On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will assume office as the 47th President of the United States of America (USA). His presidency coincides with a period of the most intense geopolitical changes since the collapse of the Cold War order in the late 20th century. At that time, the USA was the greatest global winner. Moscow (then the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) lost the Cold War rivalry, suffering significant territorial losses and a decline in international importance.
Today, America is weakening as the leading global power, and its leadership is being challenged by its main geopolitical rivals, Beijing and Moscow. The USA and Trump himself are unpopular among allies in Western Europe. Allies in other parts of the world are also uneasy, wondering what the tenure of the 47th President of the USA will bring.
Moscow
Trump’s goal is to calm “secondary” geopolitical conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and focus on the challenge posed by China. This will be a difficult task, as Eastern Europe is witnessing the largest armed conflict since World War II, which has the potential to escalate into a world war. Moscow is militarily supported by Iran and North Korea, to a lesser extent by China, and receives political or economic support from many other countries in the so-called Third World or the BRICS group. Ukraine is backed by the EU and NATO countries.
This conflict thus holds immense escalation potential. Trump would likely seek to end it quickly, potentially freezing the front line and thereby effectively agreeing to let the territories seized by Moscow remain under its control. Another concession to the Kremlin would involve halting Ukraine’s NATO membership. Such a scenario would effectively mark a victory for Moscow and a defeat for the West, including the USA, many other nations, NATO, and the EU, which have supported Ukraine against Russia.
Even if, in exchange for concessions, Ukraine received substantial military and technological support from NATO and the EU, including the deployment of NATO forces on Ukrainian territory, it is unlikely that the conflict would be definitively halted. Within a few years, a renewed escalation could be expected, potentially including an attack by Moscow on NATO members. The reason is simple: if the current strategy of military aggression brings success, why would Moscow change it? The West’s concessions only prove its weakness, potentially encouraging Moscow to expect further successes in subsequent confrontations.
It is worth recalling that the ultimatum issued by Vladimir Putin before the invasion of Ukraine in December 2021 demanded that the West and its military structures withdraw not only from Ukraine but also from all of Central Europe and the so-called “eastern flank,” including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic states, as well as Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, Moscow transitioned its economy to a wartime footing much faster than the West, and its arms production capacity is expected to peak in 2026. At the same time, Moscow’s advantage in weaponry and offensive capabilities relative to NATO’s capacity in Europe is also expected to be at its highest.
The conflict would escalate even faster if Putin decides not to freeze the armed conflict in 2025. In that case, the U.S. administration would likely increase military aid to Ukraine, inevitably leading to greater confrontation with the West. It is difficult to predict what might deter Moscow’s elites from further aggression—certainly not Western concessions or weakness. Perhaps only further territorial fragmentation of Russia (similar to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991) might bring the long-awaited peace to Europe and the world.
In summary, when discussing Trump’s geopolitical challenges, it must be acknowledged that a military confrontation between NATO and Moscow is, sooner or later, inevitable. Escalation may be postponed, but it will likely return with greater intensity, just as it did after Moscow’s initial attack on Ukraine in 2014. At that time, the West deluded itself into thinking that the armed conflict in Ukraine could be permanently frozen. The U.S. played only a minor role in addressing the dispute, delegating the entire matter to Europeans, specifically Germany and France. These nations not only trusted Putin but later even strengthened him by effectively rewarding Russia with economic cooperation, particularly through the expansion of Nord Stream and increased imports of Russian energy resources into the EU.
Thus, the West made two strategic mistakes: Washington’s absence and Western Europe’s carefree return to geo-economic cooperation with Moscow.
The same mistakes could easily be repeated today. Trump may seek to withdraw from Europe, leaving defense matters to the Europeans. Meanwhile, Europeans might underestimate the threat posed by Moscow, preferring to seek an agreement with it or even a return to economic cooperation. Such a scenario would represent the greatest geopolitical error, as it would almost certainly lead to renewed Russian aggression towards the West. It would exploit the West’s apparent weakness.
Moreover, this would align with Russia’s official strategic vision of “Eurasianism,” envisioning a shared geopolitical space “from Vladivostok to Lisbon” under Moscow’s control.
Middle East
The Middle East will be another significant geopolitical challenge for the new U.S. administration. The United States is a staunch ally of Israel, and Trump himself has previously advocated for increasing pressure on Iran. The American president’s goal will be to stabilize the region, primarily by effectively ending Israel’s conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Stabilizing Lebanon would require pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River, destroying its military infrastructure in the southern part of the country, and cutting off its future arms supplies. Additionally, weakening Hezbollah’s ability to play a significant role in Lebanon’s political system is also a key objective. Israel appears to be making progress toward these goals.
In the Gaza Strip, Israel’s objectives likely include neutralizing Hamas’s ability to exert political and military influence, possibly annexing territories in the West Bank and Gaza, and controlling the reduced Palestinian Authority’s governance. U.S. support for such a plan—combined with weakening Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas, and exerting pressure on Iran—could lead to regional stabilization.
In a broader context, Syria and the Iranian challenge remain key flashpoints for both Washington and Jerusalem. Regarding the Syrian civil war, President-elect Trump previously urged the outgoing Biden administration to avoid involvement, stating, “This is not our (America’s) war.” However, the post-collapse situation of Bashar al-Assad’s regime remains far from stable and could threaten U.S. interests in the region.
An even greater challenge is Iran, despite the country suffering recent setbacks, primarily due to its conflict with Israel.
The Korean Peninsula
The Korean Peninsula is another flashpoint on the world’s geopolitical map. The primary source of concern is North Korea, which continues to expand its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons and missile systems. Pyongyang escalates tensions with South Korea and supports U.S. rivals, particularly Moscow. These actions by North Korea have so far been tolerated or even approved by Beijing. However, excessive Russian influence in North Korea could also raise concerns in China and might eventually prompt countermeasures from Chinese authorities.
The intensification of conflict between the two Koreas will likely depend on the level of tension between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially over Taiwan. If U.S.-China relations deteriorate further, an escalation of conflict on the Korean Peninsula becomes highly probable.
China
The geopolitical dispute with China is the primary challenge for the Trump administration. It is, in essence, a struggle for global hegemony. Beijing aims to dethrone Washington and dominate the region, potentially even achieving global dominance. Should the war in Ukraine escalate into a world war, it would certainly have broader implications beyond regional hegemony in Europe (which Moscow is interested in). It would become a larger rivalry for global dominance between the U.S. and China.
It is important to note that Moscow’s dominance in Europe would not align with the interests of either Washington or Beijing, so if this scenario became a real possibility, it would likely meet resistance from both global powers.
During Trump’s presidency, we can expect the escalation of a trade war, meaning geo-economic disputes between Washington and Beijing, rather than a full-scale military confrontation. Trump would likely avoid military conflicts, instead focusing on cutting China off from the American market, American technologies, and capital. He would also strive to sever similar geo-economic ties between China and America’s allies, including the EU.
If America continues to weaken, especially in terms of industrial and military capacity, with diminishing ability to engage in too many regions around the world, and if internal divisions and disputes with allies deepen, military intervention by China in Taiwan could become a real possibility. In such a case, Washington would likely be unable to defend the rebellious island. This would have a paralyzing effect on U.S. allies in the region and could pave the way for Chinese hegemony in the region, and potentially even globally. However, if the U.S. maintains its geopolitical strength, rebuilds industrial capacity, preserves technological superiority, and maintains alliances in Europe and Asia, China will not resort to military resolutions over Taiwan.
In other words, China will aim to limit the geo-economic potential of the U.S., stoking proxy conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, where Washington will be involved. China will also seek to exacerbate transatlantic misunderstandings and soothe or neutralize the growing concerns of American elites about Beijing’s rising power. Additionally, China might fuel turmoil in U.S. domestic politics, including indirectly supporting further attempts at the physical elimination of Donald Trump.
European Union
An important element of the geopolitical puzzle during Trump’s presidency will be the situation within the European Union (EU). A strong Europe and strong transatlantic relations would benefit Trump. However, a weak EU, especially one in conflict with Trump, would serve his biggest rivals. Unfortunately, many indicators suggest that the EU will become increasingly weaker and mired in chaos.
In the 21st century, successive economic regimes within the European Union have proven dysfunctional, facing multiple crises. It has been difficult to maintain economic growth and global competitiveness while simultaneously preserving the high level of social benefits that Europe had previously enjoyed. Several factors contributed to this situation. Geopolitical pressure from Moscow resurfaced, and the United States was no longer willing to bear such high security costs for the Old Continent as it had in the past. Additionally, the economic development model in Western Europe (especially in Germany), which relied on cheap Russian raw materials, collapsed due to the geopolitical crisis. Another factor was the increasing competitive pressure from Chinese companies, which outpaced European corporations in more and more sectors. Europe was becoming geo-economically dependent on Beijing, especially in the area of climate transformation. Washington will likely increase pressure on the EU to sever its economic ties with China. However, it may be too late for such a “decoupling” (severing ties). This could be one of the factors leading to deteriorating relations between the EU and Donald Trump.
Other reasons for the breakdown of the EU’s economic model include dysfunctions in the monetary regime and the flawed climate transformation policy introduced within the EU. Regarding climate policy, it should be noted that it was based on completely different principles within the EU than in the U.S. and China. This led to a significant rise in energy prices in the EU compared to the two other powers, thus worsening economic competitiveness, lowering economic growth, and reducing investments.
The monetary union also proved to be a system limiting economic growth and competitiveness for most member states. Furthermore, it forced the accumulation of ever-increasing budget deficits and public debt in countries within the eurozone. This had negative consequences not only for individual European societies, for whom European integration ceased to be synonymous with prosperity, but also weakened the EU’s geopolitical potential and its international role. The economic and monetary union became vulnerable to crises, thereby contributing to internal destabilization within Europe. Moreover, the monetary union was a highly asymmetric economic regime, in which there were not only center-periphery divisions but also economic benefits were concentrated in the strongest member states, primarily Germany, while the costs were shifted to the weakest countries. This tendency is increasingly visible in other economic regimes within the EU (e.g., in the internal market and in the context of climate transformation). In the long term, this presents a disintegrative factor, which could have geo-economic consequences.
The response of the leaders of Western European integration to the continuing dysfunctions of the EU’s economic regimes has been, so far, to increase the accumulation of capital in Western Europe by relying on the internal peripheries of the Union, as well as shifting the costs of crises onto these peripheries. At the same time, there has been an attempt to reformulate the economic model operating within the internal market toward greater protectionism and the development of industrial policy. However, this attempt to reorient the model was fraught with serious inconsistencies due to the EU’s strong dependence on external rivals. An example of this was the German economy, initially highly dependent on Russian raw materials, and later on Chinese raw materials and components, as well as access to the Chinese market. This led to excessive openness of the EU’s internal market to Chinese competitors, as well as the inability to implement an effective policy to protect against unfair competition from them.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the revision of the EU’s geo-economic strategy in the 21st century was introduced too late, was too strongly based on anti-American sentiment, and was overly liberal toward Moscow and Beijing. It did not address the structural problems of the currency regime or climate transformation. The excessive shifting of costs to the internal EU peripheries could have led to significant political tensions within the EU.
All of this makes the European Union a rather weak ally for Trump in the face of very serious geopolitical conflicts. Transatlantic tensions, especially with the leaders of Western Europe, are not ruled out, which could negatively affect the relations between the entire EU and the United States. However, the much larger problem for Trump may be the EU’s chronic geopolitical weakness and its inability to overcome successive crises. This is likely to embolden Moscow’s elites to pursue an even more aggressive policy toward the West. This means that Trump will have to maintain America’s involvement in Europe. He will have to take at least some responsibility for the security of Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank, as neither the EU nor the largest Western European countries will be able to meet this challenge.
[1] NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/nato-russia-dynamics-prospects-for-reconstitution-of-russian-military-power/
[2] “The United States should have nothing to do with it. This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved!” https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1865434273953509462