarily. Thus, we can expect that the United States will want to prove to the world that it still retains geopolitical agency, which may draw it into a regional conflict, for example, in the Middle East.
Regional Conflicts…
Resolving tensions between Washington and Beijing is crucial for stabilizing the international system. Without this, any hope of rebalancing the global order is in vain. It is difficult to imagine that the current asymmetries can be sustained over the long term, as they will only contribute to growing instability across the system. Therefore, the hope that Beijing and Washington can peacefully coexist while improving their bilateral relations seems futile.
The resolution of rising tensions lies in either the voluntary relinquishment of primacy by the United States or confrontation with the People’s Republic of China—including the possibility of military solutions. Until this core geopolitical conflict is settled, we should expect increasing disorder in the international system. One manifestation of this will be regional wars. It will be in China’s interest to undermine American influence and to draw U.S. capacity into regional conflicts around the world—treated as proxy wars, avoiding direct confrontation between Beijing and Washington. This is a strategy aimed at wearing down the rival and its allies, for example in Europe, while also buying time—something that benefits the increasingly powerful and globally influential Beijing.
The ongoing war in Ukraine, therefore, aligns with China’s interests, which is why Moscow continues to receive support from the PRC and its allies. Demonstrating the helplessness or weakness of what was once the leading global power—its unreliability toward allies, as seen in the cases of Ukraine or NATO’s eastern flank—is intended to sow doubt about the credibility and agency of the United States. That is why Beijing is taking advantage of Trump’s actions, which undermine globalization
The withdrawal from Europe and its strained relations with allies) as a pretext for criticizing Washington. It accuses the United States of destabilizing the international order. It also attempts to win over America’s current partners and allies. It is increasingly encroaching on the U.S. sphere of influence, primarily in Latin America but also in Europe.
The escalation of regional wars affects many areas of the globe, beginning with Europe, followed by the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, and so on. These wars will intensify or lose momentum, but they are all manifestations of the ongoing instability of the international system. In such a situation, regional powers are seeking opportunities to expand their own spheres of influence—because the opportunity exists. This applies not only to Russia but also to Israel, Iran, Türkiye, South Korea, and others. After all, there is no longer a “global policeman.” Moreover, the major global players are preoccupied with the struggle for supremacy on a global scale. That is why a resolution to the primary conflict between the U.S. and China will lead to a calming of regional conflicts, including the one in Europe.
Russian elites have imperial ambitions which they seek to realize by taking advantage of the West’s weakness. For now, as mentioned, these actions align with China’s interests. That is why China supports Moscow by supplying raw materials and components necessary for weapons production. It also allows for the recruitment of Chinese personnel and the presence of North Korean soldiers on the front lines. China’s allies, such as Iran and North Korea, have long been actively supporting Moscow’s war effort. Beijing has significantly more leverage than the U.S. when it comes to influencing Russia’s behavior in this conflict, and thus in potentially bringing it to an end. China may choose to exercise this influence either when it no longer needs to engage in systemic rivalry with the U.S. and its allies, or when Moscow’s gains in Europe no longer align with China’s interests.
What about Europe?
The European Union is the result of U.S. primacy after World War II—primarily due to Washington’s support for the post-war reconstruction of the Old Continent and its political and economic integration. Europe was able to integrate thanks to the American nuclear umbrella, which stabilized the security situation under Washington’s protection. Therefore, a U.S. withdrawal from Europe—as part of an offshore balancing strategy—would be a major blow to the stability of the security system on the Old Continent Strategic autonomy by Western Europe in this situation is an attempt to save not only its own security but also political integration, which could collapse in the event of geopolitical destabilization. However, attempts to rescue the European integration project may prove difficult.
The system of continental geopolitical stability has been achieved since the 17th century based on three factors.
First, it was rooted in the principles of Peace of Westphalia (1648), meaning respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal political affairs, especially ideological matters. Second, the practice of the Westphalian system in the 17th century, followed by its stabilization after the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), was based on the balance of power among the major states—sometimes referred to as the “Concert of Powers.”
Third, starting in the 18th century, a crucial element of system stability was the dominance of an external hegemon in the continental system—first the United Kingdom, and later the United States.
In the 21st century, all three principles of the European order have been seriously undermined.
Above all, the global primacy of the United States is weakening, while at the same time, this great power is withdrawing from European affairs. This alone must destabilize the geopolitical system on the European continent.
As if that were not enough, Moscow’s attack on Ukraine has disrupted the strategic balance in Europe.
There is also no longer a balance of power within the European Union itself. Germany dominates, no longer counterbalanced by France and its southern European allies. Central Europe is becoming increasingly peripheral to Germany—primarily in economic terms, but increasingly also politically. This strengthens Berlin’s power and reduces the internal balance of power within the EU.
Furthermore, the European Union is unceremoniously abandoning the principles of Westphalia. These principles were not only a condition for systemic stability on the European continent, but over time became core values legitimizing international relations globally.
Yet the Union has rejected the Westphalian concept of respecting the sovereignty of its member states and is increasingly interfering in their internal politics.
The clearest example of violating Westphalian principles is Brussels’ top-down imposition of EU ideology—including so-called “European values”—without regard for national political cultures or local democracies.
For this reason, the actions of Brussels—supported by French elites and German ideas are being criticized and contested. This is especially true in the countries of Central Europe, which have only relatively recently regained their sovereignty — that is, they have freed themselves from the colonial dominance of Moscow. As a result, these countries are strongly attached to the Westphalian system principles.
As if that were not enough, another important process is destabilizing the international order. Western Europe is ceasing to function as the center of economic processes. It is increasingly becoming a market for goods and a peripheral area within globalization, which is now concentrated in the new global core — China. A clear expression of this trend is the European Union’s decreasing economic competitiveness, its declining innovation, and weakening industry. The trade surplus China holds over the EU is also growing. According to
Eurostat data, in 2024 it amounted to €304.5 billion. The European Union is becoming increasingly dependent on the import of Chinese goods and raw materials, as well as on investments originating from the People’s Republic of China. This strengthens Beijing’s global power while simultaneously relegating Western Europe, further disrupting the balance of power in Europe.
Western Europe continues to play a leading role in relation to the intra-EU peripheries, such as Central Europe, although this type of power asymmetry within the EU is met with resistance in at least some Central European nations. At the same time, Western Europe itself is being degraded to a peripheral role in relation to the new center, which is increasingly shifting toward Asia. In international relations theory, this dual function is referred to as semi-periphery.
Naturally, Western Europe is trying to defend itself against this decline in status while also attempting to control and discipline its own peripheries — namely, Central and Southern Europe more tightly. For this reason, Western European elites are trying to consolidate power within the EU. They aim to strengthen the centralization of governance and streamline the decision-making processes in the Union — processes which simultaneously aim to privilege the largest member states, particularly Germany and France. This power consolidation is accompanied by attempts to enhance capital accumulation in Western Europe — at the expense of peripheral regions, their economic interests, and their security. This raises the possibility of significant internal tensions within the EU, including the emergence of disintegration tendencies. As a result, the EU’s “reforms” are placed under serious question.
It is hardly surprising that countries holding the status of internal peripheries within the European Union would protest treaty changes in the EU that are unfavorable to them. At the same time, the elites of Western Europe are trying to consolidate power within the EU’s core to preserve their own position in the international system. However, instead of addressing the major dysfunctions of the economic system—which contribute, among other things, to the EU’s declining competitiveness on the international stage—they are attempting to improve the situation of the center at the expense of the periphery.
There is no indication that they will be able to effectively resolve Europe’s security challenges following the United States’ withdrawal from the Old Continent. This leaves the EU’s eastern periphery in a particularly difficult position—without sufficient support from the EU center in geopolitical terms, while simultaneously facing increasing control exerted by that center and other costs resulting from European integration.
How can stability be restored to the European system?
The key to restoring geopolitical balance in Europe—and, by extension, stability to the international order—is the consolidation of Central and Eastern Europe. I am referring to deepening regional integration in this area, both in terms of security, economy, and politics. The development of the Three Seas Initiative, based on cooperation between Poland and Ukraine, as well as collaboration among the so-called eastern flank NATO countries, is of fundamental importance for security. In other words, it can effectively counter Moscow’s imperialismespecially if such regional integration were supported by a global hegemon, whether that continues to be the United States or becomes the People’s Republic of China.
Deepening cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe helps stabilize the entire continent. Not only does it hinder Moscow’s expansion toward the West, but it also checks the growing power of Germany, which is increasingly becoming a source of geopolitical imbalance. Therefore, the potential for deeper cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe is a “thorn on the side” of both Moscow and Berlin. In relation to the latter, it is worth noting that the consolidation of power within the EU will obstruct efforts to deepen cooperation within the Three Seas Initiative, as well as limit stronger security cooperation along NATO’s eastern flank.
Moreover, a strong Three Seas Initiative prevents German Russian collaboration or rivalry—something of fundamental importance for stabilizing the European order.
The destabilization resulting from the rivalry between the two powers over Central and Eastern Europe is evident. Regarding cooperation between Berlin and Moscow, this poses a threat to the primacy of the global superpower—whether we are thinking of Washington or Beijing. As such, it becomes a source of destabilization, only on a global scale.