In this complicated geopolitical situation we find ourselves in, Poland’s position is very important – not only on the eastern front of the European Union, but also because of its socio-political development. We asked Marcin Przydacz, former Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019-2023) and current head of the Office of International Policy at the Chancellery of President Andrzej Duda, to give us an overview of the situation from the point of view of his political experience.
As for my experience and cooperation within the Polish government, I originally worked as a director in the Office of the President, dealing with international affairs. Beginning in 2015, I had the opportunity to cooperate on foreign policy implemented by President Duda. I then moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I became deputy minister responsible for key directions: security policy, Eastern policy – that is, relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Russia – further transatlantic policy, that is, relations with the United States, which is our fundamental ally, and Asian policy, focusing on looking at China and what is happening in the Pacific region. During the last elections, I decided to run for Parliament and became an MP. Today we are in opposition, so my ability to influence government policy is mildly limited, but I serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Union Affairs Committee, which means I continue to address the same security issues.
The war in Ukraine: how we arrived at a seemingly unsolvable situation and what are the prospects for a way out of the conflict
Before we talk about the future, we must clarify that Russia is responsible for this war; neither Ukraine nor the European Union had the goal of reaching a military confrontation with Russia. The issue is that while the Ukrainians were getting closer and closer to the Western world, Russia, which looks at the world through completely different eyes than we do, saw the risk of Ukraine leaving its sphere of influence. If we look at the last 500 years, Russia has constantly sought to create its empire. As we know, that empire collapsed in 1991, and now Russia is trying to rebuild it. How can it do this? Certainly not through the economy, which is not its strong point compared to China, the US or the EU. So in recent years it has worked on two levels: on the one hand, using natural resources, through which it has made many countries dependent on its supplies, and on the other hand, showing itself strong from a military point of view. Over the past 300 years, every time Russia has been an empire, it has dominated Central and Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine. Vladimir Putin’s most important goal is to keep U.S. influence away from the region, as Russia fears the U.S. above all, knowing that it has more leverage with Europe, often politically divided and dependent on Russian raw materials. Also, keeping the Americans out is key to dominating neighboring countries, as is exploiting Orthodoxy. Russia knows that the unipolar global system in which America dominates is disintegrating and will become a multipolar system, and in this new arrangement Russia wants to play a leading role. And for that, it needs control over other countries. Ukraine, on the other hand, remembering its experience of poverty, slavery and genocide, does not want to come under Russian domination. It knows that economic and social development will come by looking west, following the example of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Therefore, there is a deep divergence of perspectives between Russia and Ukraine, but international law is on the Ukrainian side. Self-determination of peoples, inviolability of borders – these are principles that all UN states have agreed to, so if we allow Russia to build its position based on strength, the entire international system will collapse, because in a moment other Asian, European or American states will be able to do exactly the same thing.
Why did Russia start this war at exactly this historical moment?
This was a planned choice. First of all, after the pandemic, there was economic weakness, disruption of communication routes and a change in the US president; according to Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden was supposed to be less determined and weaker than the other presidents. It was also the moment of Angela Merkel’s departure from her post as German Chancellor and the eve of the French elections, which, as we know, are always a certain element of instability. At that time, I think, Russia assessed that Ukraine’s pro-Western tendencies were becoming stronger and more pronounced every day, so it was necessary to stop this process. Of course, there were reports that there were still many pro-Russian social forces in Ukraine, but the trend was changing. While 20 years ago many Ukrainians saw Russia as their main patron, on the eve of the war the vast majority were already looking to the West, so Russia said it could not wait any longer, because without Ukraine there is no Russian empire. .
Without Putin, would Russia have adopted different strategies?
No, this imperialist vision is inherent in the Russian elite, and it’s what brought Putin to power. This is the way it looks at the world, it sees neighboring countries as places to expand its influence, and with little to offer, it terrorizes by showing its military might. But we’ve known this for 300 years, Russia has never had anything interesting to offer from an economic point of view and has only shown its military strength. I think it was Alexander II who once said that Russia has only two allies – its army and fleet – and that’s exactly how I see it. As for “if there were no Vladimir Putin,” of course, in any authoritarian system – and Russia is one of them – when the leadership changes, there is strong instability. So, of course, if there was to be a change sooner or later, there would be a moment of shock, but I have no doubt that the idea of such an aggressive policy is not only Vladimir Putin’s idea, but that of most of the elite and, unfortunately, a large part of Russian society. The pro-democratic part of public opinion is weak and not very visible
So what are the prospects in the context of the war in Ukraine and Kiev’s uneasy entry into the European Union?
The process of integrating Ukraine into the European Union and NATO will not be easy, it will take a long time, of course, but this prospect must be possible for Ukraine, because each country has the right to choose its own path. If Ukrainians want to integrate with Europe, and they want to, they must be given this opportunity, but this must not mean a complete departure from what Europe expects of its countries. Ukraine needs to undergo deep reforms: fight corruption, de-oligarchize power, and then adapt to European law and its economic and social rules. As for Ukraine’s values, it is true that part of the country had traditions associated with Russian culture, derived from Orthodoxy and some Oriental thought, as well as remnants of Mongolian philosophy and Central Asian thought. But there is also that Ukraine, which for hundreds of years was part of the democracy of the Polish-Lithuanian Confederation. This is not just about geographic parts, but a way of thinking. Today Ukrainians, both in the West and in the East, do not want Russia, they want to be part of the West, and they have the right to fight for it.
Yes, but only a piece.
Much of it, all the way down the Dnieper River to Kiev, so democratic thinking is fairly common in Ukrainian elites and society. However, in the centuries that followed, Ukraine underwent strong Russification and then Sovietization, which left its marks. But one cannot say that Ukraine is not a European country, because its Europeanness cannot be questioned because of its Orthodox faith – otherwise we would have to define Greece, Romania, Bulgaria as non-European…. Of course, it cannot be denied that there is a big difference between the west and east of Ukraine, for example, between Lviv and Kharkiv. A difference that is, however, steadily shrinking. When I was in Kharkiv for the first time 20 years ago, no one spoke Ukrainian, everyone spoke Russian. When you go to Kharkiv now, more and more people speak Ukrainian..
Following your reflection, if there is a region of Ukraine that we can always consider as Europe, also because it was part of Poland for centuries – such as the Lviv area – but there is also, however, another part of Ukraine whose past is more strongly connected to the eastern world. Will this situation affect Ukraine’s future post-war borders?
It is Ukraine that will decide how to determine the terms of peace. Pressing for certain solutions is neither our task nor our goal. I believe that we cannot accept Russia’s armed appropriation of part of another country’s territory, as this would be tantamount to admitting that war is a tool for achieving foreign policy goals. If we agreed that part of Donbas, Crimea or any other occupied region should be annexed by Russia, we would be giving Vladimir Putin permission to think: “My policy of aggression is working, because I have achieved my goals, I will stop for now, but in the future I will be able to start another war conquest,” and he would find himself right back in Poland..
But is it credible that Russia will withdraw from Ukraine?
I understand that for some Southern or Western European countries the defeat of Russia is unimaginable, but I assure you that history provides examples of Russian defeats. Poland stopped Russian expansion in 1920. Russia has lost three wars in the last 200 years, and each time a lost war was followed by a profound internal transformation, some kind of revolution or liberalization. After the Crimean War, lost to France and Britain, there was a thaw during the Sevastopol Spring. After the Japanese War, when they lost to Japan in 1906, there was a revolution and another wave of reform. And then the war in Afghanistan, lost by the Soviets, followed by perestroika and the total collapse of the Soviet Union. The defeat was not its only factor, but as you can see, authoritarian or totalitarian states have difficulty dealing with losing a war. And if we compare Russia’s potential with the economic, financial and military potential of the entire free world, not just NATO countries or the EU, but all of Europe, the United States, Japan and Australia: we are 100 times stronger
The difference is that the Russian government can impose all kinds of sacrifices on the people, while in democratic countries, citizens are not willing to put up with so many privations.
This is true, but no one expects European countries to send their troops. When I say financial issues, I mean that we can afford to produce more tanks, planes, firearms, ammunition and send them to Ukraine. If we had done this from the beginning of the war, as Poland asked, we might have been in a different situation, but with the current method Ukraine was only able to hold the front. Of course, Ukraine is bleeding out, so Russia is in no hurry, because it is counting on the fact that sooner or later a bored West will ease the war or consider it secondary. But we can’t send a signal to Moscow that it can win against the West. Russia’s perception of the war is that Ukraine only survived because of the support of all of us. If we withdraw that support after a certain period of time, other countries will be attacked after Ukraine: if you win, you keep playing..
The fact is that Putin can do what he wants, and people will not protest because of hunger and poverty. In Europe, the price of gas has risen and there are more protests by supporters of stopping investment in armaments.
This is our weakness, because we too are vulnerable to disinformation. Gas has become more expensive, and it is said with certainty that if the war in Ukraine were to end, energy prices would fall, but why should they fall? Perhaps we should take a longer-term view and think that our peace and security come at a price. We can’t be so short-sighted, we can’t just think that today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow there must be peace and that energy prices must fall. What did Russia ask NATO and the United States for on the eve of the attack on Ukraine? For the withdrawal of US troops from Europe and the withdrawal of NATO troops from Central Europe. So what was the purpose of this, if not to further destabilize NATO countries? In my opinion, the longer we send strong signals, the better for us: it is simply a matter of determination and will, not just a matter of money. It is true that during this war our standard of living could deteriorate by 0.5%, but the overall military impact of the West could be so strong that it would force Russia to withdraw. However, we must overcome our own mental obstacles.
In this situation, we can produce more ammunition and more weapons, but only the Ukrainian people will remain on the battlefield. Will they be able to win the war on their own, even with all the Western weapons?
It is clear that Ukraine’s demographic potential is much lower than Russia’s, but it is also true that those who attack need a much larger army than those who defend themselves. Moreover, the West’s technological superiority in terms of equipment quality seems obvious to me, but we lack the determination and production capacity. Russia transformed its industry into a war economy a year and a half ago and is producing a lot of equipment, maybe not the most advanced, but still a lot, while we in Europe have not done so. We really cannot afford to jeopardize the security of the EU and NATO by waiting for this barbarian to arrive. Referring to the history of ancient Rome, it was probably better to keep the barbarians on the other side of the Danube than to fight them in Rome.
So the prospects for peace in Ukraine are dim, and if there were to be one, it will only serve Russia to buy time and then attack some other European country?
I’m not such a catastrophist to think that there will definitely be a war between Russia and NATO, but I follow the Latin principle se vis pacem para bellum: if you don’t want war, prepare for it. The stronger we are, the greater the cost of potential aggression will be for Russia, although this will certainly have an economic cost for us as well. But it really is the last call, we need to start allocating a larger budget for our weapons and deploy heavy equipment where it will act as a deterrent. We need to put strong assets on the eastern border and send the “don’t even try, because we are ready” signal with them; this will help peace
Will the European Union change direction on some important issues, such as the Green Deal, after the recent elections?
When it comes to Europe’s internal affairs, my impression is that we are often subjected to processes that weaken us internally. This is of course due to the desire to respect our values, but also due to ideology. As a conservative, I say that the ideology of the left is very strong. But there is also a third factor: there are other totalitarian states that can’t wait to accelerate the processes of internal decay in Europe. Like during the Cold War, who sponsored the Rose Brigades in Italy? The Soviet Union, of course. Today I see this destructive activity of Russia in various ways: through disinformation, attempts to weaken us internally and cause conflicts, creating discord between the left and the right, and also through migration, very important for Italy. Why did the Russians suddenly find themselves in Mali, in Chad? Wagner’s group allegedly mines gold there, but at the same time maintains control over the migration routes and uses them for its own purposes. Europe must realize that aggression is being conducted against it, often below the threshold of war, and we ourselves have financed this aggression, for example by paying Russia for Nord Stream. We must look at what is happening in the world with a vision that takes into account European interests – otherwise we will end up like ancient Rome: we will not fall because of barbarians, but because of our divisions. As for the elections, it should be noted that the right has strengthened, and voters have shown that they are not entirely satisfied with how Europe functions today. True, the Liberals, Socialists and Christian Democrats are still in power, but weaker than a few years ago. If these processes do not change, I am convinced that in 5 or 10 years Europe will move even further to the right, but I have no doubt that Europe under the rule of the three: liberals, socialists and Christian Democrats will not change the direction of its policies..
In this world, which has been changing very rapidly from 1989 to the present day, Poland has assumed an extremely important geopolitical role, but will it also be relevant at the European level?
The fact that Poland has not always played an important role in the last 30 years after regaining sovereignty is due not only to its economic weakness (now overcome), but also to certain mental maps of the West. The West did not see Poland for 200 years, because it did not exist or was behind the Iron Curtain, so it was not an important entity, and even in the 18th century, Central and Eastern Europe was not treated as an important entity. At the time, Paris, Tuscany, Milan, Venice, Bavaria counted, but not Central and Eastern Europe, until Russia appeared and began to pose a great threat. Unfortunately, even today many people look at Central and Eastern Europe this way, even though Poland is sovereign and strong, much stronger than most Western European countries. We experienced this very well during the eight years of our (Law and Justice) government, in which double standards were applied: what France or Spain, for example, could do, Poland could not, even if we were equal in the EU. This of course breeds frustration and anger, and of course anti-European sentiment resulting from the inequality. But it pushes the process of Poland’s development, which forges its subjectivity by further strengthening its economy, its international position, its military strength – with these we will be a frontier state for NATO and the EU, which will change the way it is treated by the Dutch, French, Germans, Italians and Spaniards. Poland is a large and important partner; it is a subject, not just an object.
If Trump wins, will this mean less support for Ukraine, or will it mean peace by accepting the breakup of the country?
Sometimes businessmen think that certain things in politics are very simple, often their statements are just election campaign rhetoric. If Trump is elected, he will probably try to resolve some diplomatic issues in his own way, but he will soon discover that it is difficult to practice diplomacy with Vladimir Putin, because Putin considers any concession as weakness. This is the mentality of Turanian civilization: if you come and offer something, it means that you have a problem, that you are weak, so only the forceful method works on such people. I repeat, Russia also plays on the field of disinformation, they said, “we are peaceful, we just want this piece and everything will be fine.” It was thought that they only wanted Crimea, then also Donbass, they said various things, and then denied it. I remember that a few hours before the war, Putin announced that Russia absolutely does not want the annexation of another country. We will see how the U.S. elections turn out, but until Donald Trump takes office, we cannot predict his moves. We, as Poland, our President Andrzej Duda, and we conservatives have an excellent relationship with Donald Trump, and we will try to explain to him and his entourage what the Russians’ real goals are. Without the United States, it would be very difficult to deal with this situation, but other solutions can be proposed, such as imposing more security spending on the part of European countries, which today feel safe because they have American troops, paid for by American taxpayers. And we, as Europe, how much percentage of GDP do we spend on defense policy? Not enough.
Poland is the country that spends the most in the defense sector.
Every NATO country should invest at least 2% of GDP, Poland spends 4%, but much of Europe spends less than 2%. So perhaps if European countries increase military spending, Trump will change his attitude..
What role does China play in this global scenario?
It is clear that China also wants to change the world political order. Although they are reaping the benefits of globalization and Pax Americana, and economically, their industrial production has increased after joining the WTO. China has a long-term perspective, Putin has a shorter one and uses different methods. For the time being, they are building their political power not with military methods, but with economic and industrial methods. However, I have no doubt that many in the Chinese elite see the unrest happening in the world as a positive element. China is looking at us from the outside and appreciates that the other protagonists of political control in the world are fighting and weakening each other. The United States is militarily engaged in Ukraine, the Middle East and other parts of Asia. From this perspective, if some industrial and military production were restored in Europe, we could benefit economically as well. It’s just that right now we’re driven by climate ideology: close down metal factories, move heavy production out of Europe, leave only services. And when the confrontation comes, we will find that, except for being morally superior, we have nothing to defend ourselves with, because we have moved all our production to Asia..
So is it better to buy weapons and ammunition in Europe than in South Korea?
Of course, only that there must be availability. We would be happy to buy the equipment here and now if it were available. Korea has offered very fast delivery, which no one else has been able to offer, and also this Korean equipment is very compatible with the American equipment we have. Personally, I would have preferred that we produce ammunition and weapons in Poland, Italy or somewhere in Europe, but we have made it difficult for ourselves by abandoning heavy industry. I understand that it’s bad for the climate, but is the fact that a certain steel mill is located in India and not in Romania that important for the global atmosphere and clean air?
Returning to the U.S., will there be new problems with China if Trump wins?
In my view, both Democrats and Republicans see China as their long-range adversary, just as China sees the United States. The vision that began with Obama and continued with Trump and Biden’s tariffs on Chinese products confirms that this is an all-American policy, even if the rhetoric of the leaders may seem different
In addition, in the background, as if the wars in Ukraine and Palestine were not enough, there is the issue of Taiwan, the construction of military bases by the US in the Philippines, or Russia’s alliance with North Korea.
As we can see, the security challenges are many, and in this scenario Putin has shown that war in the 21st century will not just be a war in cyberspace or space, as some had imagined. Today, tanks and missiles clash on the battlefield, while we Europeans are still, to quote Kant, immersed in a metaphysical dream: we sleep and enjoy an easy life while the barbarians sharpen their knives.