Donald Trump’s second term as President of the United States promises to be a response from America to the processes that have been undermining the country’s leadership in the world for some time, particularly the systemic challenges in international and economic relations. Trump’s return is viewed with great concern in the European Union (EU). The elites in Western Europe do not perceive this politician as a sign of a deep crisis of the liberal order, but rather in terms of particular interests. Therefore, they are looking for short-term solutions specifically regarding Trump, instead of systemic solutions that would address the profound structural changes affecting Europe and the entire world.
For many years, the West has been struggling with problems that the existing order of liberal globalization has been unable to address. It has even contributed to the weakening of countries identified as Western. Therefore, Trump took actions that can be described as “creative destruction” of the liberal order. These actions have sparked opposition from supporters of liberalism and progressive ideas. Unfortunately, they fail to recognize that this is an attempt to defend American primacy, and thus the Western geopolitical order. In recent years, Western countries have found themselves in a deep defensive position and in crisis. They face the systemic ineffectiveness of the liberal order established by the United States after World War II. Therefore, it was to be expected that a politician would emerge who would dare to confront these structural challenges. Trump is thus a “product” of history, or a consequence of the challenges faced by America and the Western world.
We do not know whether the deconstruction carried out by Trump will have the intended effect, i.e., whether it will prevent the USA and the rest of the West from facing decadence and the decline of international significance. Trump is certainly a model of a destroyer. However, it is unclear whether he can effectively build a new international order. Nevertheless, the actions he is undertaking may be the last attempt to stop the negative processes that, if continued without any obstacles, and thus in the previous manner, will inevitably lead to disaster for America and its closest allies, including those in Europe.
Geopolitical Turn
The international geopolitical order after World War II was based on a bipolar system. This was advantageous for mobilizing Western allies around America, as well as for Washington’s elites to safeguard key interests in geopolitical security. Right after the collapse of the Cold War order, a period of détente followed. This demobilized the allies, making them much more likely to question U.S. leadership. An example of this trend is the idea of strategic autonomy, which gained significance in Western Europe. It aimed at reducing dependence on Washington, intensifying competition with the U.S. in the economic sphere, and even “pushing” America out of Europe, particularly its military presence. This period also weakened the geopolitical vigilance of American elites. One example is the takeover of the Panama Canal by Chinese entities, which, in the long run, the U.S. could not tolerate, as it weakened their ability to project power in two key areas for them: the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and eventually in the Arctic Ocean as well. Trump announced plans to regain control of this canal.
The desire to control Greenland is not a whim of the American president, but an acknowledgment of the island’s strategic importance in overseeing increasingly vital maritime routes through the Arctic Ocean. Greenland’s resources are also crucial for the development of modern industries. Trump clearly wanted to show Russia and China that the island is within the U.S. sphere of influence. It must also be stated clearly that the European Union, not to mention Denmark, would not be able to stop the expansion of Moscow and Beijing in the region.
Trump has promised to build the world’s strongest military, which of course has significant geopolitical implications for both U.S. enemies and allies. However, he does not declare an intention to engage in more wars. On the contrary, he plans to de-escalate conflicts and avoid sending American troops into volatile regions of the globe. This way, he preserves resources and builds geopolitical deterrence potential. This strategy has been advocated by most American experts for many years. They argued for it in the context of American militarism right after the Cold War, which, in their view, led to the waste of resources on secondary conflicts.
Trump has also announced a significant leap forward in astronautics, with plans for expeditions to the Moon and Mars. Additionally, he is returning to the Star Wars program, which involves building a laser defense system against nuclear attacks. Again, this is not a whim or megalomania but a strategic geopolitical decision. The competition among great powers is increasingly shifting to space, and the president wants to strengthen American leadership in this domain. He may also wish to make up for lost time to China, which is heavily involved in space projects, including plans to establish a permanent station on the dark side of the moon.
Geo-economic Challenges
The main challenge is to meet the technological competition with China. This is not only of geopolitical importance (the mentioned technologies will have applications in armament and military potential), but also geo-economic. In other words, technologies will simultaneously serve as an economic driver, crucial for the competitiveness of the U.S. and its export potential, as well as a geopolitical tool. The new president has announced a program with $500 billion to support modern information technologies and the development of artificial intelligence. This will be a public-private partnership program, involving investments from the largest corporations in the sector, supported by federal authorities.
China responded to Trump’s announcement by revealing the DeepSeek project, which developed more efficient artificial intelligence models with lower financial costs compared to the U.S. investments. This example shows that the United States has not succeeded in cutting off China from the most advanced technology, just as they were unable to block China’s access to Western financial markets.
This means that the United States will face a difficult task in overcoming Beijing in the technological race, and consequently, the military race.
An important geo-economic decision made by Trump was the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, as well as a focus on the extraction and sale (including to the EU) of energy resources, primarily natural gas and oil. The goal was to reduce costs for American businesses and lower energy prices and inflation. This was intended to improve international economic competitiveness, increase exports, and attract investors, including industrial ones. This decision also strikes at China, which largely profited from the climate transformation process carried out in the U.S., although it benefitted even more in the EU. Trump’s actions are also having some impact in Europe. Increasingly, governments and political representatives in Western Europe are considering scaling back their own climate ambitions and limiting access for Chinese products to the EU’s internal market.
Another key geo-economic instrument is the tariff increase in international trade, announced by Trump. This is not only about changing unfavorable trade balance trends with many countries, both allied and powerful rivals like the People’s Republic of China (PRC). An even more important objective is to encourage investors to relocate production to America. The 25% tariffs imposed on Canada and Mexico will likely encourage many investors to close their factories in these countries and relocate them to the U.S.
The tariff policy was initiated during Trump’s first administration (2017–2021) and was later continued, and even expanded, by Joe Biden. It became a geo-economic weapon primarily aimed at geopolitical rivals like the PRC, Russia, and Iran. Trump also had the courage to apply it broadly against allies, who often quickly sought to adapt, at least partially, to his expectations.
Trump’s presidency is a response to geopolitical and geo-economic threats, and at the same time, an important factor in change. It is a response to the growing advantages of China and the aggressiveness of Moscow, the problems of so-called liberal (or progressive) democracy, and the associated inefficiency in managing crises. It is a systemic reaction to the increasing costs of liberal globalization for the U.S. and the growing benefits for countries like China. It is difficult to say how Trump’s “creative destruction” will end, which will impact the U.S., the liberal international order, and the EU. China, Russia, Iran, and representatives of the previous liberal establishment—both in the U.S. and the EU—will likely oppose Trump.
However, an even greater threat to the “creative destruction” pursued by Trump is that the destruction could outweigh the creative aspect of restoring America’s primacy in the world. Trump might open too many fronts and conflicts, which could destabilize both the economy and international relations. In this context, it is worth noting the traditional willingness of the U.S. to engage in conflicts on the side of Israel in the Middle East. Wars in this region could therefore soon escalate again.
Another problem is the limited ability of the U.S. to counter Moscow’s imperial ambitions in Europe. While China has the means to influence Russia, this would require a broader agreement between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China. Especially since the United States may already be too weak to engage in a more decisive rivalry with Beijing. For example, it is unlikely that the U.S. would be capable of militarily defending Taiwan. However, an agreement with China would mean that the United States would lose its chance to rebuild its geopolitical primacy in the world and would have to accept some form of a duopoly with Beijing.
Europe is preparing for Trump.
As evidenced by the report from Mario Draghi, the European Union has been losing economic competitiveness to the U.S. and China for at least a quarter of a century. The former head of the European Central Bank argues that the structural problems in Europe are so significant that the potential for economic growth, investment, innovation, and productivity is diminishing. It’s hard not to blame the liberal-left elites from Western Europe for this situation, as they have consistently managed European integration. They have demonstrated incompetence in addressing successive crises within the EU. For over twenty years, they have relied on the same solutions, many of which have repeatedly failed.
The main problem with the EU’s strategy lay in basing economic development on cheap energy resources from Russia and inexpensive products imported from China. Both assumptions led to a strong geo-economic dependency, which, instead of yielding the expected benefits, became an economic and geopolitical trap. Another strategic mistake was the climate policy, which increases energy prices, leads to social impoverishment, reduces economic competitiveness, causes deindustrialization, and increases geo-economic dependence on China. Another source of trouble is the currency union, which diminishes economic competitiveness – primarily in Southern Europe and France – and also contributes to growing debt. The EU and its member states are investing less and less in economic development due to increasingly limited fiscal capabilities resulting from this debt. To make matters worse, the European Union is essentially defenseless, as it has relied on the United States for security. Western Europe was indeed interested in producing some military equipment for export, but systematically neglected the ability to defend its own territory.
The return of Donald Trump as the President of the United States could not have come at a worse time. For the Western European elites managing the EU, this presents a challenge on at least several fronts. Primarily, there is a strong fear that Trump will withdraw American support for Ukraine, and consequently, the unresolved military conflict at the EU’s borders will become an unbearable challenge for militarily weak Europe. In a less negative scenario, European elites fear they will be forced by the American president to intensify defense spending and take on the majority of the financial burden for supporting Ukraine.
Western Europe is also concerned about Trump’s support for eurosceptic forces within the EU, which could undermine the legitimacy of the liberal-left mainstream political leadership. This could remove the current elites from power, who, as previously mentioned, have proven incompetent in managing the European Union. Western Europe also fears an American takeover of influence in Greenland, although, as I have argued, it itself lacks the potential to effectively deter Moscow and Beijing from controlling the island and its surrounding region.
Trump has announced the imposition of punitive tariffs on goods imported from the EU, which will likely deepen the economic crisis in Europe. It will also provoke retaliatory sanctions from the EU, although escalating a trade war with the U.S. is certainly not in the EU’s best interest. As a result, Brussels will seek to reach an agreement with Trump. European Commission officials had already proposed increasing purchases of energy resources from the U.S., particularly liquefied natural gas. They also wanted to resume negotiations on a trade and investment treaty, similar to the long-dead Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Such actions have also been announced by Friedrich Merz, likely the future Chancellor of Germany..
However, it must be acknowledged that, as with nearly every strategic issue, Western European elites are deeply divided, and often, particularistic interests are the most important to them. This is the case with the purchase of American liquefied natural gas. For some, this could hinder the achievement of climate goals, which actually means that the fight against climate change is more important to them than the serious economic and geopolitical costs. For others, narrow national interests take precedence. This is the case for the French, who are reluctant to increase imports of liquefied natural gas from the U.S. because they import huge amounts of such gas from Russia. In 2024, France was the largest recipient of Russian gas in the EU, accounting for over 40% of the entire EU import. The French company TotalEnergies is a co-owner of an LNG production facility on the Yamal Peninsula in Siberia. This has geopolitical consequences, as French and German elites wish to end the conflict in Ukraine as quickly as possible in order to return to importing Russian energy resources on a large scale.
To stimulate the weak economy, Ursula von der Leyen is planning a new major economic recovery program in the EU, called the Compass for Competitiveness. The goal is to increase innovation, simplify administrative burdens imposed on businesses, and provide them with cheaper energy, primarily through the import of resources from the U.S. The Commission President also hopes to negotiate many trade agreements with foreign partners, not only with the U.S., but also with Mexico, Malaysia, and India. She will also finalize the implementation of the Mercosur treaty. At the same time, these agreements would be made without requiring ratification by all member states. This will increase the powers of the Commission but also strongly support the interests of the most politically influential countries in Western Europe
This new “Compass for Competitiveness” (after the previous “Strategic Compass”) is largely wishful thinking and does not guarantee success. The climate policy will largely continue, though some burdens may temporarily be lifted from the largest corporations. For example, the Commission plans to allow the sale of combustion-engine vehicles after 2035 if they use ecological fuels. It also seeks to delay the introduction of new emissions standards in the automotive industry. As we can see, the mentioned adjustment to the Green Deal is not significant, and it primarily affects large Western European companies. This means that high energy prices will persist in Europe. Although the Commission mentions that the solution to high energy prices is to build more interconnectors and cross-border energy networks, this does not resolve the issue of prices or the increasingly frequent energy shortages in the EU. Importing resources from the U.S. means that even if the Green Deal were completely abolished (which is not expected), energy in the EU will still be more expensive than in America. Currently, energy in Europe is more than twice as expensive as in the U.S., and with the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, this difference will likely increase. In other words, the EU’s competitiveness will lose out to the competitiveness of the American economy.
Von der Leyen has announced slight simplifications of bureaucratic burdens on companies, but she does not speak about radical deregulation. The Commission expects member states to make certain adjustments in this regard, such as simplifying national bureaucracy. However, at the EU level, reporting requirements will continue to increase, so that the Commission can collect more information and, consequently, increase the centralization of control over economic processes in the EU. As I mentioned, the EU faces an increasing problem in financing development and investment. Therefore, it aims to rely more on financial markets, which is the purpose of another initiative by the Commission, the Savings and Investments Union. The problem is that many financial institutions are simultaneously being encouraged by national governments to purchase public debt, which, given the enormous level of debt, must be done at the expense of supporting the real economy..
The protectionist actions against external competition will also be implemented inconsistently by the EU. This is evident in the ongoing discussion about delaying the implementation of the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) tax, as well as the significant difficulties in limiting the influx of Chinese imports into the Union (a prime example was the heated debate between France and Germany regarding the taxation of Chinese electric vehicles imported to the EU). Experts predict that if Trump escalates a trade war with Beijing, Europe will be flooded with goods from China.
The European Commission’s planned expansion of trade agreements with external partners may encounter serious difficulties amid the growing retreat from liberal principles. With this attitude, Europe will struggle to both protect its market and support exports. The EU, therefore, lacks an effective solution to the crisis of liberal globalization or the systemic dysfunctions of its own economy. It remains torn between protectionism and liberal solutions, between the desire to rebuild competitiveness and loyalty to previous goals and methods of governance, which have often stifled development.
These contradictions stem from the fact that liberal values are deeply embedded in the EU’s genetic code. They were instilled by the Americans, for whom building a liberal, open European internal market that welcomed external competition was a key component of a broader plan for the development of liberal globalization after World War II. As a result, the EU is defenseless and ill-prepared for the “creative destruction” carried out by Trump. It lacks a solution to the overwhelming forces that have been dismantling the natural environment for the development of European integration—namely, the liberal order..
Conclusion
“In the short term, the strategy of the EU elites is to shift the burden of adjustments onto the internal peripheries in the southern and eastern parts of the EU, as well as to rebuild core areas in Western Europe based on the resources of these peripheries. The success of this plan is supposed to be ensured by economic and political consolidation within the EU, specifically in the Union’s core. I mean the proposed centralization within the EU, based on an increasingly stronger compulsion, such as financial sanctions and more undemocratic management. At the same time, processes are planned that aim to bring about capital accumulation in the core areas, including through the use of EU law and funds. Such actions may stabilize the situation in Western Europe, but only in the short term.
From a strategic perspective, the primary challenge for the western part of the continent is whether it can respond to the crisis of the liberal order in the world in a way that prevents it from being marginalized. Europe has found itself trapped between the revision of the liberal order carried out by Trump and the growing dependence on China. On the one hand, it is difficult for Europe to adapt to the anti-liberal revolution of the American president, while on the other, it is hard to approve of the deepening dominance of authoritarian China. In addition, there is the real threat from Moscow, which is largely downplayed by most of the liberal establishment in the EU.
Therefore, Europe is an attractive target for both Moscow and Beijing. It is becoming a less credible ally for America, which is strongly reconsidering whether it should continue to protect the security of the Old Continent. The European Union is losing its economic and geopolitical potential, and thus the ability to strategically shape its own fate. It may therefore not survive the collapse of the liberal order and the rivalry of the world’s greatest powers.”