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The US is demanding that Europe takes full responsibility for conventional deterrence and defence. For the first time in the history of NATO, European allies must assume that in case of large scale war they will not receive the support of the US Army. Although the Russian threat has been escalating for years, and the US has long communicated that it will focus on China, Europe remains unprepared for the situation in which it should defend itself against a Russian agression and support Ukraine at the same time. The only thing it can do in such situation is to increase defence spending, and strengthen the European pillar of NATO as soon as possible, without antagonising Trump’s Administration.

Three years after Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, it became clear that Europe is unprepared to face a major strategic threat coming from Russia’s agressive, revisionist policy and U.S. determination to limit its contribution to European security. Russia has not given up on its strategic goal, which is a full subjugation of Ukraine and is fighting the war of attrition, which favours the country with greater resources. It issues the maximalist demands, which if accepted would not only neutralize Ukraine keeping it out of NATO, but also would lead to complete demilitarization of the country (demands on limits on the size of the armed forces) and left it in the Russian sphere of influence (objection to any presence of Western troops on Ukraine’s territory). This would allow Kremlin to use intimidation, coercion and renewed agression to achieve the full subjugation of Ukraine. Even though Russian military is losing some 30 tousand killed and wounded a month, it is able to encourage between 30 thousand to 40 thousand people during the same period to sign contracts and fight in Ukraine. Russia is likely to meet its plans to increase its armed forces to 1.5 million active duty troops (around 900,000 in 2022) already by 2026. With the deployment of new military units near the borders with Finland and the Baltic states, Russia’s ability to threaten the Alliance but also to carry out limited aggression against NATO will increase. The deployment of troops and the ongoing expansion of rail infrastructure will reduce the time needed to launch an attack and may make it more difficult for the Alliance to assess what Russian intentions are. The possible conclusion of a ceasefire or peace agreement with Ukraine will free up some of Russia’s military capabilities, which may be further concentrated in the Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus. As the regime may be worried that NATO will finlly strengthen its military potential while sanctions imposed on Russia may lead to social and political destabilisation, the Russian government may feel that time is not in its favour. Therefore, despite the high losses Russia suffers in Ukraine, there will be an increased risk of limited aggression against NATO even in the short term perspective. The Political aim of such agression, would be to enforce the concessions on the demands contained in the 2021 ultimatum issued to NATO and the US. Kremlin demanded the withdrawal of foreing troops from the countries bordering Russia, signing of the legally binding treaties, which would limit NATO the ability to send reinforcements to the eastern flank countries and the renunciation of NATO’s open door policy.

At the same time U.S. administration is determined to limit American involverment in European security and demonstrates readiness to negotiate with Russia a deal on Ukraine over the heads of the Europeans. If U.S. decided to withdraw its troops from Europe, it would be susceptible to Russian intimidation and probably unable to defend itself effectively. Many years of being in denial about the reality that Russia is a threat to European security system and may try to achieve its goals through a major war, has put Europe in a position of strategic weakness and vulnerability, which can be exploited by enemies and allies alike. The Trump administration has the option to reduce its military presence in Europe under various pretexts. It can accuse Europe of not supporting the US approach to negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. It can try to blackmail Europe to force concessions on economic issues. It can accuse Europe of not sufficient spending on defence.  The withdrawal of US troops from Europe, may further undermine the credibility of deterrence and encourage Russia to launch an agression, especially if the US were engaged in the conflict against China in the Indo-Pacufic.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 showed that the West’s attempts to build a stable relationship with Russia has failed. Russia is determined not only to subjugate Ukraine but wants to create a system in which it would be able to exert influence both in Europe and globally. That is why together with China it aims at building the so called multi-polar international system, and tries to undermine the credibility of U.S. led alliances. As former Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov admits in a March 2025 interview (available in several languages), Russian influence has no borders. Russia is prepared to expand it until it encounters a real resistance. This is especially visible in attempts to increase influence in Europe, where Russia wants to be perceived as a superpower that does not have to reckon with the interests of small and medium-sized states. The similarities of Soviet and Russian approaches to European security are striking. Since the end of the II world war Moscow has remained determined to push the U.S. out of Europe, which is why it is in its strategic interest to undermine the credibility of NATO. After the end of the Cold War it was not interested in coperation with the EU and NATO, but rather in their weakening and traditionally has tried to drive a wedge between the US and Europe. Russian elites see the possibility of the U.S. engagement in the defence of Europe as the main obstacle to promote its expansionist goals. The U.S. maintains greatest military and nuclear potential in NATO, which provides a credible nuclear deterrent capability against Russia. American conventional potential, logistical support and technological superiority provides NATO with the possibility of winning a conventional conflict with Russia quickly, before Kremlin is able to turn it into the war of attrition, which favours authoritarian state with vast resources and greater resilience then demiocratic states. American political leadership also enables the building of a much stronger coalition than potentially any other European power or a group of states.

Europe started slowly to accept the fact that Russia is determined to subjugate Ukraine and will pose a long term threat for NATO and the EU. They had to aknowledge that the reason for war, was not the „legitimate security interests of Russia”, but Russia’s deep rooted revanchism against Ukraine and the determination to subjugate it. On 1 December 1991, in a referendum on independence, more than 90% of the Ukrainian population voted to break away from Russia. In the eastern regions of Ukraine, which Russia now occupies and recognises as its territory, this support exceeded 80%. The lowest was in Crimea, although there too it exceeded 50%. The fact that it was Ukraine, presented by Russian propaganda as the craddle of Russian statehood, took the first opportunity to demand independence and was against any form of a new federal  state was treated by the Russian elite as a betrayal and fuelled the sense of revanchism.

At the same time Russia saw the extension of Western Political, economic and military structures to the East primarily as a threat to its ambitions to reintegrate at least the core elements of the USSR (Belarus and Ukraine) and maintain ability to exert influence in Central and Eastern Europe and across the continent. The West could not accept such policy but nevertheless tried to acommodate some of Russian interests, short of approving new dividin lines in Europe. NATO completely changed its strategy and started to depart form the policy of deterrence. In 1997 the Alliance adopted a political declaration that it would not deploy significant combat troops (as long as the security environmnet remains unchanged) on the territory of the new members and respected this principle until Russia became a real threat. Despite political declarations on the part of NATO regarding Ukraine and Georgia’s future membership, individual states were not ready to initiate any practical steps in such direction, which was clearly signalled to Moscow. The US reduced its military presence in Europe and the EU deepened its reliance on Russian energy. In response Russia only increased its agressive policy. It effectively exploited the myth of the ‘betrayal of the West’, which supposedly promised that NATO would not enlarge. Even though the existence of such a promise was denied by Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian elites used the myth as a pretext for their revisionist and revansicht policy towards neighbours and the West. In 2014, at a time when Ukraine was a neutral state and did not seek NATO membership but wanted closer economic cooperation with the EU (initially supported even by pro-Russian president Viktor Janukovich), Russia annexed Crimea and fuelled conflict in the eastern part of the country.

At the same time, Russia used NATO’s self-imposed restrictions on defence and deterrence to exploit this weakness and to demonstrate that it is capable of attacking the Alliance from several directions simultaneously. As NATO did not have sufficient forces and capabilities to repel such an attack, Russia was able to intimidate Europe. Most notable effect was NATO’s rapid return to cooperation with the Kremlin after the Russian agression on Georgia in 2008. This was facilitated by effective Russian propaganda, which convinced Western public opinion that Georgia had provoked the agression and limited the Political cost of returning to „business as usual” with the agresor.

After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO began to take steps in response to Kremlin’s increasingly agressive policy. However, from todays perspective it is quite clear that there was no political will to build a credible potential and defence and deterrence mechanisms, which would prepare Europeans for quickly approaching strategic threats. A number of states continued their traditional policy of deepening dependence on Russian gas. Germany decided to build the second line of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which made it easier for Russia to send gas to Europe, bypassing Ukraine. The defence spending was increasing but not fast enough. This only encouraged Russia to increase military pressure on both Ukraine and NATO, with demonstrations of its ability to attack Europe and employ nuclear weapons, while NATO had no plans and cabapilities neccessary for effective defence. It was only in 2022, after Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, that NATO decided to adopt a new strategy, which describes Russia as the main military threat. Although decisions to approve operational plans and to develop necessary capabilities followed, it will take at least a decade of serious investments to develop a credible warfighting capability by the Europeans.

The Russian aggression showed clearly that Western policy was based on false assumptions, that by offering Russia concessions, it will be able to stabilize relations and avoid major investments in defence. The West was unable to comprehend fully Russia’s strategic goals and determination to achieve them, especially in lack of real resistance. NATO’s weakness must have influenced Putin’s calculations about the potential benefits of the full scale invasion of Ukraine. He probably assumed that he will be able to intimidate the West and dicourage it from offering Ukraine a meaningful support. Even though he was unable to achieve its strategic goals quickly and the costs of the agression may be higher than he anticiopated, he clearly expects that Russia will be able to achieve them in the longer term. He pretends to be ready to negotiate but in fact his demands demonstrate he expects Ukraine’s capitualtion. Putin may be closer to realize his goals as the new U.S. administration seems not interested in continuing American support for Ukraine. The U.S. seems also determined to limit its support for NATO and European security, because it wants to Focus on the threats from China The strategic threat for NATO and the EU could not have been more clear, than it is now. Even though European leaders had at least a decade to prepare for such scenario, the lack of neccessary determination left Europe unable to protect its strategic interests, for example through offering Ukraine security guarantees without American support.

Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her memoirs defends previous policy. In her view, Germany pursued a rational policy for which there was no alternative, while the states to the East of Germany would like Russia to simply disappear. This is a classic attempt to portray the states of the region as irrational Russophobes who cannot recognise that it is necessary to get along with Russia.  However, the problem is not the calls of the Baltic states and Poland to strengthen defence and deterrence policy but inability of some other leaders and countries to make neccessary sacrifices and investments. To develop stable relations with Russia, one cannot be vulnerable to Russian economic and military threats. For Western leader sit was easier to exploit economic and political benefits from the cooperation with Russia, instead of trying to convince public opinion to suuport costly investments in military potential.

After Donald Trump’s re-election for the President of the United States, the administration gave an explicit warning that U.S. troops would not stay in Europe forever. Behind the scnenes the message was more blunt: U.S. will no longer support conventional defence and deterrence in NATO and will provide only nuclear umbrella for its allies. It should not come as a surprise. It has long been known that the U.S. regarded China as a major threat. The U.S. strategy states that the US will only develop the capability to win a war against China, while in Europe it is to help deter Russian agression and the use of nuclear weapons.

Even without Trump’s pressure strategic and political realities indicate that Europe must be able to take responsibility for conventional defence and deterrence. The problem is that Europe needs time to build it. A rather general calculation shows that without US contribution, NATO is short of 200,000 to 300,000 troops (50 brigades), thousands of air defence systems, long-range missiles for deep precision strike, ect. The Europeans also rely on U.S. satellite intelligence, surveillance and reconeissance (ISR) and logistical support. According to European Commission estimates, filling the main gaps requires at least an additional EUR 500 billion of investment in military capabilities. Taking full responsibility would probably cost even more. As european NATO member states spend on average 2% of their GDP on defence, they would have to increase the spending to at least 3,5% to take over from the US within a decade.

The problem is that Europe may not have a decade. Russia is learning from its initial failures in Ukraine and has regained the strategic initiative. Depending on the assessment of the credibility of NATO’s defence and deterremce it may decide whether to decide for a direct military confronation with the Alliance. Moscow does not need to carry put a full scale aggression to achieve its political goals included in the 2021 ultimatum. It would enough if Russia, under the pretext of stopping NATO from supporting Ukraine, would start attacking military targets on the Polish or Romanian territory with drones and missiles and threatened further escalation. How would NATO behave then? Will Italy and other states that are militarily and politically unprepared for a confrontation with Russia decide to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (one for all, all for one)? Would NATO target Russian launchers that would attack Alliance territory, or would the US president decide that a third world war should be avoided at all cost and it is better to negotiate and accept Russian terms?

To this day, some experts are convinced that if the West handed over Ukraine to Russia, it would succeed in stabilising relations with Moscow. The effects of the policy of concessions so far demonstrates clearly that Kremlin will take this as only another signal of weakness and lack of determination, and as an invitation to increase pressure on NATO, with the risk of agression growing substantially. If there was a war, the same experts in such a situation would probably argue that if concessions are made on the status of Poland or the Baltic states, then peace would surely be secured.

The withdrawal of US troops and air defence systems from the base in Jesionka, Poland, which is used to send support to Ukraine, has increased the risk of a black case scenario. Russia may feel encouraged to launch a limited attack on the base, hoping that it will devide the Alliaince over the neccessary response.

Europe must now demonstrate its strategic responsibility and strengthen European pillar of NATO, without creating a false expectations that Europe can go on its own without America.

Firstly, Europe does not have a large enough nuclear capability to provide a credible deterrent to Russia. The capabilities of France and the UK are too small to threaten escalation or provide a credible extension of the nuclear umbrella over allies. Even though their strenghtening might be desirable in the longer term, today it would consume resources that both powers should be devoting to expanding their conventional forces.

Secondly, because Russia sees the threat of US involvement in a conflict as a major deterrent, it is in Europe’s interest to exploit such a threat and not to undermine it. Therefore, as long as the US remains a member of NATO, the Alliance should be the main mechanism for collective defence and deterrence in Europe. European leaders understand this and talk about strengthening the European pillar of NATO instead of European strategic autonomy, which can be understood as a willingness to pursue a defence and deterrence policy independent of the US.

Even if the US decided to withdraw from NATO, which is unlikely, an important element of deterrence would be a US presence maintained in various countries on a bilateral basis. A complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe is unlikley, if only because of the need for credible nuclear deterrence. Should there be a decisions on the reduction of US conventional presence, it would still be in the interest of countries such as Italy, Germany or Poland to maintain strong bilateral relations and strengthen the alliance as a whole by working to maintain the US troops on their territory.

The reduction of American military presence in Europe seems inevitable. regardless of whether Trump or another president sits in the White House. However, if the proces is coordinated in NATO and Europeans have time to fill the gaps in military capabilities, the negative effects of U.S. decisions can be minimized.

 

Wojciech Lorenz, Head of International Security Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs

 

My hands in your belt-just solve it! (1)

(I grovel, weep, I offer my eternal gratitude—just solve it!)

I

(To the Lovers of Old Songs, Including the Symphony of the Two-State Solution)

By Adeeb Shaheen (The Palestinian Storyteller) / Nottingham / UK

We are not oblivious to the statements of numerous politicians around the world regarding the “solution” to the Middle East “conflict.” (2) They tirelessly and endlessly repeat a scratched record disc called the “two-state solution.” Despite my constant disgust with such statements, today, I have decided to write this article, leaving my fate to a God whose existence I do not believe in. I will accept everything they say and attempt to refute it.

They say: “Two states for two peoples.”

Alright. Where do you propose these states should be?

They will answer, bewildered by my ignorance: “In Palestine/Israel or Israel/Palestine” (depending on the current trend), as that is the land they “dispute” or “struggle” over, with each side claiming exclusive ownership.

I will ask again: “Where exactly? What are the borders of each of the proposed states, and on what basis?”

At this point, their astonishment will grow: “Of course, based on international legitimacy, meaning the borders of June 4, 1967.”

Excuse me. I’m not entirely sure about that second idea. Although there is very little black left in my hair, I haven’t heard any official mention of the June 4, 1967 borders in what feels like an eternity.

But let’s assume they did say that.

I will say: “Alright! I will venture to claim that the majority of the Palestinian people would agree with what I’m saying, with minor objections from some. Let’s ignore them for now. “My hands in your belt”—I agree! Give us the land that Israel occupied in 1967.”

And here begins the talk of “details”—that we must sit at the negotiating table to discuss these details, that there are complex issues within these details, and that the “sponsor” of these negotiations must be a “neutral” and powerful party capable of enforcing what is agreed upon on “all” sides.

Yes, exactly as you expected—they will say that this shepherd (3) is the United States of America.

And this statement will bring me back to my senses, forcing me to set aside my delirium and begin writing what I truly want to say.

The two-state solution depends on the approval of the concerned parties. Assuming that the weaker party in this equation—the Palestinians—agrees to it, the Israeli side, which holds the greater power, will inevitably reject it, as it does both in words and actions.

This is not merely an assessment of the situation but a confirmation of facts. The Israeli political establishment, both in government and opposition, rejects the twostate solution and openly declares this to the public, which makes my argument easier.

The opposition aspires to seize power by exposing the far-right government’s failure to uphold and achieve its declared objectives. At the same time, it announces goals that, in essence, do not differ from those of the current government.

The opposition opposes the establishment of a fully independent Palestinian state and instead favours an entity resembling the Kingdom of Lesotho during the apartheid era in South Africa. It calls for “democracy,” but within a state that has a religious and racial character (a Jewish state, as it is declared).

So, what two states are you even talking about?!

The political-military establishment in the State (4) of Israel has been built, since the founding of that infamous (5) state, on a racist ideology with a religious character that entrenches the rejection of the “other”—whoever they may be, especially if that other is weak. This presents a real dilemma, as the state has indoctrinated its entire society with this racist ideology, creating a militarized and aggressive community that places itself in contradiction and conflict with its entire surroundings, all while lamenting to the world about being rejected by that same environment.

In 1993, the State of Israel signed a peace agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) known as the Oslo Accords, named after the capital of Norway, where the agreement was initially signed. Implementation began with the entry of PLO personnel and security forces—whom Israel allowed (6) —into Gaza and Jericho first, followed by an expansion of their presence into several Palestinian cities and residential areas in the West Bank.

The agreement contained many loopholes, the most significant of which, according to many experts, were:

The division of Palestinian land into three categories: A, B, and C.

–Area A (approximately 18% of the West Bank) was supposed to be under full Palestinian security and administrative control.

–Area B (about 22% of the West Bank) was placed under Palestinian civil administration but remained under Israeli security control.

–Area C, the largest portion (around 60% of the West Bank), remained under full Israeli control. These divisions were meant to be temporary, pending the declaration of an independent Palestinian state in the year 2000, as stipulated in the agreement. However, they remain in place to this day.

• Key issues such as borders, water rights, Jerusalem, settlements, and “security measures” were left in Israel’s hands “until further negotiations.”

• The right of return for Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 and 1967 was not resolved, despite UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948) and UN Security Council resolution from 1967 affirming this right.

Between the signing of the Oslo Accords and the planned declaration of a Palestinian state in the year 2000, the number of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, increased significantly. As a result, the number of settlers rose from 110,000 in 1993 to 200,000 by the year 2000.

In the year 2000, a key figure in the Israeli “opposition”, Ariel Sharon—a former general in the Israeli army—stormed the courtyard of Al-Aqsa Mosque, escorted by Israeli police. This move aimed to distract the world’s attention from Israel’s refusal to fulfil its obligations under the previously mentioned Oslo agreement and to provoke the Palestinian people into violently reacting. He succeeded, sparking the Second Palestinian Intifada against Israeli occupation, demanding the implementation of the agreements and the declaration of a Palestinian state alongside Israel on Palestinian land.

Of course, Israel rejected this, citing the “Palestinian people’s unwillingness” for peace and the Palestinian Authority’s refusal to comply with Israeli and U.S.-backed demands. The “peace process” was then put on hold indefinitely—until further notice, or perhaps until God wills it. At that time the Israeli army attacked the Palestinian cities and villages, demolishing houses, ruining infrastructure, killing hundreds of Palestinians and injuring thousands. It surrounded the residency of the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, who mysteriously died lately.

It was clear that the two-state solution was within reach (7) , but as evidenced by Israel’s escalating settlement expansion, it was never intended to be fully implemented. Instead of preparing for Palestinian statehood, Israel built new settlements and expanded existing ones on land that, according to the agreement, was supposed to be part of the future Palestinian state. This alone proves that Israel never intended to follow through with the “two states for two peoples” framework. Beyond settlement expansion, other “contentious issues” contributed to derailing the two-state solution. The status of Jerusalem, borders, security measures (8) , and water rights remain major obstacles preventing a so-called “fair and balanced” resolution for both “disputing” parties.

Anyone advocating for the two-state solution should direct their questions to Israel’s political and military establishment, as well as to the Israeli society as a whole—and they will receive a clear answer:

No one in Israel is seriously considering removing settlements, restoring Jerusalem to its pre-June 5, 1967 status, granting Palestinians control over their borders, or even allowing them sovereignty over their own water resources.

So, what are we really talking about?

On the Issue of Settlers in the 1967 Occupied Territories

In one of my discussions with a supporter of the “two-state solution,” in Nottingham, I asked him:

“What do you propose we do about the nearly 800,000 settlers in these territories?” His answer was simple:

“Let them return to where they came from!”

This raises an additional question:

Should we, as Palestinians and our global supporters, treat others the way we were treated—simply as numbers?

Would international law—which opposes the mass expulsion of Palestinians from their land—permit such an action against the settlers who have lived in these occupied territories for decades? I don’t think so.

Many settlers were born in these settlements; some are already in their second or third generation in the older settlements. Those who speak of removing them are essentially calling for the expulsion of all who migrated to Palestine since the early 20th century and their descendants.

Such people fail to understand what the Palestine concept is (9) , nor do they genuinely seek to end the bloodshed in this land.

On the Right of Return

Since we have begun discussing the rejection of forced displacement and the commitment to international legitimacy, it is only fitting that we remember those Palestinians who were forcibly expelled from their homes between 1947 and 1951—the same period in which Gaza was turned into a massive detention camp for many who were forcibly displaced from their towns and villages in Palestine.

In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 194(10) , which explicitly affirmed the right of Palestinian refugees—those forcibly displaced—to return to their homes and lands, or, for those who chose not to return, to receive compensation for their lost or damaged property, in accordance with the principles of international law.

One can easily guess what the Israeli government’s response was at the time. But for those who do not wish to speculate:

The Israeli government outright rejected the resolution, and every subsequent Israeli government has maintained that rejection to this day.

To demonstrate that this rejection is not a mere tactical position that could be negotiated from a Zionist perspective, I will cite a passage from an article (11) by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, one of the leaders of the Zionist movement:

“There can be no voluntary agreement between us and the Palestinian Arabs. Not now, and not in the foreseeable future. I say this with complete conviction—not because I wish to hurt the feelings of moderate Zionists. I do not believe they would be hurt. Except for those who were born blind, all have long understood that it is absolutely impossible to obtain the voluntary agreement of Palestinian Arabs to the transformation of ‘Palestine’ (12) from an Arab land into a land with a Jewish majority.” End of quote.

It is evident that the forced displacement of Palestinians and the denial of their right to return are at the core of the Zionist ideology. There is not a single Zionisteven among the so-called “moderates”—who opposes this principle. If one does claim to oppose it, then they are simply not a Zionist.

The equal coexistence of all people on the land of Palestine—regardless of their religion or ethnic origin—is a fundamental Palestinian demand. And, without exaggeration, it is also a universal humanitarian demand.

On Borders and Security

Look at the borders of the Arab state and the Jewish state in Palestine as outlined on the map attached to the 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Partition of Palestine, and you will understand why Zionist militias (even before the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948) carried out ethnic cleansing of Palestinians by committing numerous massacres, specifically in areas allocated to the Jewish state.

The reason is simple: the geographical area designated for the Jewish state had an Arab Palestinian majority. Therefore, any discussion about the borders of a Palestinian state must take this map into account if we aim to uphold international law.

The territories “occupied” under international law are not just those seized by Israel in 1967, but also the “additional” lands that Zionist armed militias (which later became the Israeli “Defence” Forces) took by force, in direct violation of UN Partition Resolution 181.

The fact that Arab states and the Palestinian national movement rejected the partition plan at the time does not legitimize this occupation. Even if we were to say, “Fine, let’s recognize the June 4, 1967 borders”—as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) did in the framework of the 1993 Oslo Accords—the Israeli government would still claim that it needs secure borders, arguing that these borders are indefensible.

Thus, they reject the idea outright. They have openly declared, time and again, that they categorically refuse the establishment of any Palestinian state on “the Land of Israel”!

The Real Obstacle to Peace

From the above, we can conclude that it is not the Palestinians who reject international resolutions and laws, but rather the Israeli state and its backers. The only true path to resolving this conflict is through a commitment to international legitimacy in its entirety and adherence to human rights principles.

However, in a reality where the most powerful country in the world offers unconditional support to the Zionist project and its violations of international law—including genocide—there is no solution except a global revolution against this injustice.

This injustice not only crushes the Palestinian people but also targets anyone who dares to oppose it, even with words, and anyone who exercises their legitimate right to freedom of expression.

The Path Forward: Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS)

In my view, this necessitates action in the form of boycotting the rogue Israeli state and its major backer, withdrawing investments, and imposing sanctions in all fields to force them into compliance with international law.

This is neither delusional nor utopian—it is a realistic roadmap for defeating oppression and building a free and just global society.

I am not speaking about an imaginary right, nor am I expressing desires that contradict logic or international law. Rather, I am demanding—just as the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people demand—a right that is firmly rooted in human rights principles and international law.

The only logical and just solution—one that aligns with human rights and all humanitarian principles—is the establishment of a single democratic state on the land of historic Palestine, where all its citizens and all those connected to it can live on the basis of equality in rights and duties.

“Two-State Solution”—A Smokescreen for Oppression

In short, today’s discourse around the “two-state solution” serves no purpose other than to mislead the world, prolong Palestinian suffering, and continue their displacement and eradication—all under the guise of international legitimacy and moral conscience.

And to those who accept servitude, I say: blessed be your chains.

By Adeeb Shaheen (The Palestinian Storyteller)

Nottingham / UK 6 February 2025

 

 

NOTES:

1 There is a common tradition among Bedouins: when someone seeks something from a powerful and influential person, they seize the belt of that person at the right moment. The influential person then responds, “Rejoice!”—a promise of fulfilment. If they fail to meet the request, their prestige is diminished.

2 Some may ask why I placed the word “conflict” in double quotation marks, expressing my doubt about whether this term accurately describes the situation in that afflicted part of the world. My answer is that what has been happening for at least a hundred years is nothing less than a fierce colonial war against powerless and defenceless peoples, whose primary means of resistance is their perseverance in remaining on their land, along with some acts of resistance that, at best, succeed in drawing the world’s attention to their misery.

3 This time, I did not put the word shepherd (in Arabic it is the same word as the sponsor) “shepherd” (sponsor) in quotation marks because I used it in its literal (in Arabic) sense—the shepherd, with his staff and his flock. Feel free to use your imagination to figure out who the sheep are in this picture and what the staff represents.

4 There is a state called Israel, established on a land called Palestine. This distinction, which I consistently use in my writing, stems from geographical and historical facts and does not deny the ever-changing political realities.

5  Some may object to this terminology, considering it offensive to a certain people or religion, but I emphasize my commitment to facts and information. This state, which has committed—and continues to commit—genocide and ethnic cleansing for the past 77 years, particularly in recent times before the eyes of the entire world, has undoubtedly earned that title.

6 Despite the positive atmosphere that accompanied the signing of the agreement, Israeli occupation authorities refused to allow several PLO members to enter the occupied territories, citing various pretexts—one being that these individuals had “Israeli blood on their hands,” as if the Palestinian blood that was at that time dripping from the elbows of numerous Israeli leaders was of no consequence. As if states and organizations sign peace agreements with their friends, not their enemies. As if they were merely playing chess rather than waging war and killing each other.

7This is what many—including myself—believed. However, the “two states for two peoples” concept, within the Zionist “liberal” framework, has always been and remains conditional on the submission of the “Palestinian state” to the dictates and “requirements” of the “Jewish state.” Readers can look up the statements of self-proclaimed “liberal Zionists”, who openly express their vision. Their desired level of control extends even to Palestinian school curricula, while, of course, there is no discussion about Israeli school curricula.

8 From the Israeli perspective—because no one looks at this issue from a Palestinian perspective—the dominant and undisputedly stronger party, which controls everything, is the one that supposedly “needs” security. Meanwhile, the incomparably weaker side is expected to submit to the conditions of the powerful and accept the concepts imposed from the stronger party’s perspective.

9 On the Concept of Palestine
I had written a speech, which I read at a solidarity demonstration for the Palestinian people in Nottingham last summer. In that speech, I compared the concept of Israel and the concept of Palestine.
Israel is a racist, religious state that claims exclusive ownership of the land of Palestine for Jews alone. It dictates that others must either leave or die, and those who are allowed to stay must accept this notionresigning themselves to being second-class citizens and remaining a permanent minority in the “Jewish state.”
Palestine, on the other hand, has embraced all who have come to it—those who stayed either became part of the land itself, enriching its soil, or passed on their genes to future generations. Based on this principle, everyone who lives in Palestine is Palestinian. The only condition for coexistence in Palestine is accepting others and treating them as equals.

10 See:
United Nations General Assembly Resolution AS/RES/194 (III), 11 December 1948

11 The aforementioned article was published in the Russian-language magazine “Rassvet” on November 4, 1923, under the title “The Iron Wall.”

12 I have preserved the original double quotation marks from the writer, maintaining their intended emphasis and meaning exactly as presented in the original text

 

Donald Trump’s second term as President of the United States promises to be a response from America to the processes that have been undermining the country’s leadership in the world for some time, particularly the systemic challenges in international and economic relations. Trump’s return is viewed with great concern in the European Union (EU). The elites in Western Europe do not perceive this politician as a sign of a deep crisis of the liberal order, but rather in terms of particular interests. Therefore, they are looking for short-term solutions specifically regarding Trump, instead of systemic solutions that would address the profound structural changes affecting Europe and the entire world.

  

For many years, the West has been struggling with problems that the existing order of liberal globalization has been unable to address. It has even contributed to the weakening of countries identified as Western. Therefore, Trump took actions that can be described as “creative destruction” of the liberal order. These actions have sparked opposition from supporters of liberalism and progressive ideas. Unfortunately, they fail to recognize that this is an attempt to defend American primacy, and thus the Western geopolitical order. In recent years, Western countries have found themselves in a deep defensive position and in crisis. They face the systemic ineffectiveness of the liberal order established by the United States after World War II. Therefore, it was to be expected that a politician would emerge who would dare to confront these structural challenges. Trump is thus a “product” of history, or a consequence of the challenges faced by America and the Western world.

We do not know whether the deconstruction carried out by Trump will have the intended effect, i.e., whether it will prevent the USA and the rest of the West from facing decadence and the decline of international significance. Trump is certainly a model of a destroyer. However, it is unclear whether he can effectively build a new international order. Nevertheless, the actions he is undertaking may be the last attempt to stop the negative processes that, if continued without any obstacles, and thus in the previous manner, will inevitably lead to disaster for America and its closest allies, including those in Europe.

 

Geopolitical Turn

The international geopolitical order after World War II was based on a bipolar system. This was advantageous for mobilizing Western allies around America, as well as for Washington’s elites to safeguard key interests in geopolitical security. Right after the collapse of the Cold War order, a period of détente followed. This demobilized the allies, making them much more likely to question U.S. leadership. An example of this trend is the idea of strategic autonomy, which gained significance in Western Europe. It aimed at reducing dependence on Washington, intensifying competition with the U.S. in the economic sphere, and even “pushing” America out of Europe, particularly its military presence. This period also weakened the geopolitical vigilance of American elites. One example is the takeover of the Panama Canal by Chinese entities, which, in the long run, the U.S. could not tolerate, as it weakened their ability to project power in two key areas for them: the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and eventually in the Arctic Ocean as well. Trump announced plans to regain control of this canal.

The desire to control Greenland is not a whim of the American president, but an acknowledgment of the island’s strategic importance in overseeing increasingly vital maritime routes through the Arctic Ocean. Greenland’s resources are also crucial for the development of modern industries. Trump clearly wanted to show Russia and China that the island is within the U.S. sphere of influence. It must also be stated clearly that the European Union, not to mention Denmark, would not be able to stop the expansion of Moscow and Beijing in the region.

Trump has promised to build the world’s strongest military, which of course has significant geopolitical implications for both U.S. enemies and allies. However, he does not declare an intention to engage in more wars. On the contrary, he plans to de-escalate conflicts and avoid sending American troops into volatile regions of the globe. This way, he preserves resources and builds geopolitical deterrence potential. This strategy has been advocated by most American experts for many years. They argued for it in the context of American militarism right after the Cold War, which, in their view, led to the waste of resources on secondary conflicts.

Trump has also announced a significant leap forward in astronautics, with plans for expeditions to the Moon and Mars. Additionally, he is returning to the Star Wars program, which involves building a laser defense system against nuclear attacks. Again, this is not a whim or megalomania but a strategic geopolitical decision. The competition among great powers is increasingly shifting to space, and the president wants to strengthen American leadership in this domain. He may also wish to make up for lost time to China, which is heavily involved in space projects, including plans to establish a permanent station on the dark side of the moon.

 

Geo-economic Challenges

The main challenge is to meet the technological competition with China. This is not only of geopolitical importance (the mentioned technologies will have applications in armament and military potential), but also geo-economic. In other words, technologies will simultaneously serve as an economic driver, crucial for the competitiveness of the U.S. and its export potential, as well as a geopolitical tool. The new president has announced a program with $500 billion to support modern information technologies and the development of artificial intelligence. This will be a public-private partnership program, involving investments from the largest corporations in the sector, supported by federal authorities.

China responded to Trump’s announcement by revealing the DeepSeek project, which developed more efficient artificial intelligence models with lower financial costs compared to the U.S. investments. This example shows that the United States has not succeeded in cutting off China from the most advanced technology, just as they were unable to block China’s access to Western financial markets.

 

 

This means that the United States will face a difficult task in overcoming Beijing in the technological race, and consequently, the military race.

An important geo-economic decision made by Trump was the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, as well as a focus on the extraction and sale (including to the EU) of energy resources, primarily natural gas and oil. The goal was to reduce costs for American businesses and lower energy prices and inflation. This was intended to improve international economic competitiveness, increase exports, and attract investors, including industrial ones. This decision also strikes at China, which largely profited from the climate transformation process carried out in the U.S., although it benefitted even more in the EU. Trump’s actions are also having some impact in Europe. Increasingly, governments and political representatives in Western Europe are considering scaling back their own climate ambitions and limiting access for Chinese products to the EU’s internal market.

Another key geo-economic instrument is the tariff increase in international trade, announced by Trump. This is not only about changing unfavorable trade balance trends with many countries, both allied and powerful rivals like the People’s Republic of China (PRC). An even more important objective is to encourage investors to relocate production to America. The 25% tariffs imposed on Canada and Mexico will likely encourage many investors to close their factories in these countries and relocate them to the U.S.

The tariff policy was initiated during Trump’s first administration (2017–2021) and was later continued, and even expanded, by Joe Biden. It became a geo-economic weapon primarily aimed at geopolitical rivals like the PRC, Russia, and Iran. Trump also had the courage to apply it broadly against allies, who often quickly sought to adapt, at least partially, to his expectations.

Trump’s presidency is a response to geopolitical and geo-economic threats, and at the same time, an important factor in change. It is a response to the growing advantages of China and the aggressiveness of Moscow, the problems of so-called liberal (or progressive) democracy, and the associated inefficiency in managing crises. It is a systemic reaction to the increasing costs of liberal globalization for the U.S. and the growing benefits for countries like China. It is difficult to say how Trump’s “creative destruction” will end, which will impact the U.S., the liberal international order, and the EU. China, Russia, Iran, and representatives of the previous liberal establishment—both in the U.S. and the EU—will likely oppose Trump.

However, an even greater threat to the “creative destruction” pursued by Trump is that the destruction could outweigh the creative aspect of restoring America’s primacy in the world. Trump might open too many fronts and conflicts, which could destabilize both the economy and international relations. In this context, it is worth noting the traditional willingness of the U.S. to engage in conflicts on the side of Israel in the Middle East. Wars in this region could therefore soon escalate again.

Another problem is the limited ability of the U.S. to counter Moscow’s imperial ambitions in Europe. While China has the means to influence Russia, this would require a broader agreement between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China. Especially since the United States may already be too weak to engage in a more decisive rivalry with Beijing. For example, it is unlikely that the U.S. would be capable of militarily defending Taiwan. However, an agreement with China would mean that the United States would lose its chance to rebuild its geopolitical primacy in the world and would have to accept some form of a duopoly with Beijing.

 

Europe is preparing for Trump.

As evidenced by the report from Mario Draghi, the European Union has been losing economic competitiveness to the U.S. and China for at least a quarter of a century. The former head of the European Central Bank argues that the structural problems in Europe are so significant that the potential for economic growth, investment, innovation, and productivity is diminishing. It’s hard not to blame the liberal-left elites from Western Europe for this situation, as they have consistently managed European integration. They have demonstrated incompetence in addressing successive crises within the EU. For over twenty years, they have relied on the same solutions, many of which have repeatedly failed.

 

The main problem with the EU’s strategy lay in basing economic development on cheap energy resources from Russia and inexpensive products imported from China. Both assumptions led to a strong geo-economic dependency, which, instead of yielding the expected benefits, became an economic and geopolitical trap. Another strategic mistake was the climate policy, which increases energy prices, leads to social impoverishment, reduces economic competitiveness, causes deindustrialization, and increases geo-economic dependence on China. Another source of trouble is the currency union, which diminishes economic competitiveness – primarily in Southern Europe and France – and also contributes to growing debt. The EU and its member states are investing less and less in economic development due to increasingly limited fiscal capabilities resulting from this debt. To make matters worse, the European Union is essentially defenseless, as it has relied on the United States for security. Western Europe was indeed interested in producing some military equipment for export, but systematically neglected the ability to defend its own territory.

The return of Donald Trump as the President of the United States could not have come at a worse time. For the Western European elites managing the EU, this presents a challenge on at least several fronts. Primarily, there is a strong fear that Trump will withdraw American support for Ukraine, and consequently, the unresolved military conflict at the EU’s borders will become an unbearable challenge for militarily weak Europe. In a less negative scenario, European elites fear they will be forced by the American president to intensify defense spending and take on the majority of the financial burden for supporting Ukraine.

Western Europe is also concerned about Trump’s support for eurosceptic forces within the EU, which could undermine the legitimacy of the liberal-left mainstream political leadership. This could remove the current elites from power, who, as previously mentioned, have proven incompetent in managing the European Union. Western Europe also fears an American takeover of influence in Greenland, although, as I have argued, it itself lacks the potential to effectively deter Moscow and Beijing from controlling the island and its surrounding region.

Trump has announced the imposition of punitive tariffs on goods imported from the EU, which will likely deepen the economic crisis in Europe. It will also provoke retaliatory sanctions from the EU, although escalating a trade war with the U.S. is certainly not in the EU’s best interest. As a result, Brussels will seek to reach an agreement with Trump. European Commission officials had already proposed increasing purchases of energy resources from the U.S., particularly liquefied natural gas. They also wanted to resume negotiations on a trade and investment treaty, similar to the long-dead Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Such actions have also been announced by Friedrich Merz, likely the future Chancellor of Germany..

However, it must be acknowledged that, as with nearly every strategic issue, Western European elites are deeply divided, and often, particularistic interests are the most important to them. This is the case with the purchase of American liquefied natural gas. For some, this could hinder the achievement of climate goals, which actually means that the fight against climate change is more important to them than the serious economic and geopolitical costs. For others, narrow national interests take precedence. This is the case for the French, who are reluctant to increase imports of liquefied natural gas from the U.S. because they import huge amounts of such gas from Russia. In 2024, France was the largest recipient of Russian gas in the EU, accounting for over 40% of the entire EU import. The French company TotalEnergies is a co-owner of an LNG production facility on the Yamal Peninsula in Siberia. This has geopolitical consequences, as French and German elites wish to end the conflict in Ukraine as quickly as possible in order to return to importing Russian energy resources on a large scale.

To stimulate the weak economy, Ursula von der Leyen is planning a new major economic recovery program in the EU, called the Compass for Competitiveness. The goal is to increase innovation, simplify administrative burdens imposed on businesses, and provide them with cheaper energy, primarily through the import of resources from the U.S. The Commission President also hopes to negotiate many trade agreements with foreign partners, not only with the U.S., but also with Mexico, Malaysia, and India. She will also finalize the implementation of the Mercosur treaty. At the same time, these agreements would be made without requiring ratification by all member states. This will increase the powers of the Commission but also strongly support the interests of the most politically influential countries in Western Europe

This new “Compass for Competitiveness” (after the previous “Strategic Compass”) is largely wishful thinking and does not guarantee success. The climate policy will largely continue, though some burdens may temporarily be lifted from the largest corporations. For example, the Commission plans to allow the sale of combustion-engine vehicles after 2035 if they use ecological fuels. It also seeks to delay the introduction of new emissions standards in the automotive industry. As we can see, the mentioned adjustment to the Green Deal is not significant, and it primarily affects large Western European companies. This means that high energy prices will persist in Europe. Although the Commission mentions that the solution to high energy prices is to build more interconnectors and cross-border energy networks, this does not resolve the issue of prices or the increasingly frequent energy shortages in the EU. Importing resources from the U.S. means that even if the Green Deal were completely abolished (which is not expected), energy in the EU will still be more expensive than in America. Currently, energy in Europe is more than twice as expensive as in the U.S., and with the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, this difference will likely increase. In other words, the EU’s competitiveness will lose out to the competitiveness of the American economy.

Von der Leyen has announced slight simplifications of bureaucratic burdens on companies, but she does not speak about radical deregulation. The Commission expects member states to make certain adjustments in this regard, such as simplifying national bureaucracy. However, at the EU level, reporting requirements will continue to increase, so that the Commission can collect more information and, consequently, increase the centralization of control over economic processes in the EU. As I mentioned, the EU faces an increasing problem in financing development and investment. Therefore, it aims to rely more on financial markets, which is the purpose of another initiative by the Commission, the Savings and Investments Union. The problem is that many financial institutions are simultaneously being encouraged by national governments to purchase public debt, which, given the enormous level of debt, must be done at the expense of supporting the real economy..

The protectionist actions against external competition will also be implemented inconsistently by the EU. This is evident in the ongoing discussion about delaying the implementation of the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) tax, as well as the significant difficulties in limiting the influx of Chinese imports into the Union (a prime example was the heated debate between France and Germany regarding the taxation of Chinese electric vehicles imported to the EU). Experts predict that if Trump escalates a trade war with Beijing, Europe will be flooded with goods from China.

The European Commission’s planned expansion of trade agreements with external partners may encounter serious difficulties amid the growing retreat from liberal principles. With this attitude, Europe will struggle to both protect its market and support exports. The EU, therefore, lacks an effective solution to the crisis of liberal globalization or the systemic dysfunctions of its own economy. It remains torn between protectionism and liberal solutions, between the desire to rebuild competitiveness and loyalty to previous goals and methods of governance, which have often stifled development.

These contradictions stem from the fact that liberal values are deeply embedded in the EU’s genetic code. They were instilled by the Americans, for whom building a liberal, open European internal market that welcomed external competition was a key component of a broader plan for the development of liberal globalization after World War II. As a result, the EU is defenseless and ill-prepared for the “creative destruction” carried out by Trump. It lacks a solution to the overwhelming forces that have been dismantling the natural environment for the development of European integration—namely, the liberal order..

Conclusion

“In the short term, the strategy of the EU elites is to shift the burden of adjustments onto the internal peripheries in the southern and eastern parts of the EU, as well as to rebuild core areas in Western Europe based on the resources of these peripheries. The success of this plan is supposed to be ensured by economic and political consolidation within the EU, specifically in the Union’s core. I mean the proposed centralization within the EU, based on an increasingly stronger compulsion, such as financial sanctions and more undemocratic management. At the same time, processes are planned that aim to bring about capital accumulation in the core areas, including through the use of EU law and funds. Such actions may stabilize the situation in Western Europe, but only in the short term.

From a strategic perspective, the primary challenge for the western part of the continent is whether it can respond to the crisis of the liberal order in the world in a way that prevents it from being marginalized. Europe has found itself trapped between the revision of the liberal order carried out by Trump and the growing dependence on China. On the one hand, it is difficult for Europe to adapt to the anti-liberal revolution of the American president, while on the other, it is hard to approve of the deepening dominance of authoritarian China. In addition, there is the real threat from Moscow, which is largely downplayed by most of the liberal establishment in the EU.

Therefore, Europe is an attractive target for both Moscow and Beijing. It is becoming a less credible ally for America, which is strongly reconsidering whether it should continue to protect the security of the Old Continent. The European Union is losing its economic and geopolitical potential, and thus the ability to strategically shape its own fate. It may therefore not survive the collapse of the liberal order and the rivalry of the world’s greatest powers.”

On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will assume office as the 47th President of the United States of America (USA). His presidency coincides with a period of the most intense geopolitical changes since the collapse of the Cold War order in the late 20th century. At that time, the USA was the greatest global winner. Moscow (then the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) lost the Cold War rivalry, suffering significant territorial losses and a decline in international importance.

Today, America is weakening as the leading global power, and its leadership is being challenged by its main geopolitical rivals, Beijing and Moscow. The USA and Trump himself are unpopular among allies in Western Europe. Allies in other parts of the world are also uneasy, wondering what the tenure of the 47th President of the USA will bring.

 

 

Moscow

Trump’s goal is to calm “secondary” geopolitical conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and focus on the challenge posed by China. This will be a difficult task, as Eastern Europe is witnessing the largest armed conflict since World War II, which has the potential to escalate into a world war. Moscow is militarily supported by Iran and North Korea, to a lesser extent by China, and receives political or economic support from many other countries in the so-called Third World or the BRICS group. Ukraine is backed by the EU and NATO countries.

This conflict thus holds immense escalation potential. Trump would likely seek to end it quickly, potentially freezing the front line and thereby effectively agreeing to let the territories seized by Moscow remain under its control. Another concession to the Kremlin would involve halting Ukraine’s NATO membership. Such a scenario would effectively mark a victory for Moscow and a defeat for the West, including the USA, many other nations, NATO, and the EU, which have supported Ukraine against Russia.

Even if, in exchange for concessions, Ukraine received substantial military and technological support from NATO and the EU, including the deployment of NATO forces on Ukrainian territory, it is unlikely that the conflict would be definitively halted. Within a few years, a renewed escalation could be expected, potentially including an attack by Moscow on NATO members. The reason is simple: if the current strategy of military aggression brings success, why would Moscow change it? The West’s concessions only prove its weakness, potentially encouraging Moscow to expect further successes in subsequent confrontations.

It is worth recalling that the ultimatum issued by Vladimir Putin before the invasion of Ukraine in December 2021 demanded that the West and its military structures withdraw not only from Ukraine but also from all of Central Europe and the so-called “eastern flank,” including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic states, as well as Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, Moscow transitioned its economy to a wartime footing much faster than the West, and its arms production capacity is expected to peak in 2026. At the same time, Moscow’s advantage in weaponry and offensive capabilities relative to NATO’s capacity in Europe is also expected to be at its highest.

The conflict would escalate even faster if Putin decides not to freeze the armed conflict in 2025. In that case, the U.S. administration would likely increase military aid to Ukraine, inevitably leading to greater confrontation with the West. It is difficult to predict what might deter Moscow’s elites from further aggression—certainly not Western concessions or weakness. Perhaps only further territorial fragmentation of Russia (similar to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991) might bring the long-awaited peace to Europe and the world.

In summary, when discussing Trump’s geopolitical challenges, it must be acknowledged that a military confrontation between NATO and Moscow is, sooner or later, inevitable. Escalation may be postponed, but it will likely return with greater intensity, just as it did after Moscow’s initial attack on Ukraine in 2014. At that time, the West deluded itself into thinking that the armed conflict in Ukraine could be permanently frozen. The U.S. played only a minor role in addressing the dispute, delegating the entire matter to Europeans, specifically Germany and France. These nations not only trusted Putin but later even strengthened him by effectively rewarding Russia with economic cooperation, particularly through the expansion of Nord Stream and increased imports of Russian energy resources into the EU.

Thus, the West made two strategic mistakes: Washington’s absence and Western Europe’s carefree return to geo-economic cooperation with Moscow.

The same mistakes could easily be repeated today. Trump may seek to withdraw from Europe, leaving defense matters to the Europeans. Meanwhile, Europeans might underestimate the threat posed by Moscow, preferring to seek an agreement with it or even a return to economic cooperation. Such a scenario would represent the greatest geopolitical error, as it would almost certainly lead to renewed Russian aggression towards the West. It would exploit the West’s apparent weakness.

Moreover, this would align with Russia’s official strategic vision of “Eurasianism,” envisioning a shared geopolitical space “from Vladivostok to Lisbon” under Moscow’s control.

 

Middle East

The Middle East will be another significant geopolitical challenge for the new U.S. administration. The United States is a staunch ally of Israel, and Trump himself has previously advocated for increasing pressure on Iran. The American president’s goal will be to stabilize the region, primarily by effectively ending Israel’s conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Stabilizing Lebanon would require pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River, destroying its military infrastructure in the southern part of the country, and cutting off its future arms supplies. Additionally, weakening Hezbollah’s ability to play a significant role in Lebanon’s political system is also a key objective. Israel appears to be making progress toward these goals.

In the Gaza Strip, Israel’s objectives likely include neutralizing Hamas’s ability to exert political and military influence, possibly annexing territories in the West Bank and Gaza, and controlling the reduced Palestinian Authority’s governance. U.S. support for such a plan—combined with weakening Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas, and exerting pressure on Iran—could lead to regional stabilization.

In a broader context, Syria and the Iranian challenge remain key flashpoints for both Washington and Jerusalem. Regarding the Syrian civil war, President-elect Trump previously urged the outgoing Biden administration to avoid involvement, stating, “This is not our (America’s) war.” However, the post-collapse situation of Bashar al-Assad’s regime remains far from stable and could threaten U.S. interests in the region.

An even greater challenge is Iran, despite the country suffering recent setbacks, primarily due to its conflict with Israel.

 

The Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula is another flashpoint on the world’s geopolitical map. The primary source of concern is North Korea, which continues to expand its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons and missile systems. Pyongyang escalates tensions with South Korea and supports U.S. rivals, particularly Moscow. These actions by North Korea have so far been tolerated or even approved by Beijing. However, excessive Russian influence in North Korea could also raise concerns in China and might eventually prompt countermeasures from Chinese authorities.

The intensification of conflict between the two Koreas will likely depend on the level of tension between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially over Taiwan. If U.S.-China relations deteriorate further, an escalation of conflict on the Korean Peninsula becomes highly probable.

China

The geopolitical dispute with China is the primary challenge for the Trump administration. It is, in essence, a struggle for global hegemony. Beijing aims to dethrone Washington and dominate the region, potentially even achieving global dominance. Should the war in Ukraine escalate into a world war, it would certainly have broader implications beyond regional hegemony in Europe (which Moscow is interested in). It would become a larger rivalry for global dominance between the U.S. and China.

It is important to note that Moscow’s dominance in Europe would not align with the interests of either Washington or Beijing, so if this scenario became a real possibility, it would likely meet resistance from both global powers.

During Trump’s presidency, we can expect the escalation of a trade war, meaning geo-economic disputes between Washington and Beijing, rather than a full-scale military confrontation. Trump would likely avoid military conflicts, instead focusing on cutting China off from the American market, American technologies, and capital. He would also strive to sever similar geo-economic ties between China and America’s allies, including the EU.

If America continues to weaken, especially in terms of industrial and military capacity, with diminishing ability to engage in too many regions around the world, and if internal divisions and disputes with allies deepen, military intervention by China in Taiwan could become a real possibility. In such a case, Washington would likely be unable to defend the rebellious island. This would have a paralyzing effect on U.S. allies in the region and could pave the way for Chinese hegemony in the region, and potentially even globally. However, if the U.S. maintains its geopolitical strength, rebuilds industrial capacity, preserves technological superiority, and maintains alliances in Europe and Asia, China will not resort to military resolutions over Taiwan.

In other words, China will aim to limit the geo-economic potential of the U.S., stoking proxy conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, where Washington will be involved. China will also seek to exacerbate transatlantic misunderstandings and soothe or neutralize the growing concerns of American elites about Beijing’s rising power. Additionally, China might fuel turmoil in U.S. domestic politics, including indirectly supporting further attempts at the physical elimination of Donald Trump.

 

European Union

An important element of the geopolitical puzzle during Trump’s presidency will be the situation within the European Union (EU). A strong Europe and strong transatlantic relations would benefit Trump. However, a weak EU, especially one in conflict with Trump, would serve his biggest rivals. Unfortunately, many indicators suggest that the EU will become increasingly weaker and mired in chaos.

In the 21st century, successive economic regimes within the European Union have proven dysfunctional, facing multiple crises. It has been difficult to maintain economic growth and global competitiveness while simultaneously preserving the high level of social benefits that Europe had previously enjoyed. Several factors contributed to this situation. Geopolitical pressure from Moscow resurfaced, and the United States was no longer willing to bear such high security costs for the Old Continent as it had in the past. Additionally, the economic development model in Western Europe (especially in Germany), which relied on cheap Russian raw materials, collapsed due to the geopolitical crisis. Another factor was the increasing competitive pressure from Chinese companies, which outpaced European corporations in more and more sectors. Europe was becoming geo-economically dependent on Beijing, especially in the area of climate transformation. Washington will likely increase pressure on the EU to sever its economic ties with China. However, it may be too late for such a “decoupling” (severing ties). This could be one of the factors leading to deteriorating relations between the EU and Donald Trump.

Other reasons for the breakdown of the EU’s economic model include dysfunctions in the monetary regime and the flawed climate transformation policy introduced within the EU. Regarding climate policy, it should be noted that it was based on completely different principles within the EU than in the U.S. and China. This led to a significant rise in energy prices in the EU compared to the two other powers, thus worsening economic competitiveness, lowering economic growth, and reducing investments.

The monetary union also proved to be a system limiting economic growth and competitiveness for most member states. Furthermore, it forced the accumulation of ever-increasing budget deficits and public debt in countries within the eurozone. This had negative consequences not only for individual European societies, for whom European integration ceased to be synonymous with prosperity, but also weakened the EU’s geopolitical potential and its international role. The economic and monetary union became vulnerable to crises, thereby contributing to internal destabilization within Europe. Moreover, the monetary union was a highly asymmetric economic regime, in which there were not only center-periphery divisions but also economic benefits were concentrated in the strongest member states, primarily Germany, while the costs were shifted to the weakest countries. This tendency is increasingly visible in other economic regimes within the EU (e.g., in the internal market and in the context of climate transformation). In the long term, this presents a disintegrative factor, which could have geo-economic consequences.

The response of the leaders of Western European integration to the continuing dysfunctions of the EU’s economic regimes has been, so far, to increase the accumulation of capital in Western Europe by relying on the internal peripheries of the Union, as well as shifting the costs of crises onto these peripheries. At the same time, there has been an attempt to reformulate the economic model operating within the internal market toward greater protectionism and the development of industrial policy. However, this attempt to reorient the model was fraught with serious inconsistencies due to the EU’s strong dependence on external rivals. An example of this was the German economy, initially highly dependent on Russian raw materials, and later on Chinese raw materials and components, as well as access to the Chinese market. This led to excessive openness of the EU’s internal market to Chinese competitors, as well as the inability to implement an effective policy to protect against unfair competition from them.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the revision of the EU’s geo-economic strategy in the 21st century was introduced too late, was too strongly based on anti-American sentiment, and was overly liberal toward Moscow and Beijing. It did not address the structural problems of the currency regime or climate transformation. The excessive shifting of costs to the internal EU peripheries could have led to significant political tensions within the EU.

All of this makes the European Union a rather weak ally for Trump in the face of very serious geopolitical conflicts. Transatlantic tensions, especially with the leaders of Western Europe, are not ruled out, which could negatively affect the relations between the entire EU and the United States. However, the much larger problem for Trump may be the EU’s chronic geopolitical weakness and its inability to overcome successive crises. This is likely to embolden Moscow’s elites to pursue an even more aggressive policy toward the West. This means that Trump will have to maintain America’s involvement in Europe. He will have to take at least some responsibility for the security of Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank, as neither the EU nor the largest Western European countries will be able to meet this challenge.

 

 

 

[1] NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/nato-russia-dynamics-prospects-for-reconstitution-of-russian-military-power/

[2] “The United States should have nothing to do with it. This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved!” https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1865434273953509462

 

According to Saint John, the end of the world will be heralded by four horsemen of the Apocalypse.

The Apocalypse mentions only the fourth horseman by name – Death and his companion Abyss. There are indications that the first horseman is the Antichrist, as the horsemen brought unimaginable disasters to the Earth. All the horsemen, except Death, are depicted in human form.

In John’s revelation, the first horseman rides a white horse, carries a bow, and receives a crown to symbolize conquest, perhaps invoking the plague or the Antichrist. The second carries a sword and rides a red horse as the creator of civil war, conflict, and unrest. The third, a food merchant, rides a black horse symbolizing famine, and carries scales. The fourth and last horse is pale, and Death rides it, accompanied by Abyss – Hades.

 

… “I looked, and behold, a white horse, and he who sat on it had a bow; and a crown was given to him, and he went out conquering and to conquer”.

Revelation 6:1–2, New American Standard Bible

 

… “And another, a red horse, went out; and to him who sat on it, it was granted to take peace from Earth, and that men would slay one another; and a great sword was given to him”.

Revelation 6:3–4, New American Standard Bible

 

… “I looked, and behold, an ashen horse; and he who sat on it had the name Death; and Hades was following with him. Authority was given to them over a fourth of the Earth, to kill with sword and with famine and with pestilence and by the wild beasts of the Earth”.

— Revelation 6:7–8, New American Standard Bible

 

The Apocalypse of St. John was written almost 2,000 years ago (probably 89 AD); and there are some, who think that its prophecy is being fulfilled now.

 

When you look around the horizon of the modern world, you can easily identify the riders of the approaching Apocalypse.

 

Let’s look: the rider of the modern Apocalypse is undoubtedly Vladimir Putin, a psychopathic mass murderer who does not hesitate before any crime, any provocation. Russia, a country whose founding doctrine mentions greatness through expansion, has already conquered a vast area of Europe and more than half of Asia by manu militari. Its influence reaches all other continents. The aggression against Ukraine, whose security it guaranteed under the Budapest Agreement, has most clearly demonstrated its goals and its methods.

The increasingly frequent allusions by Putin and other Russian leaders to plans for Russia to use nuclear weapons, also in response to an alleged attack with conventional weapons, his delirious speeches about “Russia’s civilizing mission,” unbridled expansionism, enslaving successive states and nations with weapons or economic blackmail: does all this not qualify Putin as the herald of the Apocalypse?

 

Another harbinger of the Holocaust is Kim Jong-un; he would be a funny, operetta dictator of a small country (although not for his own citizens) if he did not have a huge arsenal dominated by atomic bombs and countless long- and medium-range missiles. He is pathologically aggressive, in speech and – recently – in action; after all, he has sent a large contingent of soldiers to Russia, to the front line of the fight against Ukraine, as well as huge quantities of weapons (including howitzers) and ammunition; at least one and a half million pieces of large, destructive “Kaliber” missiles. All of this will fall on Ukrainian soil.

But this is only a small fraction of his arsenal: he reserves the largest part of it for regional wars, primarily with their brothers from the free part of the Korean state, with Japan and with the USA, mainly with American military bases in the Far East and the Pacific, but also with the west coast of the USA – Kim’s missiles are capable of hitting cities there, from Seattle to San Diego. Looking at what he does to his own citizens, we can be sure that if Kim decided to start aggression against other countries, he would stop at nothing.

 

Who knows, maybe the most dangerous rider of the modern Apocalypse is not the dictator of communist China Xi Jinping.

Until recently, the prevailing view was that even Chinese communists would not violate the holy commandment of Confucius, condemning expansionist wars other than defensive ones. This view, widely taught at universities, was not entirely true, because the Chinese communists had already taken over Tibet – once one of the largest countries in the world – 2.5 million square kilometers. And East Turkestan (today’s Xinjiang Chinese province) – 1.7 million square kilometers, or, if you prefer, more than a third of the present-day area of the People’s Republic of China (9.6 million square kilometers ca.).

Of course, the issue of annexing Taiwan and eliminating there the democracy, which Beijing hates, has always been present in the doctrine of the People’s Republic of China, but under the rule of the latest dictator Xi Jinping, preparations for the invasion of Taiwan have taken on a completely new dimension.

But it is not just about Taiwan.

China has begun to pursue a very aggressive policy in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, making several territorial claims, which it does not intend to abandon despite unfavorable rulings of the UN Arbitration Court. It has built several artificial islands in the South China Sea, and on them, heavily manned military bases. China is in a border dispute with many countries in the region. It occupies part of the internationally recognized territory of India, they make territorial claims (the rocky pinnacles protruding from the waters of the South China Sea) to Japan; they have disputes over territorial waters with the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, and even Indonesia.

In addition, for two decades, they have been pursuing an aggressive neocolonial policy in Africa and are increasingly boldly reaching out to South America. They are also one of the initiators of the “Global South Alliance”, which, in their intention, is to be an alternative to Western civilization.

They have a huge, constantly developed, and increased nuclear arsenal, they are quickly making up for the delays in the Navy and military aviation.

 

It is debatable whether the fourth horseman of the modern Apocalypse is capable of starting a world war. I am talking about Ali Khamenei, the religious and political leader of Iran. Iran is responsible for starting many local wars, and its regional expansionism seems unbridled. Iran has almost complete control over Iraq, has a huge negative influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah, has taken over large parts of Syria, which has become a joint Iranian-Russian condominium, controls most of Yemen through the Zaidis – a religious branch of Shiism – and their Houthi militias. It has tried to take control of Shiite Bahrain and would have succeeded if not for Saudi military intervention. Arabia itself has three turbulent eastern provinces inhabited by the Shiite minority, where Iran has repeatedly tried to provoke bloody revolts, muddied the waters in Pakistani Baluchistan, which is inhabited mostly by Shiites, and gained influence in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan… It is certainly one of the most aggressive countries in the world, and history teaches us that regional conflicts can easily escalate into global ones, especially when they take place in a region as crucial from an energy perspective as the Middle East.

 

For many years, the most explosive point in the world was considered to be the India-Pakistan border, especially the province of Jammu and Kashmir, which is inhabited mostly by Muslims and was forcibly separated from India by Pakistan. Both countries are nuclear powers, and both are extremely populous – India has already overtaken China with almost 1.5 billion people, and Pakistan will reach a quarter of a billion in the next year or two. Both countries are ethnically, linguistically, and even culturally complex, so a war between them, in addition to being devastating, could trigger a series of minor conflicts on the Indian subcontinent, from which, after long and bloody wars, completely new subjects of international law could emerge.

 

Recently, the United States, the guardian of the post-war world order, an order that is now ending, has also joined the ranks of heralds of the Apocalypse. The election of the unpredictable Donald Trump as president has incredible destructive potential. The customs barriers he has announced will certainly trigger tariff wars that could threaten the world economy. Mass deportations – the main theme of his election campaign – could seriously undermine the economy of the United States itself. His privileged, never fully explained relations with Vladimir Putin, as well as his primitive approach to international politics, could easily lead to the military and political collapse of Ukraine, the full consequences of which we in Europe cannot yet fully imagine. If it follows through on its threats to withdraw the US from NATO, it will radically reshape the global balance of power, decidedly to the benefit of China and the detriment of Europe and the broadly understood West. The apocalypse may therefore come from Washington.

 

There is another apocalypse that threatens us: the possible collapse of the European Union. From the beginning of its existence, it has been the target of hybrid wars by Russia, China, and other countries from the “axis of evil”. These wars are very effective in fuelling the activity of extremist, anti-EU forces, which are already widely present in the European Parliament. Far-right groups, traditionally hostile to the European Union, are coming to power in successive European countries. The presence in the Union of Hungary, Slovakia, and until recently Poland, the general crisis of leadership in European countries, as well as the clear economic slowdown of Germany, the main contributor to the EU coffers, make the prospect of the collapse of the Union increasingly likely. And separately, all European countries will become easy targets for powerful authoritarian forces that are conquering ever larger areas of the world.

 

So, what is left for Europe and the West as a whole? To passively observe the inevitably approaching Apocalypses? Or rather to make another great creative effort that will restore its position as the dominant economic power in the world, a military power with a huge deterrent potential?

Of course, the latter. But, for the time being, the societies of the Western world, especially those in Europe and North America, seem to be wandering not so much in the fog, which is in the thick goo of egoism, hedonism, and endless mental laziness.

Jacek Pałasiński

 

 

The Middle East on the Brink of Disaster

 

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinian territories, particularly Gaza, as well as Lebanon, remains one of the most complex and protracted in modern international relations. The recent surge in violence between Israel and Gaza, alongside heightened tensions in southern Lebanon, has raised critical questions about the strategies, decisions, and mistakes made by all parties involved. To understand the root causes of this escalation, it is important to delve into Israel’s actions—both historical and strategic—that have contributed to the current crisis. This analysis does not justify violence from any side, but rather seeks to identify missteps that have exacerbated the situation.

 

Historical Context: Setting the Stage for Conflict

 

Understanding Israel’s recent actions in Gaza and Lebanon requires a look at the broader historical context. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and subsequent Arab-Israeli wars. After the Six-Day War in 1967, Gaza, which had previously been under Egyptian control, was occupied by Israel, becoming a central battleground for Palestinian resistance.

 

Similarly, Israel’s history with Lebanon has been fraught, especially due to its conflict with Hezbollah, a Shiite militant organization formed in the 1980s in response to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006 left much of southern Lebanon in ruins, and the tensions from that conflict have continued to simmer.

 

The most recent clashes, triggered by Hamas attacks on Israel in October 2023, and the mounting friction along the Israeli-Lebanese border with Hezbollah, stem from years of unresolved political grievances, military operations, and failed diplomatic efforts. Israel’s blockade of Gaza, its unwillingness to meaningfully engage with Palestinian leadership, and its military actions in Lebanon have all contributed to the current state of affairs.

 

Israel’s Missteps in Gaza

 

1. The Gaza Blockade: Fueling Desperation

 

A key misstep by Israel has been its ongoing blockade of Gaza, which began in 2007 after Hamas seized control of the territory. Although the blockade was intended to weaken Hamas and curb weapons smuggling, it has had devastating effects on Gaza’s economy and infrastructure, pushing the civilian population into deeper poverty and despair. The restrictions on movement and goods have created what many see as collective punishment, further inflaming resentment against Israel.

 

Instead of weakening Hamas, the blockade has had the opposite effect, solidifying the group’s control over Gaza. As living conditions worsen, support for Hamas has grown, with the group being viewed as the primary force resisting Israeli policies. The cycle of violence has been perpetuated, as many in Gaza see Israel as an oppressor, strengthening the militant resolve instead of opening the door to peace.

 

2. Underestimating Hamas and Its Military Capabilities

 

Another critical error has been Israel’s underestimation of Hamas’ military strength and the extent of popular support for armed resistance. Despite Israel’s advanced military capabilities and intelligence apparatus, it was caught off guard by Hamas’ large-scale attacks in 2023, including the launching of thousands of rockets.

 

While Israel’s Iron Dome defense system has been effective in intercepting many of these rockets, it has done little to address the root causes of the conflict. A reliance on military solutions, rather than political ones, has entrenched both sides in a cycle of violence, with diplomacy sidelined in favor of armed confrontation. Repeated military operations, such as those in 2008-2009, 2014, and again in 2023, have caused significant destruction but have failed to eliminate Hamas or deter further attacks.

 

3. Failure to Address the Humanitarian Crisis

 

Israel’s inability to address the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza represents both a moral and strategic failure. Civilian casualties, particularly among women and children, have drawn international condemnation, damaging Israel’s reputation and fueling global outrage. The destruction of essential infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and water facilities, has worsened living conditions for civilians, exacerbating the humanitarian disaster.

 

While Israel argues that its airstrikes are aimed at neutralizing Hamas militants, the widespread suffering among civilians has further alienated moderates who might have been open to peace. International pressure for a ceasefire and a more humanitarian approach has increased, but the ongoing devastation continues to deepen the divide.

 

4. Diplomatic Isolation and Waning International Support

 

Israel’s hardline policies in Gaza, coupled with its expansion of settlements in the West Bank, have isolated it diplomatically. While Israel has long relied on support from allies like the United States and European nations, even these relationships have been strained by its recent actions. Calls for an end to the Gaza blockade and for more measured responses to violence have increased.

 

Israel’s broader rejection of Palestinian statehood and its lack of engagement in a viable peace process have further weakened its standing on the global stage. As a result, Israel is increasingly isolated, facing not only condemnation but also a diminishing number of diplomatic allies willing to defend its policies.

 

Mistakes in Lebanon: The Hezbollah Challenge

 

1. Escalation Along the Lebanese Border

 

Israel’s military actions along the Lebanese border, particularly its confrontations with Hezbollah, mirror the dynamic seen in Gaza: provocation leading to retaliation. Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon has only grown stronger due to Israel’s actions, which have often been seen as provocative. Israel’s airstrikes on Lebanese territory have prompted Hezbollah to respond with rocket fire, raising the specter of a broader regional conflict.

 

As in Gaza, Israel’s military actions have heightened tensions without resolving the underlying issues. Instead, they have bolstered Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon, increasing the risk of a repeat of the 2006 war, which caused widespread devastation on both sides.

 

2. Ignoring Lebanon’s Fragile Political Landscape

 

Israel’s failure to account for Lebanon’s fragile political and economic situation has also been a strategic error. Lebanon is in the midst of an economic crisis and political instability, with Hezbollah filling a power vacuum in many areas. By continuing to engage Hezbollah militarily, Israel risks further destabilizing Lebanon, inadvertently empowering the very group it seeks to weaken.

 

Strategic Missteps

 

1. A Militarized Approach to a Political Problem

 

Israel’s reliance on military force to address political grievances in both Gaza and Lebanon is at the heart of its missteps. While military power may offer short-term security, it has failed to provide a long-term solution. The economic deprivation, political disenfranchisement, and absence of viable peace negotiations have left the door wide open for militant groups to thrive.

 

2. Failure to Support Palestinian Statehood

 

Israel’s refusal to support the establishment of a Palestinian state has been a central mistake in its regional strategy. Without a clear path to statehood, Palestinian frustration has festered, leading to the rise of groups like Hamas. Continued settlement expansion in the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza have further undermined the possibility of a two-state solution, which remains the most viable option for lasting peace.

 

Conclusion: The Need for a New Path

 

Israel’s recent actions in Gaza and Lebanon have underscored the limitations of a military-first approach. The ongoing blockade of Gaza, combined with the failure to engage diplomatically and address humanitarian needs, has only deepened the cycle of violence. Similarly, the confrontation with Hezbollah along the Lebanese border risks igniting a wider conflict. Moving forward, a shift toward diplomacy, humanitarian relief, and a commitment to a two-state solution will be essential to breaking this cycle and finding a path to lasting peace.

 

—

 

In this complicated geopolitical situation we find ourselves in, Poland’s position is very important – not only on the eastern front of the European Union, but also because of its socio-political development. We asked Marcin Przydacz, former Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019-2023) and current head of the Office of International Policy at the Chancellery of President Andrzej Duda, to give us an overview of the situation from the point of view of his political experience.

 

As for my experience and cooperation within the Polish government, I originally worked as a director in the Office of the President, dealing with international affairs. Beginning in 2015, I had the opportunity to cooperate on foreign policy implemented by President Duda. I then moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I became deputy minister responsible for key directions: security policy, Eastern policy – that is, relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Russia – further transatlantic policy, that is, relations with the United States, which is our fundamental ally, and Asian policy, focusing on looking at China and what is happening in the Pacific region. During the last elections, I decided to run for Parliament and became an MP. Today we are in opposition, so my ability to influence government policy is mildly limited, but I serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Union Affairs Committee, which means I continue to address the same security issues.

The war in Ukraine: how we arrived at a seemingly unsolvable situation and what are the prospects for a way out of the conflict

Before we talk about the future, we must clarify that Russia is responsible for this war; neither Ukraine nor the European Union had the goal of reaching a military confrontation with Russia. The issue is that while the Ukrainians were getting closer and closer to the Western world, Russia, which looks at the world through completely different eyes than we do, saw the risk of Ukraine leaving its sphere of influence. If we look at the last 500 years, Russia has constantly sought to create its empire. As we know, that empire collapsed in 1991, and now Russia is trying to rebuild it. How can it do this? Certainly not through the economy, which is not its strong point compared to China, the US or the EU. So in recent years it has worked on two levels: on the one hand, using natural resources, through which it has made many countries dependent on its supplies, and on the other hand, showing itself strong from a military point of view. Over the past 300 years, every time Russia has been an empire, it has dominated Central and Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine. Vladimir Putin’s most important goal is to keep U.S. influence away from the region, as Russia fears the U.S. above all, knowing that it has more leverage with Europe, often politically divided and dependent on Russian raw materials. Also, keeping the Americans out is key to dominating neighboring countries, as is exploiting Orthodoxy. Russia knows that the unipolar global system in which America dominates is disintegrating and will become a multipolar system, and in this new arrangement Russia wants to play a leading role. And for that, it needs control over other countries. Ukraine, on the other hand, remembering its experience of poverty, slavery and genocide, does not want to come under Russian domination. It knows that economic and social development will come by looking west, following the example of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Therefore, there is a deep divergence of perspectives between Russia and Ukraine, but international law is on the Ukrainian side. Self-determination of peoples, inviolability of borders – these are principles that all UN states have agreed to, so if we allow Russia to build its position based on strength, the entire international system will collapse, because in a moment other Asian, European or American states will be able to do exactly the same thing.

Why did Russia start this war at exactly this historical moment?

This was a planned choice. First of all, after the pandemic, there was economic weakness, disruption of communication routes and a change in the US president; according to Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden was supposed to be less determined and weaker than the other presidents. It was also the moment of Angela Merkel’s departure from her post as German Chancellor and the eve of the French elections, which, as we know, are always a certain element of instability. At that time, I think, Russia assessed that Ukraine’s pro-Western tendencies were becoming stronger and more pronounced every day, so it was necessary to stop this process. Of course, there were reports that there were still many pro-Russian social forces in Ukraine, but the trend was changing. While 20 years ago many Ukrainians saw Russia as their main patron, on the eve of the war the vast majority were already looking to the West, so Russia said it could not wait any longer, because without Ukraine there is no Russian empire. .

Without Putin, would Russia have adopted different strategies?

No, this imperialist vision is inherent in the Russian elite, and it’s what brought Putin to power. This is the way it looks at the world, it sees neighboring countries as places to expand its influence, and with little to offer, it terrorizes by showing its military might. But we’ve known this for 300 years, Russia has never had anything interesting to offer from an economic point of view and has only shown its military strength. I think it was Alexander II who once said that Russia has only two allies – its army and fleet – and that’s exactly how I see it. As for “if there were no Vladimir Putin,” of course, in any authoritarian system – and Russia is one of them – when the leadership changes, there is strong instability. So, of course, if there was to be a change sooner or later, there would be a moment of shock, but I have no doubt that the idea of such an aggressive policy is not only Vladimir Putin’s idea, but that of most of the elite and, unfortunately, a large part of Russian society. The pro-democratic part of public opinion is weak and not very visible

So what are the prospects in the context of the war in Ukraine and Kiev’s uneasy entry into the European Union?

The process of integrating Ukraine into the European Union and NATO will not be easy, it will take a long time, of course, but this prospect must be possible for Ukraine, because each country has the right to choose its own path. If Ukrainians want to integrate with Europe, and they want to, they must be given this opportunity, but this must not mean a complete departure from what Europe expects of its countries. Ukraine needs to undergo deep reforms: fight corruption, de-oligarchize power, and then adapt to European law and its economic and social rules. As for Ukraine’s values, it is true that part of the country had traditions associated with Russian culture, derived from Orthodoxy and some Oriental thought, as well as remnants of Mongolian philosophy and Central Asian thought. But there is also that Ukraine, which for hundreds of years was part of the democracy of the Polish-Lithuanian Confederation. This is not just about geographic parts, but a way of thinking. Today Ukrainians, both in the West and in the East, do not want Russia, they want to be part of the West, and they have the right to fight for it.

Yes, but only a piece.

Much of it, all the way down the Dnieper River to Kiev, so democratic thinking is fairly common in Ukrainian elites and society. However, in the centuries that followed, Ukraine underwent strong Russification and then Sovietization, which left its marks. But one cannot say that Ukraine is not a European country, because its Europeanness cannot be questioned because of its Orthodox faith – otherwise we would have to define Greece, Romania, Bulgaria as non-European…. Of course, it cannot be denied that there is a big difference between the west and east of Ukraine, for example, between Lviv and Kharkiv. A difference that is, however, steadily shrinking. When I was in Kharkiv for the first time 20 years ago, no one spoke Ukrainian, everyone spoke Russian. When you go to Kharkiv now, more and more people speak Ukrainian..

Following your reflection, if there is a region of Ukraine that we can always consider as Europe, also because it was part of Poland for centuries – such as the Lviv area – but there is also, however, another part of Ukraine whose past is more strongly connected to the eastern world. Will this situation affect Ukraine’s future post-war borders?

It is Ukraine that will decide how to determine the terms of peace. Pressing for certain solutions is neither our task nor our goal. I believe that we cannot accept Russia’s armed appropriation of part of another country’s territory, as this would be tantamount to admitting that war is a tool for achieving foreign policy goals. If we agreed that part of Donbas, Crimea or any other occupied region should be annexed by Russia, we would be giving Vladimir Putin permission to think: “My policy of aggression is working, because I have achieved my goals, I will stop for now, but in the future I will be able to start another war conquest,” and he would find himself right back in Poland..

But is it credible that Russia will withdraw from Ukraine?

I understand that for some Southern or Western European countries the defeat of Russia is unimaginable, but I assure you that history provides examples of Russian defeats. Poland stopped Russian expansion in 1920. Russia has lost three wars in the last 200 years, and each time a lost war was followed by a profound internal transformation, some kind of revolution or liberalization. After the Crimean War, lost to France and Britain, there was a thaw during the Sevastopol Spring. After the Japanese War, when they lost to Japan in 1906, there was a revolution and another wave of reform. And then the war in Afghanistan, lost by the Soviets, followed by perestroika and the total collapse of the Soviet Union. The defeat was not its only factor, but as you can see, authoritarian or totalitarian states have difficulty dealing with losing a war. And if we compare Russia’s potential with the economic, financial and military potential of the entire free world, not just NATO countries or the EU, but all of Europe, the United States, Japan and Australia: we are 100 times stronger

The difference is that the Russian government can impose all kinds of sacrifices on the people, while in democratic countries, citizens are not willing to put up with so many privations.

This is true, but no one expects European countries to send their troops. When I say financial issues, I mean that we can afford to produce more tanks, planes, firearms, ammunition and send them to Ukraine. If we had done this from the beginning of the war, as Poland asked, we might have been in a different situation, but with the current method Ukraine was only able to hold the front. Of course, Ukraine is bleeding out, so Russia is in no hurry, because it is counting on the fact that sooner or later a bored West will ease the war or consider it secondary. But we can’t send a signal to Moscow that it can win against the West. Russia’s perception of the war is that Ukraine only survived because of the support of all of us. If we withdraw that support after a certain period of time, other countries will be attacked after Ukraine: if you win, you keep playing..

The fact is that Putin can do what he wants, and people will not protest because of hunger and poverty. In Europe, the price of gas has risen and there are more protests by supporters of stopping investment in armaments.

This is our weakness, because we too are vulnerable to disinformation. Gas has become more expensive, and it is said with certainty that if the war in Ukraine were to end, energy prices would fall, but why should they fall? Perhaps we should take a longer-term view and think that our peace and security come at a price. We can’t be so short-sighted, we can’t just think that today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow there must be peace and that energy prices must fall. What did Russia ask NATO and the United States for on the eve of the attack on Ukraine? For the withdrawal of US troops from Europe and the withdrawal of NATO troops from Central Europe. So what was the purpose of this, if not to further destabilize NATO countries? In my opinion, the longer we send strong signals, the better for us: it is simply a matter of determination and will, not just a matter of money. It is true that during this war our standard of living could deteriorate by 0.5%, but the overall military impact of the West could be so strong that it would force Russia to withdraw. However, we must overcome our own mental obstacles.

In this situation, we can produce more ammunition and more weapons, but only the Ukrainian people will remain on the battlefield. Will they be able to win the war on their own, even with all the Western weapons?

It is clear that Ukraine’s demographic potential is much lower than Russia’s, but it is also true that those who attack need a much larger army than those who defend themselves. Moreover, the West’s technological superiority in terms of equipment quality seems obvious to me, but we lack the determination and production capacity. Russia transformed its industry into a war economy a year and a half ago and is producing a lot of equipment, maybe not the most advanced, but still a lot, while we in Europe have not done so. We really cannot afford to jeopardize the security of the EU and NATO by waiting for this barbarian to arrive. Referring to the history of ancient Rome, it was probably better to keep the barbarians on the other side of the Danube than to fight them in Rome.

So the prospects for peace in Ukraine are dim, and if there were to be one, it will only serve Russia to buy time and then attack some other European country?

I’m not such a catastrophist to think that there will definitely be a war between Russia and NATO, but I follow the Latin principle se vis pacem para bellum: if you don’t want war, prepare for it. The stronger we are, the greater the cost of potential aggression will be for Russia, although this will certainly have an economic cost for us as well. But it really is the last call, we need to start allocating a larger budget for our weapons and deploy heavy equipment where it will act as a deterrent. We need to put strong assets on the eastern border and send the “don’t even try, because we are ready” signal with them; this will help peace

Will the European Union change direction on some important issues, such as the Green Deal, after the recent elections?

When it comes to Europe’s internal affairs, my impression is that we are often subjected to processes that weaken us internally. This is of course due to the desire to respect our values, but also due to ideology. As a conservative, I say that the ideology of the left is very strong. But there is also a third factor: there are other totalitarian states that can’t wait to accelerate the processes of internal decay in Europe. Like during the Cold War, who sponsored the Rose Brigades in Italy? The Soviet Union, of course. Today I see this destructive activity of Russia in various ways: through disinformation, attempts to weaken us internally and cause conflicts, creating discord between the left and the right, and also through migration, very important for Italy. Why did the Russians suddenly find themselves in Mali, in Chad? Wagner’s group allegedly mines gold there, but at the same time maintains control over the migration routes and uses them for its own purposes. Europe must realize that aggression is being conducted against it, often below the threshold of war, and we ourselves have financed this aggression, for example by paying Russia for Nord Stream. We must look at what is happening in the world with a vision that takes into account European interests – otherwise we will end up like ancient Rome: we will not fall because of barbarians, but because of our divisions. As for the elections, it should be noted that the right has strengthened, and voters have shown that they are not entirely satisfied with how Europe functions today. True, the Liberals, Socialists and Christian Democrats are still in power, but weaker than a few years ago. If these processes do not change, I am convinced that in 5 or 10 years Europe will move even further to the right, but I have no doubt that Europe under the rule of the three: liberals, socialists and Christian Democrats will not change the direction of its policies..

In this world, which has been changing very rapidly from 1989 to the present day, Poland has assumed an extremely important geopolitical role, but will it also be relevant at the European level?

The fact that Poland has not always played an important role in the last 30 years after regaining sovereignty is due not only to its economic weakness (now overcome), but also to certain mental maps of the West. The West did not see Poland for 200 years, because it did not exist or was behind the Iron Curtain, so it was not an important entity, and even in the 18th century, Central and Eastern Europe was not treated as an important entity. At the time, Paris, Tuscany, Milan, Venice, Bavaria counted, but not Central and Eastern Europe, until Russia appeared and began to pose a great threat. Unfortunately, even today many people look at Central and Eastern Europe this way, even though Poland is sovereign and strong, much stronger than most Western European countries. We experienced this very well during the eight years of our (Law and Justice) government, in which double standards were applied: what France or Spain, for example, could do, Poland could not, even if we were equal in the EU. This of course breeds frustration and anger, and of course anti-European sentiment resulting from the inequality. But it pushes the process of Poland’s development, which forges its subjectivity by further strengthening its economy, its international position, its military strength – with these we will be a frontier state for NATO and the EU, which will change the way it is treated by the Dutch, French, Germans, Italians and Spaniards. Poland is a large and important partner; it is a subject, not just an object.

If Trump wins, will this mean less support for Ukraine, or will it mean peace by accepting the breakup of the country?

Sometimes businessmen think that certain things in politics are very simple, often their statements are just election campaign rhetoric. If Trump is elected, he will probably try to resolve some diplomatic issues in his own way, but he will soon discover that it is difficult to practice diplomacy with Vladimir Putin, because Putin considers any concession as weakness. This is the mentality of Turanian civilization: if you come and offer something, it means that you have a problem, that you are weak, so only the forceful method works on such people. I repeat, Russia also plays on the field of disinformation, they said, “we are peaceful, we just want this piece and everything will be fine.” It was thought that they only wanted Crimea, then also Donbass, they said various things, and then denied it. I remember that a few hours before the war, Putin announced that Russia absolutely does not want the annexation of another country. We will see how the U.S. elections turn out, but until Donald Trump takes office, we cannot predict his moves. We, as Poland, our President Andrzej Duda, and we conservatives have an excellent relationship with Donald Trump, and we will try to explain to him and his entourage what the Russians’ real goals are. Without the United States, it would be very difficult to deal with this situation, but other solutions can be proposed, such as imposing more security spending on the part of European countries, which today feel safe because they have American troops, paid for by American taxpayers. And we, as Europe, how much percentage of GDP do we spend on defense policy? Not enough.

Poland is the country that spends the most in the defense sector.

Every NATO country should invest at least 2% of GDP, Poland spends 4%, but much of Europe spends less than 2%. So perhaps if European countries increase military spending, Trump will change his attitude..

What role does China play in this global scenario?

It is clear that China also wants to change the world political order. Although they are reaping the benefits of globalization and Pax Americana, and economically, their industrial production has increased after joining the WTO. China has a long-term perspective, Putin has a shorter one and uses different methods. For the time being, they are building their political power not with military methods, but with economic and industrial methods. However, I have no doubt that many in the Chinese elite see the unrest happening in the world as a positive element. China is looking at us from the outside and appreciates that the other protagonists of political control in the world are fighting and weakening each other. The United States is militarily engaged in Ukraine, the Middle East and other parts of Asia. From this perspective, if some industrial and military production were restored in Europe, we could benefit economically as well. It’s just that right now we’re driven by climate ideology: close down metal factories, move heavy production out of Europe, leave only services. And when the confrontation comes, we will find that, except for being morally superior, we have nothing to defend ourselves with, because we have moved all our production to Asia..

So is it better to buy weapons and ammunition in Europe than in South Korea?

Of course, only that there must be availability. We would be happy to buy the equipment here and now if it were available. Korea has offered very fast delivery, which no one else has been able to offer, and also this Korean equipment is very compatible with the American equipment we have. Personally, I would have preferred that we produce ammunition and weapons in Poland, Italy or somewhere in Europe, but we have made it difficult for ourselves by abandoning heavy industry. I understand that it’s bad for the climate, but is the fact that a certain steel mill is located in India and not in Romania that important for the global atmosphere and clean air?

Returning to the U.S., will there be new problems with China if Trump wins?

In my view, both Democrats and Republicans see China as their long-range adversary, just as China sees the United States. The vision that began with Obama and continued with Trump and Biden’s tariffs on Chinese products confirms that this is an all-American policy, even if the rhetoric of the leaders may seem different

In addition, in the background, as if the wars in Ukraine and Palestine were not enough, there is the issue of Taiwan, the construction of military bases by the US in the Philippines, or Russia’s alliance with North Korea.

As we can see, the security challenges are many, and in this scenario Putin has shown that war in the 21st century will not just be a war in cyberspace or space, as some had imagined. Today, tanks and missiles clash on the battlefield, while we Europeans are still, to quote Kant, immersed in a metaphysical dream: we sleep and enjoy an easy life while the barbarians sharpen their knives.

 

From a political point of view, it was the most intense beginning of summer in many decades.

We had a thriller in the form of unexpected, dramatic and potentially very dangerous elections in France, elections in Great Britain, which open new, promising prospects for this country and its allies, and presidential elections in Iran, for which the West has had high hopes. Than it should be included a significant change in the balance of power in the European Parliament and the Washington NATO summit chaired by the US president, who is under fire. Yes, this month, from the European elections to the NATO summit, was extremely intense.

 

 

 

FRANCE

Choosing between plague and cholera, the French chose cholera. Even though Putin was betting heavily on the plague, he still had cholera up his sleeve.

In the New Popular Front, the winner of these elections, the most votes were won by the ultra-populist and ultra-communist ‘La France Insumise’ party of Jean-Luc Melenchon, whom Putin loves as much as Marine Le Pen. Melenchon convened his last pre-election rally in the banlieue of Champigny-sur-Marne near Paris, or more precisely in Lenin Square, where the Resistance Museum is located.

Melenchon was also the first to react to the sensational election results. Although he expressed relief that the fascist party did not win, he devoted most of his speech to attacking Emmanuel Macron and his ‘Ensemble’ coalition. He announced that his group did not intend to enter into any agreements with the presidential camp, which is responsible for the terrible misfortunes that he allegedly brought to France.

Meanwhile, all political forces of the center and moderate right wing swear with one voice that they will never enter into any coalition with Jean-Luc Melenchon.

The problem is that Melenchon cannot be isolated definitively: the next presidential election is at stake. Marine Le Pen will probably run again and will have a better chance of winning than ever. On the democratic side, there is no personality of Macron’s stature who would be able to oppose her in the second round, or even in the direct pre-election debate. Therefore, to defeat Marine Le Pen, all anti-fascist voices will be needed, including the voice of Melenchon and his party.

 

Since June 9, that is, the day of the elections to the European Parliament, all media on both sides of the Atlantic, have unanimously criticized Emanuel Macron. “What did this man do? “He’s handing France over to the fascists!” – screamed the headlines.

And basically no one appeared to repent of all the nonsense they wrote about Macron.

Because it turns out that the biggest winner of the French elections was Emmanuel Macron. Not only he did prevent the far-right Rassemblement National from coming to power, but he brought his own political camp, seemingly doomed to extinction, to the second place in the country.

He bet that most of the third and fourth place candidates would withdraw in the second round so that their votes would go to the democratic candidate with a better chance of winning over the RN candidates – and he won. He rightly hoped that this mechanism, which had already saved France several times from the Le Pen family and its supporters, would work again.

But the final victory will only be decided by inter-party negotiations on the appointment of a new government: will it be possible to create a cabinet that will include neither Lepenists nor Melenchon’s supporters?

 

If the biggest winner was Emmanuel Macron, then the biggest loser was Vladimir Putin. Its ultimate goal is to destroy common Europe: this is the only way to reduce its individual countries to the role of vassals. The victory of the French extreme right, supported by him until the last moment, could bring this goal much closer; a fascist France could cause a domino effect in Europe, starting with Germany, where neofascists are also climbing to power.

“The parliamentary elections in France did not really resemble democracy” – this is how Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented scathingly on the election results.

Moscow, although who has excellent analysts of international affairs, did not take into account the possibility of 244 candidates withdrawing in the second round. “Clearly, the second round was aimed precisely at manipulating the will of voters expressed in the first round,” Lavrov said. – And if the result of the first round served as the basis for creating a parliament, there would be very serious changes in France,” he added, disappointed. His ministry failed this time.

 

Keeping the fascists out of the sphere of power was the result of the extraordinary mobilization of the French people. In France happened something similar as on October 15, 2023 in Poland. Mass mobilization for democracy, for human rights, for tolerance, for a common Europe, for the transatlantic alliance, for the victory of Western values over the “values” with which China and Russia are trying to nourish the world.

And if it were not for this mobilization of the French, their chances of imposing their vision of illiberal autocracy on almost the entire world would be much greater.

 

It is not yet known how the fate of France will unfold, what government will rule, what political arrangements will dominate the country of Descartes and Montesquieu, but for the time being we should all be happy: Europe has been saved.

The only large country where fascists rule is Italy. However, Georgia Meloni’s Italia will not be able to cause a domino effect; we saw this clearly during the competition for the new shape of far-right clubs in the European Parliament.

Orban’s Hungary and Fico’s Slovakia do not count in serious European competitions. The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, where the right wing is growing in strength, will also not be able to shake the foundations of the European Union.

Germany, which is threatened by neofascism, just like France, will have one more argument to vote for democracy in the next elections.

So: Europe as we know and love; Europe, which is our hope for peace and prosperity, will remain the Europe we want.

 

For it to remain so, Poles must also play a constructive role.

The party that destroyed Poland for 8 years, isolated it in the international arena and objectively acted in favour of the Kremlin’s strategic goals, still remains a powerful political force. The justice system alone will not make her return to the political open-air museum, the place where it belongs. Poles must accept the vaccine: the vaccine of democracy, so that it permanently enters their bloodstream.

 

Europe still faces enormous challenges. The first is the war in Ukraine. It is in the vital interest of the whole world that Ukraine wins and Russia loses; this Russia of Putin, which is beyond repair, this Russia must be destroyed and rebuilt on completely new foundations. Foundations to which part of Russian society undoubtedly aspires.

The second gigantic, epoch-making challenge Europe is facing is the climate and its protection. We observe climate change almost every day also in what was once called “temperate” climate. But anyone who watches TV news or looks on the Internet can see the terrifying changes taking place in countries closer to the equator. Temperatures reaching 50 degrees Celsius were once very rare; today they are part of everyday life. Some experts say that before 2050, at least one and a half billion human beings will be forced to leave their places of residence and move closer to the poles. Just to survive.

And this is the third gigantic challenge Europe and the entire West are facing: immigration. For many, many decades we have been hearing that the problem of immigration should be solved at its sources, that is, in the countries from which this immigration comes. So far, it’s all been words, empty words. It’s time for this dramatic truth to reach every citizen of the European Union and for them to give a mandate to their politicians to stop talking and start acting, because if not, in a few or a dozen years, these problems will become a matter of life or death for all of us.

 

 

UNITED KINGDOM

On July 4, 2024, in the United Kingdom, citizens elected 650 members of parliament to the House of Commons. With an overwhelming majority, the opposition Labor Party, led by Keir Starmer, defeated the Conservative Party, which had been in power for 14 years, led by Rishi Sunak.

It has a total of 411 seats, which is 174 more than the Tories and 211 more than in the previous general election in 2019, but – what few people noticed – it received fewer votes than 5 years ago.

The Conservative Party currently has 121 seats in the House of Commons, which means it lost 251 of them. It received only 23.7 percent of the vote, which is the worst result in its history. Twelve ministers of the outgoing cabinet and former Prime Minister Liz Truss were not elected. The Tories also lost all their seats in Wales.

Smaller parties performed well in the election, partly due to tactical voting against the Conservatives. Ed Davey’s Liberal Democrats achieved their best result ever, winning 72 seats. The result of the far-right “Reform UK” party, established ad hoc by Nigel Farage, may be worrying: it achieved the third largest number of votes, but thanks to the unique British ‘First-past-the-post’ voting system, it introduced only five MPs to the House of Commons, but they will certainly be regularly bring chaos to her work.

 

For the first time in British history, a woman, Mrs Rachel Reeves, became Chancellor of the Exchequer, i.e. Minister of Finance and Budget. They call her the “Iron Lady” of the Labor Party because she has ideas like Margaret Thatcher, such as “no tax cuts without justification, we are not Tories” and “the British will not live on subsidies with me”. She is considered a ruthless strategic mind; after all, she was the British Under-14 Chess Champion.

Born in London, the 45-year-old inherits an economy and finances that have been plagued in recent years by Covid, war and the disastrous policies of Conservatives such as Liz Truss.

Rachel Reeves, from a left-wing teaching family, joined the Labor Party at the age of 16. Her sister Ellie, who is a year younger than her, also belongs to the same party.

Married, with two children, a self-confessed nerd – “I even studied at school during lunch breaks” – she graduated in political science, then economics at Oxford and the London School of Economics.

One of Reeves’ greatest achievements is convincing business that the Labor Party, after getting rid of old leader Jeremy Corbyn, is a business-friendly party. A few months ago, it even withdrew from the project of limiting bankers’ bonuses “because the economy needs stability.”

The second important woman in Starmer’s cabinet is Angela Rayner. The “Red Queen” – as Tory Lord Ashcroft called her – is the Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as well as the Minister for Equal Opportunities. She is 44 years old, born and raised on the outskirts of Manchester, in a very poor family. An aggressive father, a mother with bipolar disorder who constantly talks about suicide. “The motto was to survive,” Rayner said.

She loves sweatshirts, junk food, beer and cocktails, and has a weakness for eccentric shoes, because: “My father kicked me out of the house at the age of 15 when I got pregnant during my first intercourse and I didn’t want an abortion: this child was the only revenge of my life. From then on, whenever I made some money, I spent it all on shoes.”

She left school at 16, began a trade union career and then joined the Labor Party. Former blue collar Angela now has three children, and in 2017, at the age of 37, she also became a grandmother.

Two years ago, Starmer wanted to dismiss her because she was impossible to discipline. In the end, Rayner stayed, fortunately for Sir Keir. Because she is a working-class heroine in the Midlands and, generally, within the white North of England, wherever a language spoken is different than in London. Without Rayner, the Labor Party could have collapsed, so many of its supporters attract.

Finally, there is Sue Gray, 67, new chief of staff and pub owner in Northern Ireland. She will be a true eminence grise (as her name suggests) and Starmer’s “enforcer”. The Whitehall veteran already has 20 government bills ready. But most of all, Sue Gray was a permanent secretary in the Johnson government. She led the internal investigation into Downing Street’s Partygate scandal and destroyed “BoJo’s” career. A few months later, Gray was recruited by Starmer, leading to speculation that Johnson’s downfall may have been the result of a Starmer conspiracy.

 

The first moves of the Labor government are quite ambiguous. For example, the newly appointed UK Defense Secretary John Healey immediately went to Kiev to meet his Ukrainian counterpart Rustem Umerov in Odessa. He reaffirmed all commitments made by Rishi Sunak’s government to Ukraine, including recent promises to provide Kiev with military aid worth £3 billion a year.

Keir Starmer himself called Volodymyr Zelensky immediately after the royal nomination to assure him that the defence of Ukraine remains the UK’s unwavering priority.

The newBritish foreign minister, David Lindon Lammy, immediately after his appointment set off on a journey that took him to Paris, Berlin and … Chobielin, i.e. to Radosław Sikorski’s private house near Bydgoszcz, from where he went to Sweden.

On the other hand, Keir Starmer told Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that recognizing a Palestinian state is the indisputable right of his people. The election manifesto committed Labor to recognizing a Palestinian state as part of a process that would lead to a “two-state solution.”

Labor suffered significant electoral defeats in areas with large Muslim populations due to dissatisfaction with its position on Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip.

But this will certainly weaken the UK’s relationship with Israel and, consequently, will do nothing to reduce tensions in the Middle East.

Starmer also rushed to assure that his country’s re-membership of the European Union was out of the question, although he added that he would like to strengthen cooperation with Bussels and individual EU member states.

In any case, the dramatic change in the majority in Westminster and the change of decision-makers in Downing Street and Whitehall do not change the principles of British foreign policy, which undoubtedly contributes to strengthening global stability.

 

 

 

IRAN

The new president of Iran is Massoud Pezeshkian, 69, the first “reformer” since Mohammad Khatami in 2005.

A few days old beard, a blue jacket and a light blue shirt, a modest and conciliatory character, he defeated the ultra-conservative “hawk” Saced Jalilli, winning being 53% of the votes in the second round, in which the turnout was just under 50%.

This means that most Iranians want democratic reforms and reject elections in which candidates are chosen in advance by the ayatollahs.

The new president is a medic, comes from Mahabad in northwestern Iran, has an Armenian surname, an Azerbaijani father and a Kurdish mother, was quite popular among citizens of abused and repressed minorities, but did not gain any particular respect at the national level. Although he was not particularly charismatic, over the weeks he gained popularity also thanks to the support of historical reformers such as Mohammad Khatami and Ali Mohamed Karroubi.

“We will extend a hand of friendship to everyone, even to our opponents”, he announced shortly after the election results were announced. He completed his studies during the Iran-Iraq war and was a soldier and doctor on the front. Pezeshkian is a cardiac surgeon and headed the Tabriz Medical University. He has something in common with Joe Biden: in 1994, he lost his wife Fatemeh Majidi and his daughter in a car accident. He never remarried and raised his remaining children alone: two sons and a daughter. He was health minister under Khatami.

Pezeshkian was never concerned about the corruption and abuses rampant in the Iranian political system, which helped convince some of the regime’s undecided supporters. He is not a radical, he follows the footsteps of the Islamic republic and its basic principles.

When Mahsa Amini died, tortured to death by religious police, he wrote on Twitter the next day: “In an Islamic republic, it is unacceptable to arrest a girl for not wearing a hijab and then hand over the body to her family.” However, a few days later, as the protests intensified, he changed his mind and wrote that “young people by insulting the supreme leader will not cause anything but lasting anger and hatred in society.” He also paid public tribute to the Revolutionary Guard by wearing their uniform in parliament.

It does not propose constitutional reforms, it supports certain reform initiatives, without repudiating the regime establishment and ayatollahs.

When it comes to civil and social rights, such as the obligation to wear the hijab, he promises tolerance. He certainly doesn’t want to abolish the obligation to wear one, but perhaps he wants to loosen the control of the religious police a bit. It also proposes greater openness in access to the Internet.

His team consists of economic liberals, and a good half of them are pro-Western. They would like Iran to be re-admitted to the FAFT (The Financial Action Task Force) financial systems, i.e. to carry out transparency reforms, which have always been rejected by ultra-conservatives, and to resume dialogue with the West in order to at least partially remove sanctions.

Unfortunately, it is no coincidence that the first to call Pezeshkan with congratulations was Vladimir Putin, concerned about Iran’s possible turn to the West after the season of ultra-conservative Raisi, who filled Russian arsenals and weapons factories with drones.

But a doctor born in a theocracy will tend to oscillate between the East and the West. Pursuing such a policy will not be easy. He will have to deal with a parliament dominated by religious extremists and move within the boundaries imposed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Pasdarans, the real decision-makers of Iran’s foreign and security policy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE ALT RIGHT IS UNITED, MELONI END KACZYNSKI ARE OUT

Victor Orban, the nationalist and pro-Russian Prime Minister of Hungary, announced on June 30 his intention to create a group in the EU parliament called “Patriots for Europe”, and today this right-wing political movement already has enough members not only to create a separate group in the EP, but to be its third force. Its goal is to “change European politics”.

As we know, to create a separate political club in the European Parliament, you need at least 23 MPs from 7 different countries. And assembling such a team went surprisingly quickly for Orban, considering that he had terminated all previous alliances.

Because it wasn’t supposed to be this way.

Giorgia Meloni was to become the leader of the entire European right. Back in May, no one questioned her leadership. Her relations with Orban were idyllic, she received him with honors and made him understand that he could become the ‘de nomine’ head of her “European Conservatives and Reformists” group, (and the de facto leader would be her: Giorgia Meloni).

Orban entered into a strategic alliance with PiS before Jarosław Kaczyński’s party came to power. Kaczyński and his people often dreamed of having “as much Budapest as possible in Warsaw.”

And Orban was stuck with his Fidesz in the Christian Democrat club of the European People’s Party until the latter, due to his frequent violations of democratic principles, started the process of expelling his party; he then decided to leave the EPP himself and has remained “homeless” since then.

It seemed obvious that it would go to EKR, which it brought together most of the European far-right groups. But the fact that the leader of this group, Giorgia Meloni, accepted ultranationalists from Romania into the ECR and demanded that Orban join the pro-Ukrainian front meant that Orban began to be perceived as a candidate to join the second large club in the EP: “Identity and Democracy”, which was dominated by Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and the German, neo-fascist AfD.

Nothing came of it, also because Marine Le Pen expelled the AfD from the group after its main candidate’s statements that “there were not only criminals in the SS.” This seemed to favour the ECR, especially since shortly before the European elections Giorgia Meloni and Marine Le Pen seemed to have reached an agreement on building one strong far-right grouping.

 

And then it only got worse. At the EU summit, Donald Tusk with one sentence extinguished Giorgia Meloni’s hopes of playing any role in forming the new European Commission and obtaining at least a few key positions for the ECR, and then Victor Orban put the nail in her coffin when he founded in Vienna, together with the Austrian, the far-right Freedom Party (FPOe) and the populist ANO of former Czech Prime Minister Andrzej Babis, the “Patriots for Europe” group.

Soon they were joined by the Danish People’s Party and the Flemish nationalist independence group Vlaams Belang, the PVV Freedom party of Dutch politician Geert Wilders, the Portuguese far-right Chega party and Spain’s Vox. Finally – the Italian League, led by Matteo Salvini. The Hungarian Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), which has onr member of the European Parliament, also announced its intention to join the alliance after leaving the EPP group. So the nationalist, Eurosceptic group currently consists of 84 MEPs from 12 EU countries.

Representatives of the three founding parties signed the “Patriotic Manifesto for a European Future”, according to which the only valid European policy is that whose legitimacy is rooted in the existence of European nations that preserve and celebrate European identity, traditions and customs and continue their Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage. This sets out the ideology of the alliance, which includes greater sovereignty for EU member states, stronger measures against illegal migration and a revision of the Green Deal for Europe. In addition to campaigning for conservative family values and against immigration, the group will push for an end to European support for Ukraine’s defence against Russian invasion.

Hungary took over the rotating presidency of the EU in July, and shortly after establishing a new group in the EP, Orban went to Moscow to seek Vladimir Putin’s approval for it.

Among others that’s why representatives of other groups immediately called the “Patriots” the “Putin Group”

Jordan Bardella, former candidate for Prime Minister of France on behalf of the National Rally, became the chairman of the new group in the European Parliament.

“Our long-term goal is to change the European Union’s policy,” said Kinga Gál, an experienced Fidesz MEP who will be Bardella’s deputy. The second vice-president will be Italian general Roberto Vannacci, expelled from the army for fascism and racism.

She was not invited to join the Patriots Alternative for Germany, which had previously been excluded from a previous alliance with Le Pen when its leading candidate said the SS “wasn’t made up entirely of criminals.”

The ‘Patriots’ overtook the European Conservatives and Reformists of Giorgia Meloni and Jarosław Kaczyński, who suddenly lost almost all importance in Europe.

The “betrayal” of Vox Spain is particularly painful for Giorgia Meloni, because she delivered her most passionate, arch-fascist speeches at the congresses of this party, whose members always applauded her extremely warmly.

This leaves PiS alone with Giorgia Meloni.

We have an ambitious plan – we want to discuss how international relations will shape up in the next 10-20 years and where the frequent calls for armament that we hear today will lead us. Recently, an interview with Professor Tomasz Grosse, a political scientist and Europeanist, was published on our blog. In his opinion, an agreement dividing Ukraine with Russia could be reached in the near future, but this will not satisfy Russia, and in a few years, it will come back for more. Do you think this is a possible scenario?

There are many scenarios for ending the war, and this one should be considered, but we should work to prevent it. From historical experience, we know that for any potential peace to be stable, it must be based on a certain balance of power on one hand, and on the other hand, it must also have legitimacy, meaning acceptance by both the societies and elites in the warring states, as well as a significant part of the so-called international community. At the moment, it is difficult to imagine such a peace.

Russia demands the recognition of territorial losses by Ukraine, its disarmament, the declaration of neutrality, the recognition of Russian as an official language, and the free movement of people between Russia and Ukraine. In this way, it could officially absorb part of Ukraine and create a weak statelet out of the rest, which would be completely at the mercy of Russia. It would be able to intimidate Ukraine and pursue a policy of de-nationalizing Ukraine, which in the long run would create conditions for its absorption. So far, Russia has not been able to achieve these goals. Thanks to Ukraine’s determination and the support it has received from many NATO countries, Ukraine has regained a significant portion of its territories. It has threatened the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and unblocked maritime communication routes that are essential for the export of grain and Ukraine’s economic survival.

At the same time, Russia has switched to war production and is receiving support from China, North Korea, and Iran. It is attempting to resume its offensive and is destroying energy infrastructure to break the morale of Ukrainians and hinder the functioning of the state. Among other things, due to problems with approving the financial aid package for Ukraine from the USA, delays in the delivery of equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, and the slower pace of increasing ammunition production in the West compared to Russia, Ukraine is in a very difficult situation.

In Poland, due to our historical experience, we are naturally concerned that Ukraine might be forced to accept terms that would be a defeat from both their and our perspective, and a victory for Russia. Since Russia’s goals include not only subjugating Ukraine but also undermining the credibility of the USA and NATO and imposing a zone of reduced security guarantees in the area of the eastern flank states of the Alliance, a sense of victory and exposing the West’s weakness could indeed encourage Russia to attempt to achieve these broader strategic goals. Russia has put so much effort into justifying the war with Ukraine and portraying it as a defense against an aggressive West that there is an ideological, political, and social basis for a war with NATO. Under certain circumstances, such as a lack of determination to strengthen the defensive capabilities of NATO states and U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pacific, Russia might consider provoking a conflict with the Alliance as a rational way to achieve its goals.

On the other hand, the $61 billion package to strengthen American capabilities to support Ukraine has been finally approved. The West, despite various problems, is increasing the production of ammunition and armaments. In 2022, the USA and EU countries were able to produce about 500,000 rounds of artillery ammunition annually; next year, this production capacity will reach about 3 million rounds. Ukraine has received candidate status for the European Union. There is no consensus on its admission to NATO, and Ukraine’s security status may still be subject to negotiations, but 32 countries have announced and 16 have already signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. These agreements will increase the chances that support will continue for years to come. When Russia resumed its offensive around Kharkiv, the USA, Germany, and France announced that they allow the possibility of attacking military targets on Russian territory around Belgorod, where there is logistical support for the Kharkiv offensive. Russia is incurring huge losses. According to British estimates, it has over 450,000 killed and wounded. On average, it loses about 1,000 soldiers a day. Even if it can replenish these losses, circumvent sanctions, and has more resources than Ukraine, the costs of waging war are enormous. It can replenish its losses in the short term, but it is not very capable of strengthening its potential for a war with NATO. The Alliance is not idle; it has changed its strategy, is adapting its structures to the threat from Russia, and member states, even if reluctantly and slower than we would like, are adjusting their military capabilities to this threat. Unless there is a fundamental change in U.S. policy towards Ukraine and Russia, for example, as a result of Donald Trump’s return to power, over time, Russia will have to recognize that a war of attrition does not pay off and should negotiate based on more rational terms. Then the scenario in which the Russians leave the war feeling victorious, convinced that aggression ultimately paid off, significantly increasing the threat to NATO, would become less likely. In the event of Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election, the situation could of course become more complicated. This is precisely what Putin is counting on; therefore, he is not interested in negotiations at the moment.

However, forcing Ukraine to accept Russian terms without also giving it credible security guarantees is unlikely. Instead, there is a risk of a so-called “frozen conflict” along the current front lines. The Korean scenario, i.e. no formal peace and some sort of ceasefire, would allow Russia to rebuild its potential. Then it could play with the threat of escalation and de-escalation, escalating attacks and offering to stop them to achieve its goals

Is Russian aggression a result of the changes occurring in the global balance of power?

Russia wants to regain its status as a superpower, and for this, it needs to take control of Ukraine and obtain a buffer zone that would allow it to influence the policies of neighboring countries. Putin publicly signaled his intentions, among other times, in 2007 in Munich. Russia was not provoked by NATO expansion; rather, it was encouraged to attempt to regain its superpower status because it perceived the West as weak. The 2008 NATO declaration on the future membership of Ukraine and Georgia in the Alliance was an attempt to bridge divisions within the Alliance over the lack of agreement on taking practical steps toward Ukraine’s accession. For Russia, this was a signal that the West was divided and lacked consensus on policy toward the former Soviet Union. Ukraine itself was not striving for NATO membership, it was a neutral state, and most citizens did not support membership. Putin saw that the USA was reducing its military presence in Europe, the West was focused on the war on terror, and it was keen on building partnerships with Russia and economic cooperation, especially in energy. Right after the declaration regarding Ukraine’s future membership in NATO, Germany and France began deepening cooperation with Russia, which reached a military level. Germany’s Rheinmetall started building a training center for the Russian ground forces, and France decided to sell Russia two powerful amphibious assault ships and the technology to produce them. The relative decline of U.S. power was also evident. China had become the world’s second-largest economy and was rapidly increasing its military potential, while the USA announced that it would focus its strategic attention on the Indo-Pacific. Today, China and Russia no longer hide their intentions. They openly declare that they want to change the international order and replace what they perceive as a U.S.-dominated world with a multipolar one. The path to this leads through showing the world that the USA cannot stop the actions of Russia and China if they decide to change the current status quo, such as changing borders by force and breaking the fundamental principle of international law that deems such actions unacceptable.

The rise of Chinese power and the goals of China and Russia pose a serious challenge to the USA and the broadly defined West. The main challenge for the USA is China, which indeed has the potential to force a change in the international system, compelling other countries to submit. We have seen how they have applied this in recent years to Australia, Norway, and Lithuania. Between the USA and China, there are conflicting interests, especially concerning the status of maritime communication routes in the South China Sea, which China claims as its territorial waters. Gaining the ability to control routes through which most of the world’s maritime trade passes would drastically increase China’s ability to influence the stability of global trade and the economy. The most volatile point, however, is Taiwan, which is formally part of China but practically an independent, democratic political entity. The USA decided in the 1970s to normalize and cooperate with China on the condition that any reintegration of Taiwan would occur through political means and not by force. Therefore, we have a war in Europe and the risk of escalation into a NATO-Russia conflict, as well as a significant risk of war in the Indo-Pacific. We must assume that the USA would not be able to handle full-scale wars simultaneously. Japan, South Korea, and Australia fear that if there is a war in Europe, the USA will not be able to support them. We, on the other hand, fear that if there is a conflict there, Americans will not have the capacity and will to provide the necessary support to Europe.

Fortunately, this awareness is mobilizing many countries to strengthen their own capabilities. NATO is also adapting to this threat. At the level of agreed strategy, threat perception, and planning, the Alliance takes into account the military threat from Russia and the political threats related to the USA treating China as its main rival. Of course, much remains to be done in terms of strengthening the capabilities of individual countries to ensure effective deterrence of Russia, but also in strengthening security in the Indo-Pacific

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Is a war over Taiwan a real threat? The year 2027 is often mentioned in this context as a certain boundary.

This date is mentioned because Chinese leader Xi Jinping has announced that the People’s Liberation Army should be ready for a military solution to the Taiwan issue by then. However, various statements by Xi indicate that China should take control of Taiwan before 2049, when the PRC will celebrate its centenary. Using different dates is meant to mobilize the Chinese state and armed forces to strengthen their capabilities. It also exerts military pressure on Taiwan and its allies to make concessions to China without resorting to war. At the same time, it creates internal political pressure, increasing the risk of war. The credibility of the leader or party could be threatened if the set goals are not achieved.

For China, the attempt to take control of Taiwan would be extremely costly and there is no guarantee it would succeed. Even with China’s capabilities, conducting an amphibious landing on the island to bring in troops and overthrow the democratic government would not be easy. The Russian attack on Ukraine, the enormous Russian losses, and the difficulty in achieving the intended goals should serve as a sobering lesson for the communist regime. Moreover, China’s development depends on the stability of the global economy and how China is perceived by much of the world. Provoking a war could seriously harm these interests. Therefore, a war over Taiwan does not necessarily have to happen. However, to reduce the risk, active deterrent measures must be taken, influencing China’s calculations of potential gains and losses. The USA is currently trying to do just that.

Will NATO be involved in the event of a conflict over Taiwan?

It is in the interest of the USA and European countries to increase their ability to deter China through cooperation with key partners in the Indo-Pacific, namely Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. NATO is a regional alliance. The treaty clearly defines the geographic scope of security guarantees, which include Europe and North America. In the event of aggression against a member state, allies are obligated to defend it. In practice, this means maintaining the territorial integrity and independence of the attacked ally.

However, it is important to remember that the Alliance was created in completely different times and strategic situations. The USA perceived the USSR as the main threat. Their interest was in deterring the USSR from aggression in Europe, weakening Soviet ability to use the threat of such aggression, strengthening Europe’s sense of security, and its economic recovery. Today, China is seen as the main rival of the USA, and there have long been accusations in the American debate that Europe is doing too little for its own security and does not adequately support the security of the USA. Therefore, a new division of responsibilities for global security must be developed between the USA and Europe to maintain strong transatlantic ties.

Europe must strengthen its conventional capabilities and focus on deterring Russia. The USA must maintain its troops in Europe and ensure credible nuclear deterrence. NATO, on the other hand, must support deterring China and demonstrate that it can influence security in the Indo-Pacific, which does not necessarily mean sending troops there. NATO has adopted a new strategy indicating China as a challenge. Cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries—Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand—is being deepened. France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and even Germany are sending ships to the region, signaling their readiness to defend freedom of navigation, which is crucial for their economic security. Some European countries also participate in exercises, such as air force exercises in the region. These and other actions are meant to influence China’s calculations, suggesting that if a war over Taiwan were to occur, the interests of European countries could be so threatened that some might side with Taiwan and try to hinder China’s war efforts.

However, it is more likely that a coalition of the willing, such as for protecting maritime communication routes, would form rather than using NATO resources for this purpose.

Some commentators argue that since China is currently experiencing an economic crisis, the USA may seek to exploit this situation and provoke a military confrontation to prevent being surpassed. There are experts who emphasize that the United States’ vigilance over world security has always been accompanied by force and coercion—mentioning Afghanistan and especially Iraq, for example.

The USA is focusing on strengthening its capabilities to deter China and implementing the strategy of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In military terms, the strategy is based on enhancing US capabilities to ensure technological superiority needed to offset the quantitative differences in capabilities between China and the USA. Indeed, China’s rapid development of capabilities is concerning. China is enhancing its space capabilities, developing hypersonic weapons, expanding its navy, and rapidly increasing its nuclear potential. This may indicate that China no longer aims solely for nuclear deterrence through the threat of retaliation in the event of a nuclear strike on its territory. A larger number of nuclear-tipped missiles would increase the credibility of using these weapons, even if China itself has not been attacked with nuclear weapons. This, in turn, will influence the US assessment of the risks associated with engaging in war with China. On one hand, during a war, this would make it difficult for the USA to compel China to make concessions; on the other hand, it may encourage China to intensify its aggressive policies. However, it would be more in China’s interest to provoke a war. In the United States, there is a discussion whether American capabilities and alliance networks are sufficient to prevent war. In the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the goal of the USA would likely be to repel the attack and maintain the status quo. This goal would be understandable and achievable. I don’t see what the USA would gain from provoking a war with China. How would they win the war, force China to surrender? What would victory entail? In a war with China, the USA’s goal would not be the long-term weakening and defeat of China, forcing them to accept new realities. Simply put, the USA does not have that capability, even with greater nuclear potential. Therefore, I don’t see the logic in the theory that starting a war to prevent further Chinese power growth would be in the USA’s interest.

As for the role of the USA in stabilizing the international system, like many countries, I prefer a system based on American power rather than a multipolar system where authoritarian powers do as they please, especially since the UN is unable to prevent it due to China and Russia’s permanent membership and veto power in the Security Council. Although the USA is not a perfect state, its democratic system allows for control of power and demands policy corrections, unlike in authoritarian regimes.

After World War II, American power was essential for effectively deterring the USSR and ensuring the security of allies. Thanks to the sense of security provided by the United States, Europe was rebuilt and conditions were created for European integration. Thanks to American security guarantees, Japan and South Korea also became economic powers. After the collapse of the USSR, there was a brief period when American power seemed unmatched. It provided stability to the world and paved the way for globalization. The benefit was economic growth, but at the cost of deindustrialization in the West and the rapid development of China, at the expense of many other countries. New threats intensified, such as terrorism and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the USA had to consider that the next attack could involve weapons of mass destruction. The attack on Afghanistan, where the leader of al-Qaeda was hiding, was in line with UN resolutions. After killing bin Laden and weakening al-Qaeda, the USA achieved its goal and withdrew from Afghanistan. The attack on Iraq, however, was an abuse of force and is used as a propaganda tool to weaken the position and influence of the USA. However, the USA does not occupy Iraq. Anti-American sentiments exist not only in so-called global South countries but also in some Western countries. Therefore, it is necessary to explain that although the USA, like any country, is not perfect, the values on which it is based create a community of interests with other democratic countries. When the USA abuses its power, allies can criticize it. At most, Americans will pour French wine into the canals for a week. When you criticize China, the country declares economic war on you. In the common interest of democratic countries, especially small and medium-sized countries, defending an international system based on law and agreed principles is essential. It is also in their interest to maintain USA leadership based on American military superiority, economic power, and technological prowess. Even if American potential is smaller than before, during a war, it could be mobilized to such an extent that no other Western power or the European Union is capable of doing. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and China’s actions during the Covid pandemic have fortunately reduced Western tendencies to relativize and equate the USA with China or Russia.

If a conflict over Taiwan were to actually occur, the situation in Poland and Europe would undergo significant changes. How much would sabotage and disinformation activities, which we already observe on a large scale today, intensify?

Russia and China share similar strategic goals when it comes to weakening the position of the USA and the credibility of alliances, especially NATO, and have been deepening their military cooperation for years. In early February 2022, just before Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, they announced an unrestricted partnership. Russia is waging war in Ukraine with political, informational, and military support from China. In the event of a war in the Indo-Pacific, they would also support and coordinate actions. They would conduct propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at convincing societies and decision-makers that the USA is responsible for provoking the conflict, and that Europe’s interest lies in staying on the sidelines. China could resort to economic blackmail and might suspend deliveries of rare earth metals or various industrial components essential for production across Europe. Issues with loading and unloading goods could arise in several ports in Europe, such as those in Greece, Spain, Belgium, or Germany, which are to varying degrees controlled by Chinese companies. Naturally, Russia would need to repay China for the support it receives in the war with Ukraine, so Russian and Belarusian services could intensify sabotage actions in Europe. It should also be assumed that Russian forces would be mobilized near NATO borders under any pretext, possibly leading to Russian-Chinese joint exercises. China has already conducted joint maneuvers with Russia in the Baltic Sea. This would focus the Alliance’s attention on the threat in Europe and make it difficult for individual countries to support US actions in the Indo-Pacific.

It is November 2024, let’s assume Donald Trump wins the elections. What does this mean for the world? 

 

First and foremost, tensions between the USA and the European Union, as well as countries like Germany, could renew. Just as we fear that Trump will force Ukraine to accept unfavorable ceasefire terms, our partners in the Indo-Pacific fear that he will sell out Taiwan. In each region, the worst-case scenarios are being considered today – and this is exactly where the risks associated with Trump’s presidency lie. On the one hand, it should be assumed that he has a tendency to exaggerate, but once negotiations begin and he starts to see the consequences, he becomes somewhat more rational. On the other hand, we must reckon with uncertainty, both in terms of European and Pacific security. One could argue that Trump’s presidency might encourage Russia and China to escalate aggression, or conversely, that Trump’s unpredictability might deter them from actions that could lead to a confrontation with the USA. However, unpredictability creates more problems than benefits. Weakening American leadership at this time would certainly be disadvantageous for NATO and the EU, while strengthening China and Russia and facilitating their pursuit of their goals. Regardless of who the American president is, it is in Poland’s interest to maintain good relations with the USA. Poland must strengthen its own potential to the maximum extent possible, but the ability to deter Russia will always be greater if it is based on the threat of US involvement in the conflict. Therefore, even if Trump decided to withdraw the USA from NATO military structures, our priority should be to minimize losses by deepening bilateral relations with the USA and, of course, leveraging the potential for cooperation within the EU.

 

Political scientist and professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw, Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse is an important figure and one of the experts consulted by Polish President Andrzej Duda. We met with him to discuss Europe, as well as the renewed conflict between the Western world and Russia

 

 

 

Professor Grosse, let’s start with an extremely relevant question today, in the days of European elections: what is the future of Europe? Should we continue the integration of services, even imagining the creation of a potential European army, or should we remain a confederation of states often competing with each other, engaging in policies of dumping?

 

 

That is a complicated question. Generally speaking, everything is moving towards greater integration, to the point where some speak of building a superstate. This is happening because more and more competences are being transferred from member states to the European Union, including in the defense and security sector. Moreover, this goal is to be achieved through treaty changes that have already been adopted by the European Parliament and are likely to be implemented after the European elections. Therefore, this is the most probable path for the development of the European Union.

As for the idea of a Europe of confederated states, there is little chance of it being realized. It would be a more decentralized European Union, leaving competences to the member states. Regarding defense policy, the idea of integrating armed forces seems ineffective. Many projects have been announced but not implemented, or their implementation is very, very slow. Secondly, this integration is dominated by Western Europe, mainly to support the arms industry of some countries, especially Germany and France, but also Italy and Spain. So far, integration has mainly served to increase the capacity of this industry with the hope of boosting arms exports outside Europe and also within Europe. This is the main goal of this integration.

Today, we have entirely different geopolitical threats in the sphere of security, primarily Russia and the eastern flank of NATO. Now the question is whether this model of integration in the defense sector can meet the threats from Russia. In my opinion, it cannot. Firstly, the arms industry should be located on the eastern flank of NATO. It’s not about countries like Poland or Romania buying more weapons and ammunition from France or Germany, but about primarily supporting the defense industry with European funds in Poland, Romania, Hungary, and other countries. Secondly, Europe’s defense policy should not interfere with or duplicate NATO structures because currently, NATO is the best response to threats. If the European defense policy competes with NATO, it risks worsening the security situation on the eastern flank.”

 

 

If Trump wins the next election, is there a possibility that the USA will be less interested in investing in NATO, forcing Europe to rethink its defense strategy?

 

In my opinion, this is the least likely of all possible options. I do not believe that the United States would leave Europe on its own because they are aware that the European Union is not capable of stopping Russia from attacking. In other words, I anticipate that Trump’s actions will aim at strengthening European efforts, but within the framework of NATO.

 

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues, but do you believe that conclusions can already be drawn about the roles of the individual actors on the geopolitical stage?

 

Let’s say right away that if the conflict ends with the division of Ukraine, the war will not actually be over, because Russia will not be satisfied with that and sooner or later there will be a direct conflict between NATO and Russia. I do not believe that the end of the current phase of the conflict in Ukraine will be lasting in the long term. The conflict will continue for several years, perhaps with interruptions, and the West will have to prepare for that.

 

 

Conflict on the territory of Ukraine or the European Union?

 

I think it’s also on the territory of the European Union. From a strategic point of view, Russia will not be satisfied with just a part of Ukraine because it is already too involved in the confrontation with the West and NATO. A potential division of Ukraine will not end the confrontation, and I fear that there will be a military confrontation between NATO and Russia. I emphasize that in my opinion, any agreements that lead to a ceasefire in Ukraine will only be temporary, delaying the real NATO-Russia confrontation. The West must prepare for this showdown.

 

Could the scenario be different if Putin were no longer in power?

 

No, the ruling elite in Russia thinks similarly to Putin.

 

If so, will historians one day declare that the Third World War began with a Russian attack on Ukraine?

 

In reality, it began in 2014 because that’s when Putin first attacked Ukraine. As we’ve seen, subsequent freezes in the conflict didn’t prevent a major attack in 2022. Therefore, if there is a new ceasefire in Ukraine, I believe it will only be a temporary solution preceding the resumption of conflict. We’ll only have a few years of peace ahead of us. Some geopolitical analysts talk about a period of at least 20 years, while others argue that the NATO-Russia confrontation will not only be in Europe but also in Asia. So, we are only at the beginning of a broad geopolitical confrontation that will unfold across different continents. The West and Europe must prepare in every way, including industrially and in terms of training. Therefore, European integration must be a supporting element of this defensive effort, involving the entire West, countries that Russia and China are trying to divide, supporting ideas like the strategic autonomy of the European Union.

 

 

Will a new Cold War break out worldwide?

 

It’s difficult to predict the outcomes of this emerging confrontation. Will the world be divided into two blocs, as during the Cold War, or will there be a different outcome? Or perhaps there will be a winner and a loser? Currently, just as the Chinese and Russians are trying to divide the West and separate Europe from the United States, the West is also trying to divide China and Russia. There are thus many variables and unknowns.

 

 

 

Is the world, which until a few years ago largely relied on globalization and outsourcing production, heading towards decline? Is it no longer possible to relocate production anymore?

 

 

Today we can say that it was a serious mistake of the West. Outsourcing production outside the United States, outside the European Union, investing mainly in China, has led to a significant weakening of the West. China has become the world’s main factory, serving the interests of the West, major American corporations, and companies from Western Europe. It was a serious mistake that led to the deindustrialization of the West.

 

Isn’t it the other way around? Namely, that despite open trade with Russia, China is also heavily dependent on Europe and the United States in terms of selling what they produce? Added to this are uncertainties in the form of possible tariffs imposed by the USA if Trump wins, while the country is experiencing a certain crisis, and the war in Europe certainly caused a loss of market share. If a war were to break out tomorrow, dividing the world into two blocs, would China also suffer from this?

 

 

Referring to the deindustrialization of the West, I was primarily talking about what happened during the pandemic, namely that Europe was so dependent on China that there was a shortage of basic medical products, such as masks. In the current geopolitical situation, we need to imagine how much effort is needed to be able to produce everything in our countries again. Putin transformed the entire industry, preparing for a long-term confrontation with the West. He has already done that, which is why he is better prepared on the front line with Ukraine in terms of armaments. Europe is not able to produce a million missiles for Ukraine within a year. Among other reasons, because there is no armaments industry at the appropriate level. That’s what I was talking about.

As for the Chinese, firstly, they are doing everything to become independent of Western technologies, investments, and markets. This is their current strategy, which they have been implementing for at least a year. The Chinese are focusing on their own companies, and the Chinese market is mainly intended to serve Chinese production, not European or American production. Secondly, they are doing a lot to maintain their market in Europe, for example by blackmailing Europeans, saying “if you block the import of electric cars or their parts, solar panels, or wind turbines necessary for the climate transformation in the European Union, we will limit investments, economic activity, in short, the entire EU economic potential in China”. Germany, which is dependent on the Chinese market, is doing everything to prevent sanctions imposed by the European Commission on production or import from China. In this way, the European Union does not defend itself against the influx of significantly cheaper, state-subsidized products from China. As a result, many European companies, which should benefit from investments under the Green Deal, are now on the verge of bankruptcy. In other words, we have another problem arising from the fact that Europe has not developed an effective method of economically dealing with China and is losing on its own turf. In Europe, it is already difficult to withdraw from this transformation, and at the same time, Europeans are buying more and more Chinese solar panels, more and more Chinese wind turbines, etc. Soon they will also be buying Chinese electric cars.

.

 

 

Whether the European Green Deal is at risk of failure?

 

 

Yes. The European climate policy is harming our industries. Chinese companies can produce more cheaply thanks to state subsidies, which harms our firms.

 

What about the IZERA project, which involves the production of electric cars in Poland, a collaboration between Poles and Chinese? What will happen to it?

 

 

It’s hard to predict; there are indeed challenges with electric cars. We don’t know if it’s the right technology to invest in. It could quickly be discovered that these cars are not the best solution in terms of user experience, operational costs, short lifespan, and disposal costs of these vehicles. So, I believe that Poland should work on a completely different, more cost-optimal technology, which will likely replace these electric cars sooner or later. We should move towards technologies based on ammonia and fuel cells, rather than lithium batteries. That’s the first thing. Secondly, the Chinese are interested in their own product and technology markets. In other words, it’s not just about attracting a Chinese corporation – the art is in creating our own, European technology. The Chinese are also interested in strategic infrastructures, as was the case with the port of Piraeus, but they are also looking for investment opportunities in Polish ports. Meanwhile, Polish politicians are under pressure from the Americans. They are in a very particular moment because they are on the front line in confrontation with Russia, so they must try to maintain good relations with the Americans. On the other hand, there also needs to be some kind of contact with China over time, given Beijing’s significant influence on Moscow.

 

Are there significant Polish-Chinese relations?

 

 

They are far from the level of Chinese-Hungarian relations, for example, but in this geopolitical situation, the Chinese are not Poland’s main security ally. However, let’s remember that President Andrzej Duda was the only high-ranking Western leader present at the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing. So, some relations do exist..

 

Changing the subject. Today, we are all dependent on technology. It seems that as soon as we send an email, we immediately receive related advertisements. Do you think we live in a world similar to the one described by Orwell, where everyone will be monitored without privacy? Can we still defend our privacy

 

The possibilities of maintaining privacy are increasingly limited. So, for now, this direction is very clear and well-defined, exactly as you described. But the question is, what world will emerge after these geopolitical clashes, as that will be a powerful factor of change. Will people, politicians, continue to act as they do today, or will they completely change their philosophy and perspective? Today, we have American globalization, which is driven by the geopolitical interests of the United States, but also by the largest corporations. In other words, there is both an economic and political interest. A similar project was developed in the European Union. On the one hand, it was a project aimed at serving large corporations so they could thrive. On the other hand, there was also the idea of political integration, but at the cost of democracy, at the cost of ordinary citizens, their freedom, their ability to choose, their privacy, but also their ability to decide their own future. Under this concept, a European was not a citizen but a consumer. If nothing changes, the project of globalization or the project of European integration will go in this direction.

The problem with European integration is that managing this project is not as effective as one would like. If European companies are not benefiting from climate change but Chinese ones are, then something is wrong with this project. There are many other projects in the European Union that were supposed to serve the expansion of large corporations and the harmonization of regulations and policies, de facto centralization. All these actions are becoming increasingly dysfunctional. In many sectors, we do not see successes, only crises. For example, the so-called migration crisis. Firstly, it was supposed to provide labor for the expansion of companies in the EU internal market. Secondly, it was supposed to replace or weaken national traditions and nation-states through the mass influx of people who have nothing to do with Europe. This was supposed to serve technocratic and political integration. However, the migration crisis has caused many problems. The assumed goals of integration have not been achieved. On the contrary, we have a huge side effect in the form of all kinds of tendencies towards disintegration that were not foreseen when “the doors to mass migration were opened.”

 

 

So does European integration not work?

 

The problem with European integration is that the management of this project has not been effective. Many EU projects, such as the eurozone, climate policy, and migration policy, generate more costs than benefits. This leads to dysfunction and risks to the stability of the entire European project.

 

And borders have partially returned.

 

Borders have returned. At one point, even for economic exchange. Moreover, national traditions and identities, instead of disappearing, are re-emerging, leading to a significant rise in eurosceptic forces that reject the centralization project, which we call the globalist aims of large corporations and technocracy. There is a huge rebellion, to put it mildly, against this project. Even major projects that were beacons of unification are becoming dysfunctional, and instead of realizing the leading idea of integration, they risk the collapse of the EU project.

If such a scenario materializes, it would be positive for ordinary people. For family businesses, for local enterprises, for democracy. The collapse of such a centralized EU would paradoxically be positive. In this situation, it will be necessary to propose a different formula of integration, completely unrelated to these globalist or technocratic aims. It is necessary to return to the idea that through integration, Europeans should have a good life, have basic rights, have a voice in their lives. Integration cannot only serve large corporations or supranational bureaucrats. In our countries (in Poland and Italy), a huge part of the economy consists of family businesses, small and medium-sized enterprises, which today are simply marginalized, bankrupting. For small businesses in the eurozone, the common currency is lethal, just like Chinese competition subsidized by public authorities. I believe we are approaching a turning point, both in terms of European integration and geopolitics. European integration as we know it will disintegrate within a dozen or so years. There are too many mistakes, too many dysfunctional projects, such as the eurozone, climate policy, migration policy, and the Schengen area. There are too many projects that are too costly and ineffective. The positive aspects are dwindling, and they are few from the perspective of ordinary people. Costs outweigh benefits. Large Western corporations may still benefit from this European Union, but even they are benefiting less and less, because, as I repeat, Chinese companies are pushing European companies out of the internal market. Even the largest German companies cannot withstand Chinese competition. Additionally, there are the Russians, who want to completely change the geopolitics in Europe. Therefore, I believe that the European Union, as we know it, will not survive all of this. On the other hand, we must draw conclusions and create a different kind of European cooperation in the future.

 

Countries in Europe view Poland as a nation that has experienced remarkable growth in recent years, but also as a country that often seeks assistance. Has the time come for Poland to play an influential political role, presenting itself in a European context with a different approach? As a nation that does not only focus on its national interests but also champions a European vision?

 

I believe that Poland can propose an alternative vision of European integration, at least in Central and Eastern Europe. This stems from our tradition and political culture. It comes from the history of the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, formed by Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians, a state structure entirely different from today’s Europe. It was a form of regional integration but highly decentralized. So we have a historical memory that can be very useful because the First Commonwealth existed for several hundred years. Ten times longer than the European Union has existed. And the European Union is falling apart today, isn’t it? So this decentralized formula of power was probably better in terms of durability. Of course, in those historical times, many mistakes were also made, from which lessons must be drawn.

 

So, Europe as a confederation of states?

 

Why not? There would still be an internal market, right? In the First Polish Republic, we had an internal market. Everyone could pursue their own interests; for example, there was a large Jewish minority with significant trading power in the Commonwealth, and there were investors from Germany as well. So, the internal market could function very well with significant profits. In other words, not everything needs to be centralized. Central regulation is, of course, beneficial in the short term because it can force some nations to pay more. For example, in climate policy, to buy German heat pumps or wind turbines. Integration must be done in a way that ultimately benefits everyone. I think ultimately, citizens must revolt. If they’re paying a fortune for heating, if they can’t afford electricity, what stage of development have we returned to? What quality of life are we talking about in Europe? And if, for example, climate policy makes agriculture disappear in Italy. Will we have to eat insects instead of meat? All of this goes beyond the understanding of the ordinary person. How is a citizen supposed to accept such a future?

 

Does the European problem also stem from the fact that countries in Europe are very different?

 

That’s true. However, the decision-makers in the European Union thought that to overcome these barriers, they needed to weaken the member states, national identities, and cultures, while at the same time bringing in a lot of immigrants, creating something akin to a new globalist culture that is completely new and has nothing to do with Europe. This project is imposed from the top. Even for this reason, it must fail because I don’t know of any project that cuts itself off from its own roots that has stood the test of time and crises. You need to have foundations. Therefore, integration in Europe must be carried out in a completely different way: respecting national cultures, national specifics, respecting the voices of voters in different countries. If someone doesn’t want immigrants, it should be accepted. And not prohibit, for example, Italians from defending against immigrants. I’ll remind you that the previous conservative Polish government was condemned for building a barrier on the border with Belarus against immigrants sent by Lukashenko and Putin. I remember that the European Commission, the Court of Justice, and the European Parliament criticized us for building this barrier. But who were we actually helping? Germany, France. Because all these immigrants were traveling to Germany and France. Yet we were criticized, just like Italian politicians who did not allow ships with immigrants to enter Italian ports.

 

We are a few days away from the European elections. Do you think there is a real risk that Russia will try to influence these elections in some way, control them, and select different people for the European Parliament?

 

Sometimes it is said that the Russians have a very strong influence in Brussels, in the European Parliament, that they corrupt various parliamentarians, not only Eurosceptics but also mainstream politicians. Russians had an agent in Willy Brandt’s inner circle. The Russian agent was his personal secretary, Günter Guillaume. Moreover, the problem of these Russian influences in European institutions is that they are only investigated in Eurosceptic groups, which do not have a decisive influence on the EU. Meanwhile, the most dangerous Russian influences are among the politicians who actually decide, because they govern, influence regulations. I mean, if I’m going to spend money on corrupting institutions, it’s more profitable for me to invest in those who are in power.

 

Are there any differences in the geopolitical vision between Duda and Tusk regarding the relations Poland should develop with the USA and China?

 

Donald Tusk prioritizes relations with the EU, particularly with Germany and France. Andrzej Duda is skeptical about contacts with Germany, as he has been disappointed by them multiple times. He finds Americans more reliable. Additionally, Duda believes that building a strong state and pursuing domestic investments are crucial for Poland’s development and security. Donald Tusk seems to rely mainly on EU funds and support from Berlin, overlooking the fact that Germany has many conflicting interests with Poland. When it comes to China, this partner is overlooked by Tusk but viewed differently by Duda. As I mentioned, the Polish President had the courage – as the only Western leader – to participate in the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing in early 2022 and meet with President Xi Jinping..

 

 

 

It is rare for a change of the head of state or government to have such a fundamental and positive impact on the position of a country in the world, as was the case with Poland in December 2023.

This was the case when Nelson Mandela replaced Frederik Willem de Klerk, Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Konstantin Chernenko, and Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump.

And now Donald Tusk’s return to the position of prime minister meant that, literally overnight, Poland, isolated, widely criticized and omitted when making any important decisions on international forums, once again became one of the main players in Europe and NATO.

 

On December 14, 2023, the day after the swearing in of his government, Tusk began to receive congratulations from the most important politicians in the world, from Joe Biden, through Emmanuel Macron to Olaf Scholz. And they were sincere congratulations, full of enthusiasm and hope.

 

“I look forward to working with you to show that democracies can meet the challenges that matter most in the lives of our nations. … I look forward to continuing our close cooperation regarding Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russia’s brutal aggression. … I assure you that the United States will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Poland and fight the encroachment of authoritarianism into Europe. … I am confident that together we can make progress on issues affecting our shared prosperity, security and democratic values,” Joe Biden wrote.

 

Olaf Scholz published two entries with identical content – one in German, the other in Polish. These were congratulations to “dear Donald Tusk”.

“Donald Tusk wants Poland to be back in the heart of the EU – that’s where it belongs. I am glad that we can develop the EU and Polish-German relations, hand in hand with Poland, he wrote

 

The President of Ukraine also congratulated the new prime minister.

“The future of Ukraine and Poland lies in unity, mutual support and strategic partnership to defeat our common enemy. When we stand together, the freedom of both our nations is insurmountable. We appreciate Poland’s support. Together we strengthen each other and our entire Europe,” wrote Volodymyr Zelensky.

 

“Congratulations, Donald,” wrote the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. – Your experience and strong attachment to our European values will be valuable in building a stronger Europe, to the benefit of Poles. I look forward to working together.”

 

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola: ‘Warm congratulations to Donald Tusk,’ she wrote. – As Poland’s new Prime Minister, a staunch supporter of the European Union and a dear friend, I look forward to working together for a prosperous Poland and a stronger Europe. We will face current challenges. “United.”

 

“I look forward to welcoming you again to the EU summit. Your experience and commitment to European values will help build a stronger and more united EU,” wrote Charles Michel, President of the European Council.

 

“We feel a change. Congratulations, Donald Tusk,” wrote Manfred Weber, chairman of the European People’s Party.

 

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: “I look forward to working with Prime Minister Tusk on the issues most important to the citizens of both our countries. We are committed… to promoting the rule of law, fighting climate change and creating good middle-class jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. … As like-minded partners, Canada and Poland share universal values of respect for democracy and human rights. “We will continue to support Ukraine and hold Russia accountable for its illegal war of aggression.”

 

These congratulations show how great the sense of relief was in the world’s most important chancelleries that the eight-year anti-democratic rule in Poland had ended and how great the hope was that Poland would once again occupy a key position in continental systems.

 

In the years 2008-2015, i.e. during the first government of Donald Tusk and his PO-PSL coalition, Poland became extremely important in the European Union, sometimes beyond measure and beyond its economic position. In the most important capitals of Western Europe, there is little or no knowledge of Central and Eastern Europe. And these countries were undergoing dynamic changes, several of them became EU members, and Paris, Berlin or Madrid were still not particularly able to find these partner countries on the map of Europe. Poland knew a lot and was willingly listened to, which is why it determined the EU’s eastern policy.

 

And the situation became dramatic after the Russian invasion of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014. The policy of the European Union and NATO towards Russia was completely anachronistic: there were still hopes related to the timid democratization of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, and the memory of the event in Pratica di Mare near Rome in 2002, when, in the presence of all heads of state or government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, Vladimir Putin signed the declaration of establishing the NATO-Russia Council, which was to coordinate mutual security policies.

Russian journalists who accompanied Putin at the time were convinced that this was the first step towards Russia’s admission to NATO and Vladimir Putin did not dismantle those rumors.

Many Western leaders, led by Angela Merkel, were convinced that one good, honest conversation with Putin was enough to return to that atmosphere and for cooperation with Putin’s Russia to become peaceful and partnership-like again.

Even the Russian invasion of Crimea did not convince everyone that those times would not return. Berlin and Paris still maintained lively diplomatic contacts with the Kremlin and continued to invest huge funds in Russia, believing that drawing it into the Western economic system would “pacify” its aggressive expansionism.

 

It will take another eight years, until February 24, 2022, for Western chancelleries to realize that there will be no more cooperation with Russia, that Russia has gone from a potential partner to a completely real threat to the whole of Europe, to the balance of power established after World War II. World War.

But no one had any idea how to transition to a new system of relations with this security-threatening “monster” from the East, no one was fully aware of the level of threat.

 

The previous Polish government, deprived of any credibility, was unable to break into the offices of Western politicians on this issue, to which it was simply not allowed. In this situation, the Baltic Countries tried to shape the EU and NATO policy towards Russia, but their political weight is so small that their voice was unable to change the procrastinating attitude of the West.

However, there was a growing awareness of the threat from Russia and, generally, from the so-called the “ring of evil”, i.e. an alliance of authoritarian countries that openly challenged Western democracy: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran and its acolytes in the Middle East.

Joe Biden was in Warsaw twice and twice, at the Royal Castle, he delivered historic speeches, de facto declaring war on the “ring of evil”: “this is a war between democracy and authoritarianism, we have to win this war,” he said.

OK, but he didn’t say how.

 

This is why the return of Poland and Donald Tusk in person was received with such enthusiasm. Europe needed a new strategy, and during over a year and a half of the war in Ukraine, it was unable to develop it on its own.

It was also due to the weakness of Western leadership. Angela Merkel’s policy towards Russia has been completely discredited. Germany, almost one hundred percent dependent on Russian supplies of energy resources, began to switch dramatically to supplies from other geographical regions and had to completely reorient its “Ostpolitik”. But there is a fairly common belief that although Chancellor Olaf Scholz has handled it well, he is still considered a weak, indecisive leader and torn by various doubts. And his social democratic SPD party is still haunted by the specter of his predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, one of the CEOs of Gazprom: when he appeared at the SPD congress, he unexpectedly received a storm of applause.

 

There were many hopes at the beginning of his first term that Emmanuel Macron would become the informal leader of the European Union: young, energetic, with a good rhetorical apparatus, with clear, bold visions of the development of France and a determined Europeanist, he was to replace Angela Merkel as the driver of the European locomotive. Unfortunately, the fiasco of many of his plans to reform the French economy, his indecision in implementing social policies, controversial anti-American philippic, and his continued faith in dialogue with Putin until the end, made his star fade as quickly as it rose.

The remaining large European countries, starting with Spain – a country without any “Sovietological” traditions, are mired in internal conflicts, have weak governments based on very fragile coalitions: their leaders are mainly concerned with maintaining power, not drawing new continental strategies.

 

And here Donald Tusk appeared. The day after he was sworn in, he found himself in Brussels, where EU leaders literally threw their arms around him.

Although when he was president of the European Council he did not enjoy much sympathy. Not everyone liked his authoritarian methods of exercising this function, which was supposed to consist in coordinating the work of meetings of EU political leaders, and not in being something like the “president of all presidents”.

Some of his political decisions also caused controversy: during his visit to Ankara, for example, he assured the right-wing Turkish president that the European Union was still waiting for this country with open arms.

But all these memories disappeared when the disgraced, universally despised Morawiecki was replaced by world format politician Donald Tusk.

And already at the first meeting of the European Council, despite the presence of Charles Michel, he began to set the tone of the proceedings. And everyone willingly agreed to it.

All official documents of the European Council and most documents of the European Commission already bear the mark of Tusk’s intervention.

First of all, regarding Russia and Ukraine. Only a few months have passed, and no one in the world, especially in Moscow, can have any doubts about the EU’s position towards the aggressor and his victim.

The EC immediately, under Tusk’s influence, developed a strategy for the development of the European arms industry, which is currently being implemented in the vast majority of member states. Once key issues such as strict compliance with the level of inflation and the level of internal debt have fallen into the background. “Difficult times require difficult decisions” – this is the maxim that guides European institutions today.

 

And less than a month ago, from Brussels, Donald Tusk literally needed two phone calls to immediately convene a summit of the “Weimar Triangle” that has been inactive for many years: France, Germany and Poland. For which theses were prepared by Tusk’s cabinet and which theses were fully and without unnecessary discussions approved by the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany.

In some capitals, especially Rome, a radical shift in the EU’s centre of political gravity was observed: from that meeting, the tone of the EU will be set by this triumvirate, in which Tusk plays a key role, and the position of countries such as Italy and the Netherlands, which, despite its small size, played a very important role in the Union under the leadership of Marek Rutte, suddenly weakened.

Now the media are writing that the until recently certain election of Ursula von der Leyen for a second term as President of the European Commission will be protested by this triumvirate and that the candidate of the “Weimarers” is to be the former head of the European Central Bank and former (unfortunately short-lived) Prime Minister of Italy Mario Draghi.

 

 

“In a show of unity aimed at easing tensions between France and Germany over the threat posed by an aggressive Russia, the leaders of Europe’s three leading military powers have agreed to increase global ammunition purchases for Ukraine and improve their long-range artillery offerings.

A hastily arranged meeting in Berlin between France, Germany and Poland did little to mask the fact that Paris and Berlin now have different viewpoints on the twin specters of Russian military advances in Ukraine and the refusal of the US Congress to approve further significant military aid to Kiev.

The contradiction in approach – mainly between the “hawkish” French President Emmanuel Macron and the eternally cautious German Chancellor Olaf Scholz – was exposed in a dramatic interview on French television, in which Macron said that Europe’s security and even Europe’s existence were at risk.

Recently elected Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, … who has just returned from meetings with Joe Biden in Washington, called on all sides to talk less and focus on delivering more weapons. … (The Guardian)

 

 

But Poland owes its key position in Europe and NATO not only to Tusk. It is impossible to overestimate the role that the head of Polish diplomacy, Radosław Sikorski, began to play in world diplomacy.

Just a week after his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, a meeting of the heads of the CIA, Mossad and the heads of the services of Qatar and Egypt representing the Palestinians was held in Warsaw without unnecessary noise. This meeting resulted in subsequent rounds of talks on the release of the hostages and a possible ceasefire in Gaza, which, unfortunately, have not yet produced any concrete results.

Radosław Sikorski’s speech at the UN Security Council – his response to the outrageous lies of the Russian ambassador – followed by a series of interviews for American television – made him one of the most famous and admired politicians in the world.

By the way, it’s amazing that no one has ever managed to point out the lies of a representative of a totalitarian aggressor in a similar way before.

Sikorski, also thanks to his family connections, has a great influence on politics in the US, not only in democratic circles, but also in republican ones. He is ubiquitous, leading the way at meetings of EU and NATO foreign ministers, although he left the meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday, April 22, 2024, disappointed because his counterparts did not go beyond verbal declarations and avoided specific commitments regarding military aid for Ukraine.

Sikorski also has an influence on British politics, as his classmates at Oxford included, among others, Boris Johnson and David Cameron, former Prime Minister and currently Foreign Secretary of His Majesty’s Government. Both men are frequent guests at his renovated manor house near Bydgoszcz. And Great Britain is an absolutely key country in NATO

 

Individual EU and British governments seem to have already acknowledged and accepted Poland’s new position in international relations. No one anymore questions the fact that Poland largely determines the eastern policy of the European Union and NATO.

After an eight-year freeze on visits, Warsaw currently hosts up to two or three European heads of government or foreign ministers a week.

And although Giorgia Meloni was one of the first prime ministers to send congratulatory telegrams to Tusk after his election, Italy’s position is delicate because the government in Warsaw is considered liberal, and the political environment of Meloni and her cabinet is closely associated with the extreme right, in in which the previous Polish government was deeply immersed.

What may be surprising is the lack of any contacts between Madrid and Warsaw, the capital, which overnight became important again in Europe and the world.

Jacek Pałasiński

 

A More European Poland

In a world inflamed by wars, amidst successive, more or less democratic elections, Poland is changing its course in international relations.

Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech is a respected sociologist and political scientist, a lecturer at the Warsaw School of Economics, and the head of the Department of Political Studies at the Institute of International Studies. She is also the EU cooperation delegate to the Rector. A member of the Polish Sociological Association, Polish Political Science Association; an expert in the European Commission’s Team Europe Direct Poland network. Author and co-author of numerous publications on lobbying, communication, and media. She has published, among others, “The Time of Celebrities. Mediatization of Public Life,” Difin, 2013, and with J. Misiun and S. Łubiarz, “American Elections in the Post-Truth Era,” SGH Publishing House, 2018. Decorated with the French Order of Academic Palms (Chevalier des Palmes Académiques).

The last time we talked about politics was two days before the last elections in Poland. What has changed since then?

“Since the elections in October 2023, or rather since the formation of the Donald Tusk government, that is, since December 13, 2023, the process of change in Poland that has been underway for some time has accelerated. On the one hand, there has been a transfer of power to the Civic Coalition, and on the other hand, much has happened on the international stage, which also affects the policy of this government. One of such events is the ongoing war in Ukraine, a prolonged conflict that has serious repercussions on the European and international stage. Secondly, we have the year 2024, the so-called ‘year of elections worldwide,’ because probably for the first time in the world, over 2 billion people in approximately 70 countries, more than half of the countries, will vote in the same year, and these are numbers that can bring about a change in the global political order. In recent days, elections have been held in Russia, in June – in the EU member states for the European Parliament, and in November, elections will be held in the USA. The result in Russia was predetermined, and Putin became the longest-serving leader of Russia, after previously eliminating the opposition, as evidenced by Navalny’s death. In the fall in the USA, Trump could win, which will ultimately lead to the detachment of the most important country in the world from democratic values, which in turn will lead to further changes in the world order. And then there is Europe, where votes will be cast between June 6 and 9, and so far it seems that democratic parties may prevail in the European Parliament. However, there are also many important countries, such as France, where the victory of right-wing parties is likely. In short, we have a complex international framework, which, after Putin’s predictable victory in the elections, heralds further escalation of the war in Ukraine, which, I emphasize, is not Russia’s only strategic goal.”

 

Between the recurring Biden-Trump showdown and European uncertainty, one might get the impression that we are living in an era lacking political figures capable of envisioning global development.

“In the United States, after four years, a troubling rematch is underway, while in Europe, there’s a lack of strong leadership after Angela Merkel’s departure. Olaf Scholz doesn’t seem to possess the personality or charisma to become the leader of all Europe in these challenging years. Meanwhile, Emmanuel Macron is attempting to be Europe’s leader, but he’s too entangled in domestic issues in France. Macron’s ratings are the lowest among all French prime ministers, so Europe is almost a tool for him to regain support in France. Certainly, we don’t have politicians on par with those from the end of the last century.”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, instabilities in Asia, the reactivation of conflict in Palestine – on our planet, there are about fifty different small wars ongoing, something that hasn’t happened since 1945. Can we speak of a third world war? Or how can we define this situation?

“We’ve experienced such a situation before and called it the ‘cold war.’ The tension that existed between Russia and the West during the cold war is resurfacing, while the dispute between China and Taiwan is escalating rapidly – a conflict that could escalate – and almost every region of the world has serious conflicts. Why is this happening? We should go back to the beginnings of the EU, or rather the first community, the European Coal and Steel Community, which emerged as an idea of economic cooperation to avoid war. While this idea developed in Europe, we didn’t have a common defense policy, a common army, precisely because we sought to nurture the value of peace. We had the longest period without war until 2014 (Crimea) or 2020 (Ukraine). Initially, France didn’t want to recognize this war as a European conflict. It argued that it was an internal matter concerning countries considered neighbors of Europe. However, President Macron has now changed his mind and is considering the possibility of sending a European contingent to the front. However, most European countries are opposed to this. For example, Poland wants to support Ukraine with weapons and funds but doesn’t want to send troops to avoid escalating the conflict. Certainly, for Europe, this is the most challenging situation since the end of World War II.”

 

Opinions circulate regarding the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Putin says he will send troops to the border with Finland, while Pope Francis calls on Ukraine to start negotiations to end the war. What do you think will be the outcome of this war, and can Europe accept Ukraine losing part of its territory?

“At this point, we cannot entertain such a scenario. Poland rejects the vision of a defeated Ukraine, and Europe counts on its victory, which is why it continues to support it. The resistance of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary has also been overcome, so aid for Ukraine has been unanimously granted. Furthermore, the process of negotiations for Ukraine’s accession to the EU has begun, with the first stage achieved. We are talking about further EU expansion, which not only concerns Ukraine but also other Balkan European countries. Scenarios in which Russia is forced to withdraw from Ukraine are still very relevant. Diplomatic actions confirm this as well. The recent, rather rare, joint visit of President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk to Washington for a meeting with President Joe Biden demonstrates the coherence of foreign policy positions as well as security. Fortunately, there is full agreement on national security in Poland. The recent Weimar Triangle summit in Berlin between Scholz, Macron, and Tusk precisely concerns security issues and the coherence of European and Atlantic positions.”

However, the hypothesis that Ukraine will not be able to regain occupied territories remains current. How will Europe behave in such a case?

“It’s hard for me to think about such a scenario. In Poland, we remember well what it was like to live under Soviet influence, so even the thought of recreating such a situation in Ukraine fills me with deep sadness. I don’t want to think about it also because in sociology, we talk about self-fulfilling prophecies, so I believe it’s better not to talk about it. I do not accept such a scenario. If Europe does not take a firm stand against Russia at this point, the conflict will continue to escalate.”

Do you think Russia’s withdrawal from Crimea or Donbas is realistic?

“Unfortunately, Russia only understands the argument of force. I don’t think Putin has as much support as he thinks; he is weaker than he appears, and I don’t think he can face the entire Western world, which is why it’s so important for us to be united and resist him together because only a united front can make it difficult for Putin to win. We’ll see how far he will go. The death of opposition figure Navalny was another indication that Putin is an authoritarian and ruthless leader. The democratic world must set limits for him; otherwise, there will be a huge escalation of conflicts and the destruction of the world order.”

Meanwhile, on the international stage, China is becoming a decisive voice between the West and Russia.

“From China’s perspective, what matters is the economy. They are trying in every way to leverage the current geopolitical situation in the world. Russia, on the other hand, is using this situation to establish new contacts in Africa. Western embargoes on Russian products mean that they are directed to African countries, which are happy to accept them and start cooperation with Russia. Hungary is also an important player in this international game, with Prime Minister Orbán leading the support for Russia. I repeat, Putin can be defeated without support, but the lack of solidarity among democratic countries prolongs the conflict and makes the situation increasingly difficult.”

 

What role does Poland want to play in the future of Europe? In recent years, it has shown a strong focus on the Three Seas Initiative, which involves relations with the Balkans.

“Here, political and economic visions converge. Regarding the Three Seas Initiative, it was a vision that emerged during the rule of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), when Poland was isolated on the international stage and ceased cooperation within, for example, the Weimar Triangle. The PiS government sought alternatives on the international stage. The Visegrad Group turned out to be an alternative, but they were small allies, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, now divided, among other things, on the issue of Ukraine (Slovakia stands with Orban, Poland with the Czech Republic). With a change in government, the format of cooperation within the Three Seas Initiative is losing its significance. The new government is returning to cooperation within historical and most important allies. Poland wants to return to the so-called first group of European countries and has conditions for this: location, size, population, and a prime minister with experience in governing in Europe. We are also preparing for the presidency of the Council of the EU, when Poland will have a significant influence on shaping the agenda of EU affairs.

As for relations with Europe and the USA, Poland certainly has a pro-European orientation, but at the same time, it has historical ties with the USA. Poland has always been torn between these two directions. The visit of the president and the prime minister to the USA took place on the 25th anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO, a date that unites all Poles. According to the surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), 90% of Polish respondents support Poland’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance (the highest, 94% support was in 2023, after Russia started the war in Ukraine). Security is the most important thing for Poles. Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which speaks of the Alliance’s response in case of an attack on one of the member countries, gives citizens a sense of security: on the one hand, we are in the EU, focusing on political and economic relations, and on the other hand, we have real protection within NATO.”

Do you think Washington is closer to Poles than Brussels?

“If we look at the value systems of Poles, we can conclude that Poles (oriented towards family and career) are closer to the USA than the EU. Historical factors also come into play. The first waves of Polish emigration in search of work headed overseas. The Polish diaspora in the USA is strong, many Poles still maintain close family ties with relatives in the USA. The Polish community is also a significant force during elections in the States. Presidential candidates always try to gain the votes of Poles living abroad. However, generational issues should also be taken into account. The bonds between Americans and Poles are stronger in older generations, while young Poles are much more connected to Europe. For example, a terrible mistake of the old government led by PiS was an attempt to renew the stereotype of the ‘bad German.’ The Polish public ‘didn’t buy it’ because Poles were aware of the economic significance of Germany for our country. Returning to this negative rhetoric was impossible for Poles, and the only ones who fell for it were representatives of the older generation, to whom information comes only from television and who do not have direct contact with other European countries. Especially in the older generation, there is a sense of closeness to the United States, a country that expresses similar values and ideas of authoritarian power. I believe that voters of right-wing parties in Poland view Trump favorably as a candidate for the President of the United States because he is a model of power and embodiment of a leader: a strong leader using tough, nationalist language. These are models of power that fascinate a certain electorate.”

The international atmosphere is difficult and worsens due to the crisis of perspectives, for example, in the 1980s, the direction was clear: to stop military development and build a united Europe. Now, 40 years later, we find ourselves in a completely different geopolitical situation. What can we expect in the future?

 

I think we should reconsider the concept of the nation-state. We should contemplate what a modern state should look like in times when citizens move between countries and have contact with the whole world even from home through social media, yet can benefit from what the state offers without participating in elections. Almost half of the states are no longer democratic, and we often add adjectives to define these pseudo-democracies, such as illiberal democracy, electoral democracy. Elections are, of course, a symbol of democracy, yet even in Russia, there are elections, and everyone knows that they are neither fair nor equal – hence, they are unreliable. Furthermore, new technologies are often used as a means of political manipulation or corruption. Technology is advancing faster than its regulations, which is very concerning. For example, in the current campaign for the European Parliament, there is talk of regulating the use of artificial intelligence and TikTok, but at the same time, the use of TikTok for campaigning before the European Parliament elections is allowed! This shows inconsistency. We know that new technologies are used to create deepfakes, false images or voices to manipulate public opinion. We are witnessing a technological revolution over which we have no control. Thus, while on the one hand, TikTok is under scrutiny by the EU regarding potential violations of the Digital Services Act (DSA), on the other hand – during the EP campaign, the use of TikTok is allowed to reach young people and persuade them to vote.”

In summary, are we politically and socially moving in the fog of private interests and macroeconomic benefits without any vision for the future?

“I don’t want to end our conversation on such a negative note, saying that there is no vision for the future. I think the war has worsened international relations and made politics as hard power (based on strength and violence) relevant again, moving us away from the concept of soft power, where a country’s power of attraction is determined by culture, science, and social issues. We need to rethink the concept of growth, promote sustainable consumption. The generation of our children is already seriously considering climate issues, but they also need mental well-being. This generation does not want to work like their parents; they want more free time and a balance between professional and personal life. If we want to develop as a society, we need to think differently about progress, where it’s not just about numbers and GDP growth, regardless of the costs and environmental devastation, but also about choices and sacrifices, about seeking different consumption patterns, understanding how expensive our lifestyle is and how much the next generation will pay for it.”

As a closing reflection on Poland: could a change of government herald a reopening of discussions about joining the eurozone?

“It is currently a topic that is not discussed, although many experts call for reflection on the possibility of adopting the euro. However, the war on the other side of our border currently monopolizes all discussions about political-economic prospects, so as long as the conflict in Ukraine continues, it will be the only real element of political discussion.”

 

 

 

 

Jędrzej Morawiecki – a journalist, essayist, professor at the University of Wrocław, lecturer, PhD in Slavic philology and sociology, author of books about Russia. His latest work, “Szuga. Landscape after the Empire,” was published in 2022 by Czytelnik.

Russia: The Demons Have Been Unleashed

Why did you focus on Russia? How did it all begin?

I used to be called a Russophile, although I didn’t think of myself that way. Since I can remember, this term had negative connotations. Andrzej Drawicz wrote in “A Kiss in the Frost” that being fascinated by French or British culture seems normal, but if you’re a Russophile, people look at you with pity. I got used to it. In high school, I hitchhiked to Moscow and later traveled further to Siberia. The first reason was, as Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote, the need for initiation. The prevailing narrative in Poland at the time spoke of a macho, patriarchal, masculine, and cowboy-like Russia. When I returned from there, people would ask, “Tell us, how terrible is it there?” Russia was simply rejected because it was a land of oddities, something we fear, something we disdain – a place that improved our self-esteem.

However, it is essential to know that Russia did undergo a more brutal transformation, experiencing more inequalities, but at that time, we didn’t differ from them as much as everyone thought. Our sense of superiority stemmed, among other things, from Western aspirations. Back then, I wasn’t fully aware of these things.

I was fascinated by Russian culture. I learned to write based on French and Russian literature and from Russian journalists. I was fortunate to see a Russia that no longer exists, a brighter Russia – it was a short time, just a window.

Back then, we felt superior. Now, after February, we feel contempt.

Exactly, after February. Earlier, people didn’t want to hear much about the war in Donbas. When I was looking for a publisher for “Szuga,” I received signals that the book was “too sad, and people, especially after COVID, don’t want to hear about armed conflicts.” It was then that I realized we start to be interested in such topics when we begin to be afraid. And we started to be afraid on February 24, 2022.

Is it true that Russians love Putin?

Unfortunately, this is largely true. It must be said clearly – externally, Russia has lost any legitimacy to say anything to anyone. And it will be like this for several generations. What about internally? I can’t enter Russia now, like almost nobody can. It’s challenging for formal reasons, and most importantly, going in is one thing, but coming back is another unknown. Therefore, it’s difficult to talk about real moods among Russians. However, when I do my “Kremlin press reviews,” checking propaganda messages every day, I still see that someone has been arrested, sentenced. It doesn’t change the statistics; the proportions are consistently reported – about 15-20 percent of Russians openly say they do not support Putin or the war, which, considering the current conditions, is an act of courage. Today, in many ways, the repression resembles Stalinist ones – in terms of the length of sentences and the judicial system.

On the other end, there is the “hardcore electorate” – people who support Putin. They make up about one-third. The rest are “transient” – those who, in the longer term, can change something, although not necessarily people we imagine as pro-European or pro-democratic in our understanding.

We would like to see them that way.

They are mainly pragmatic – those who want to live somehow, took out mortgages, some have experienced the taste of the middle class. Pro-democratic people, understanding the role of independent media, are scarce in Russia – most of them have left, and journalists have been silenced or fled. I interview them, checking what is happening with their identity.

They must be going through a drama.

They experience depressive states, feel immense torn emotions, great loneliness, shame for the country – strategies and attitudes vary. Some say, “Leave me alone, I left, and I have nothing to do with the war.” Others apologize and know that the world will not forget. Some are aware of this, but we must remember that 71 percent of Russians do not have a valid passport, 69 percent have never been abroad. The perspective for many people will be to be fed what is in the media. And there is only one channel – the same thing is shown every day in all agencies, press, and television, following the agenda of the day.

You have been following the war from the beginning; whose arguments are stronger now?

It is said that the course of the war can only be predicted until the first shot. And that’s exactly how it is. Those who see Ukrainians on the front lines say it’s not good. But, on the other hand, if we change our perspective and look from the February point of view, then we would say it’s great because Ukraine is resisting for a long time and fighting.

We in Poland are very fortunate that it’s not happening here, and the front will not move – of course, because of NATO. One thing is certain – Putin has done incredibly much to lay Russia down and destroy it for generations. Russia is bankrupt. As for Ukraine and the identity of the Donbas residents – it has been awakened because people saw the choice between freedom and going to Moscow as a guest worker from a colonized territory where corruption and crime are rampant, and there is no freedom of speech and political freedom.

What does Putin want?

If we put aside personal stories, which are challenging to analyze…

There are speculations that he is mentally ill.

Yes, but others say it is precisely the opposite, and he thinks very rationally. What does he want? I have various answers based on my conversations with Russians and visits to the country. A change was happening before my eyes, and it was already very noticeable from 2016. In a country where special services have solidified their position, stricter control was beginning. Friends from Russian universities said, for example, that they have to pass on all their correspondence with me to avoid accusations of contact with a spy. That was the moment when I began to realize that Russia is different – and it’s not just about Putin. Once, I heard from an acquaintance, “It’s unclear who the frog is here – us or Putin and who created whom.” On the one hand, we can say that he represents 19th-century thinking, that his behaviors are like a child’s play, rearranging blocks on a map. And there is some truth in that.

 

Conspiracy theories suggest that Putin is not alive.

I think this is highly unlikely. I assume that the reasons behind Putin’s behavior stem from psychology, biology, personal ambitions, and perhaps a mid-life crisis – not the average mid-life crisis but the next one. Instead of another Ferrari, he annexed Crimea. I also think he is disappointed. We can observe a similar attitude in our political landscape, for example, in the case of Kaczyński, whose personal animosities influence the entire politics. I assume that these elements also matter for Putin. We have a person who has a significant influence on reality, has his surroundings, builds visions, and can decide to narrow the circle of trusted individuals. We wondered about the condition and situation of Kaczyński, right? Now, imagine what must be happening there and what questions Russians must be asking themselves.

In my opinion, Putin’s animosities have led him to the other side of the mirror, from where there is no turning back. This is clearly one of the reasons. And how did it happen? One of the heroes of “Szuga,” Mikołaj Karpicki, a liberal through and through, says that it was known from the beginning, from the moment Putin came to power. On the other hand, his friend Kuziczkin, who was the head of the culture department in the Tomsk region and once supported Putin, tells a different story. On the day he was told to return his passport, he packed up and left. He says he knew Putin and that Putin changed. He got scared of Khodorkovsky, of Maidan. In crisis moments, we return to settling accounts in our lives; that’s when we start testing another option, the one we didn’t choose. Kuziczkin claims that Putin once believed he was a pro-European Peter the Great, maybe even imagined that Russia would co-create the EU. I don’t exclude this possibility – he might have genuinely thought that this path was possible, but later he got scared and disappointed. As a former KGB man, he returned to the harshest KGB methods. Intelligence services think in paranoid terms; they must operate in the enemy category – otherwise, their existence makes no sense. As a result, we have what we have. Karpicki claims he has always been like that. Kuziczkin says he changed. And I think both can be true because we have several layers of our identity.

But the fact is that over all these years, unfortunately, Russians have also changed a lot, as seen in surveys. This year, only 8% of Russians declare feeling fear or disgust towards Stalin (for comparison: in 2001, 43% of Russian citizens negatively assessed Stalin). In 2023, 54% of respondents consider him a Great Leader, new monuments to Stalin are being erected in Russia, and Stalin Centers are planned in million-person cities. The demons have been unleashed. This was not visible 10-20 years ago when I regularly traveled there. Today, it’s not just about Putin; it’s about the whole apparatus of which he is a part – if he gives up a piece, he will lose everything. That’s why Russia needs to be humiliated, and I believe it will eventually happen. They must unequivocally know that it didn’t pay off.

How will the war unfold?

I’m not a great optimist, but we have to try from all sides to prevent Russia from winning. This monstrous, imperial identity must be destroyed. Certainly, it will not be that suddenly a peace agreement will be signed, and the war will end. Today, it seems that a spectacular victory for either side is not possible. Remember that war legitimizes Putin’s power. When it ends, what will be the new fuel? Russia has an interest in fueling the conflict. Any change potentially could result in a change of power and settling scores.

However, Ukraine is also not capable of winning. Many problems are piling up there, which we don’t talk about – there is massive corruption, and there is a shortage of people.

Morale is declining.

Yes. But Ukraine is genuinely fighting for its life. Some time ago, many Ukrainians said that Donbas could be given up, but that was before February. Today, now that the pro-European course is possible, Ukrainians want to go our way – something unimaginable and, paradoxically, owe it to Putin.

Many commentators emphasize that Putin is just waiting for Trump to return to power.

Speculating about Trump is probably even more challenging than speculating about Putin. But the facts are that Trump is liked in Russia. Kremlin propaganda is evidently pro-Trump, and it’s clear that his re-election would make them very happy. I’m not saying Trump is purely pro-Russian, but they share many characteristics – contempt for democracy, pluralism, and the idea and belief in a tough, strong, hard hand. It seems to work on this principle, and it’s very possible that Russia had a hand in Trump’s victory. What if Trump won again? I try not to imagine this scenario because it could be unsettling. Then the entire burden of assistance would shift to Europe, which would probably seek a truce and a freezing of the conflict.

I still believe that Russia can be very dangerous, but generally, we are witnessing the fall of the empire. Russia has such an outdated way of thinking, it is blind to itself, to its history, that it must end, we are observing a similar process to the fall of colonial states.

Importantly, Russia is losing influence. It has completely subordinated only Lukashenko, who from our perspective was already on their side. And what about the role of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Armenia? It is not obvious; these countries have stopped aligning with Russia because they see that it has little to offer. And as a superpower, it is falling apart.

How long can this collapse last?

A long time, at least a decade. We must remember that there is no mass resistance movement there; only 10-15% oppose Putin.

It is difficult to imagine today that these 10-15% suddenly gain subjectivity and start fighting.

Yes, but over the decade, that can change. Remember that many people fled from there; we have a historically unprecedented emigration. These people, potentially, can be a factor for change. We showed Ukrainians that it is possible to build a different world, to fight corruption, that elections matter, that the state can function more efficiently, better.

Are we teaching them democracy?

Yes, those are big words, but it is happening. Not through lectures, but because they can see how it works here. And I believe that when it comes to Russians, it should be the same. Those who have clearly opposed Putin, who do not legitimize evil, should receive our support. Those who try to have both – to have Europe and at the same time one foot in Russia – should be deprived of such support. Russia is like the Third Reich – those who co-create it should be excluded; those who pay a huge price for renouncing it should be supported

 

 

The seven -day break in the amazing performances of the strength of the Israeli army with Hamas in Gaza ended as befits a dramatic spectacle – a salvo of rockets towards Israel. All this only a day after the American Secretary of State decided to wipe sweat from the forehead of the Jerusalem authorities. Reason? Well, the prolonged war of Israel with this “completely peaceful” organization Hamas would have a negative impact on the presidential campaign in America. (Of course, he didn’t use these words literally, but who would care about it?)

 

Antony Blinken, wanting to impress his diplomatic finesse, added a few more conditions. A quick hearing with Hamas may not be associated with an increased number of civil victims, it must be with a full range of humanitarian aid for Gaza, and of course, Israel must reveal its great plans for the post -war period.

 

Blinken, like a real magician of diplomacy, suggests that after the fall of Hamas, Israel should transfer power over the gauze of Palestinian autonomy. Is it not beautiful, as the American secretary knows what will be best for the region?

 

The answer of the Israeli prime minister was as if he were asked to place plans for the colonization of Mars. He said firmly that as long as he sits on the prime minister’s chair, Palestinian autonomy, this excellent institution supporting terror and training youth in the field of terrorism, he would not get the opportunity to govern gauze after the liquidation of Hamas.

 

I have not yet mentioned that Blinken, like a man with a proliferation in the field of prophecy, seems to know the plans of Hamas and his principals in Tehran. He probably knew what was awaiting Israel, even before Hamas announced it in public. Blinken also stated that the Israeli army is such a miracle of technology that it can adapt to any whim. (Does anyone expect such a level of flexibility from their army?)

 

It was also not fooled to point out that after an exhausting day, Blinken, tired like a hundred marathons, flew over the ocean, and Hamas terrorists rubbed their hands, preparing their rockets.

 

Further development of the situation? Nobody knows, but what the world thinks about this conflict will certainly decide about its final result.

 

As at November 29, the UN celebrations are planned for the International Solidarity Day with the Palestinian nation. The Secretary General of this organization, António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres, promised steadfast support for Palestinians on the way to peace, security, justice and dignity.

 

Of course, the day before, during a more modest ceremony, Guterres gracified that “Palestinians go through one of the darkest chapters of their history.” Undoubtedly, everyone present had an unequivocal idea, as the secretary said. Nobody thought it was about Hamas’ actions, oppressing Palestinians or a murderous dictatorship. Of course not.

 

Guterres has repeatedly emphasized that Hamas’ attack on October 7 requires condemnation, but nothing justifies a collective penalty for Palestinians. After all, who would not understand that Hamas is a victim.

 

In Poland, when we hear about collective responsibility, we immediately think about the German occupation, round -ups, shots and similar fairy tales. But are we not happy that the current UN Secretary general has a name from the Portuguese government, who with virtuosity in 1496 issued Jews and Muslims from Portugal? A real treat for history.

 

Of course, the name Manuel, although it is associated with unpleasant stories for Jews, in Portugal it is like gold. And who could associate them with collective responsibility? Finally, it is always better to pay attention to overseas conquests and the greatest flourishing of Portugal under the same Manuel.

 

António Manuel de Oliveira probably would never have thought that cutting the heads of infants is such a nice form of collective punishment, in line with the spirit of Christianity and Islam. In the end, this is the tradition of Portugal, which is absolutely incompatible with the UN card, but who would care about it?

 

The idea of collective punishment for today’s Europeans and Americans is “Solidarity with Palestinians”. Of course, not those who want peace with Israel, whether they want to return to their homes, or those who are fed up with the rule of Hamas or Fatahu. It is about those who want to continue terrorism and raise their children for future war heroes.

 

According to some, the war against a genocidal organization is a “collective penalty”. But for whom? For those who support an organization murdering on their behalf. Israel, trying to limit civil victims, seems to be the only villain in this story. Antony Blinken and António Guterres know this perfectly. But the use of such concepts has its higher goals, right?

 

 

Europe is becoming increasingly impoverished, a political fortress with a stagnant economy

Interview with Tomasz Wróblewski, CEO of the Warsaw Enterprise Institute

Conducted by Sebastiano Giorgi

On Aleje Jerozolimskie 30, in the heart of bustling Warsaw, we met with Tomasz Wróblewski, the CEO of the Warsaw Enterprise Institute (WEI). A journalist who has written for publications such as “Newsweek Polska” and “Forbes Polska,” he began his professional career in the United States. After graduating from the University of Houston, he worked for “Newsweek” and “The Washington Post.” He was a correspondent for Radio Free Europe in Washington, and after 1989, for Polish independent media. He created, among other things, the Washington bureau of the RMF radio station. Upon returning to Poland, he was the program director of RMF radio, deputy editor-in-chief of “Wprost,” and later the editor-in-chief of “Newsweek Polska” and “Forbes,” as well as the vice president of the publishing group “Polskapresse.” Later, he became the editor-in-chief of “Dziennik Gazety Prawnej” and “Rzeczpospolita.” Currently, he is the CEO of one of the largest and most important freedom-oriented think tanks in Poland and Central-Eastern Europe.

 

The world is in a state of war – are the causes more ideological or economic?

 

Interest is always underpinned by ideology. For example, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is accompanied by a massive ideological apparatus that explains why Russia is doing this. And it is not unfounded – rejecting Putin’s conspiracy theories, there remains the conviction that Russia must govern Ukraine to remain the most important state in the region. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to exist in Europe. It is not a European but an Asian country. In this war, economics and ideology mix because Putin’s historiographical interpretation of Ukraine’s historical ties to Russia emerges. Putin believes that a historical interpretation can change people’s sense of belonging, but it is not so. People feel Italian or Polish, or they feel Ukrainian and do not feel Russian. History does not matter. The same can be said about the war between Israel and Palestine, where ideology and religion play a huge role. Add to this the fact that in today’s world, there is a deep division largely stemming from the collapse of the so-called West, the breakdown of the Athenian-Judaistic-Christian value system that connected us for years, and the decline of Aristotle’s thought, which proclaimed that man thinks of the community as the most important frame of reference. Instead, we experience a breakdown into tribal individualism that divides states but also people based on affiliation: women, men, homosexuals, heterosexuals, and so on. The weakness of the West pushes other countries to exploit it. This is the so-called “perfect storm” phenomenon due to the number of problems that overlap at the same time. We are dealing with a demographic decline that makes us less efficient and productive, exacerbating economic decline, partly caused by an aging society. The older the society and the more social funds are needed, the greater the protectionism. The more protectionism grows, the weaker the economy becomes. Add to this ideologies that make people see no reason to die for Ukraine, Gaza, or Israel. All these elements come together

 

For many decades, Italy has been one of the most closely connected European countries with the United States. Has Poland now taken on that role?

 

For decades, Poland has always had a close connection with North America, dating back to the great emigration of the 19th century. Since then, everything good came to Poland from the USA: money from emigrant families, President Wilson’s guarantee of establishing an independent state for Poland after World War I, and, when under the yoke of Russia, hope for salvation in America. Idealization of America has always been present in Poland. However, the situation is changing. Pro-American sympathies are not as strong as they used to be, partly because the United States itself is changing. It is no longer the same country as in the 1960s and 1970s. America is divided, fragmented. It is true that in Poland, we are still attached to America and have illusions, but that is also changing. Meanwhile, President Macron, talking about building a Europe sovereign from America, understands the public sentiment. Twenty years ago, he wouldn’t have said this because no one would have taken him seriously. Today, America is, in a sense, “thrown out” of Europe. True, American troops still station here, but if you look at financial institutions, most investment banks have left Europe, not because they were kicked out, but because the market is overregulated. In Europe, for example, large American IT companies are seriously hindered by a wave of regulations, causing America to no longer see Europe as a place that can bring high profits. However, what do we get in return for this loss? In reality, there is no strong European community focused on a common idea. We have a few vague ideas about a united Europe. We still repeat phrases like “European tradition and identity,” but we don’t really know what that means, and above all, we can’t translate it into reality. Here’s an example – when a crisis erupts in one of the U.S. states, like a hurricane in Louisiana, aid from other states arrives the next day. But when floods and fires hit Greece, immediate financial aid from the European Union is not sent, and when Italy experiences a financial crisis, loans are offered, not joint support. European solidarity is an empty word.

Poland and Europe maintain complex relations, and it even seems that for Warsaw, Europe is merely an institution to seek support from rather than an ideal to actively participate in and contribute to.

 

The justification is that, fundamentally, we are still a country “catching up,” convinced that we always have to chase after other nations. I admit that Poland probably does not contribute as much to the European Union as it should, and even if there are ideas at the European level, they are not implemented. For years, we were told that we had to look at the large European countries and copy them. And so we did, copying everything from banking systems and restaurants to work ethics. Over time, we learn that not everything is worth emulating, or that perhaps it was at some point, but today we can do many things better.

 

However, in Poland, a country that did not exist on maps for over 120 years and then was under Soviet domination until 1989, there is still an “embedded” complex that reinforces the belief that everything good comes from abroad. This attitude is changing in Polish companies that acquire businesses from Germany or other countries, demonstrating that they can do business better. However, changing our mentality takes time.

 

Poland is more business-friendly than Italy.

 

We do not perceive Poland as economically favorable; on this scale, we are second to last, better only than Italy in terms of the quality of the tax system. The state’s involvement in the economy is very high. We have not been able to fully unleash this economic driving force. A good measure of this is the low number of Polish investments in Poland. It is foreigners who believe in the economy and opportunities of our country, not Poles who, after making profits in Poland, invest in homes in Italy and abroad because they consider the legal and tax system in Poland too unpredictable and unstable. This is a unique case: I do not know of any other country in the world where citizens are afraid to invest in their own country, unlike foreigners whose investments surpass domestic ones. I believe that the most business-friendly economies are those in which the state has the least say. Even in Sweden, the situation is better because it is a country where, although the economy is much more social, the state is far from business. Of course, one cannot deny that there are hard facts in favor of Poland: we have one of the highest rates of economic growth in Europe, strong exports despite the crisis in the West, and fantastic growth in prosperity. Prime Minister Morawiecki claims that in a short time, we can have a higher GDP per capita than the Italians, which, in my opinion, is more a result of Italy denying its prosperity. However, Poland is not fully utilizing its potential, and this is somewhat due to what we talked about earlier, namely the lack of vision, the perspective of a country capable of playing a leading role in the European and international arena.

 

There are two crucial issues that are on the agenda of every country: energy and immigration.

 

Energy will be a real problem in the coming years. The increasing electricity prices for businesses and households are becoming a growing concern. The government is addressing the issue by offering benefits to families and businesses, but it cannot do this indefinitely. Sooner or later, a crisis will come. At this moment, the only solution in the relatively short term seems to be nuclear energy. The topic of the energy revolution concerns the whole of Europe, and much is said about it, which made us think that we had found a solution. In reality, we have not fully transitioned to renewable energy sources. There are many ideas on how to eliminate the old energy model, but there is none on how to create a new one that will make businesses thrive. The energy revolution is often referred to as a technological revolution. However, this is not the case – every technological revolution has created more jobs and increased GDP. So far, all changes in the energy sector have created fewer jobs in the energy industry and businesses, resulting in more losses than benefits. Perhaps it will be beneficial for the climate in a hundred years – I wish this for my great-grandchildren – but for today, we have no idea how to solve the energy problem. It is a huge challenge, especially for the Polish government due to our dependence on coal.

As for immigration, there is much talk about it in Poland, but in reality, the problem does not exist because we do not have generous benefits for immigrants. An immigrant coming to Poland receives the same amount of money as an unemployed Pole, which is practically not enough to live on. Those who come to Poland counting on benefits go straight to other European countries. However, we have many immigrants who work. Few people know that we have around 100,000 Pakistanis and Hindus. We have Vietnamese and, of course, immigrants from Eastern Europe, Belarusians, and Ukrainians. They all work. The employment rate of foreigners is 84%, which is very high compared to 30 or 40% in other European countries. We look with horror at European solutions to the migration crisis, such as refugee camps. When the problem with Ukraine started, we met with Prime Minister Morawiecki and told him, ‘Whatever happens, let’s not open camps, let’s not gather people in one place. Let’s spread them throughout the country, let NGOs operate.’ I was in Greece, and I personally saw such a camp. I know that there are such camps in Italy as well. It is a tragedy for those in the camp and those living nearby. These are structures that attract criminal organizations. Our response to this problem is: if you cannot welcome someone into your home, do not let them into your country. And certainly, do not lock them up in a camp. Isolating people means you do not want to integrate them, so do not expect them to be part of your community when they leave the camp because they will harbor immense resentment

 

 

In the midst of this “perfect storm” — encompassing wars, energy issues, and global instability — are we in a moment of counter-globalization? Will supply chains undergo changes, and will the production of certain goods shift back to Europe?

 

The European Union originated as a coal and steel community, essentially a goods union. Since then, virtually nothing has changed. Today, two-thirds of the EU’s GDP is comprised of services, not coal and steel or goods. The Treaty on the Free Exchange of Services has not been ratified by the majority of countries. Consequently, we lack a single large financial portal like the United States. The largest e-commerce platform is Amazon, and the biggest film distributor in Europe is Netflix, not a European company. If you want to apply for a loan to buy a car or a house in Italy, you have to submit an application to an Italian bank. The same goes for Poland—apply to a Polish bank. You cannot search the offers of all European banks to get the best loan. Banks do not compete with each other. We talk a lot about market competition, but it doesn’t exist! Now, let’s look at Asia, where there is no political community, and each country—Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia—is separate. However, Asia has a community of services. It has free trade in services and goods. These are things not discussed in Europe and things we can only dream about. Recently, Indonesia scored much worse in all digital financial trade quality indicators. What did other Asian countries do—which often differ in religion, values, and politics—such as China? They invested in Indonesian banks to raise the quality of financial services and ensure Indonesian banks are on the same financial level as others. In Europe, no one would do that. We are not even allowed to do it unless through European institutions. If we consider any trade route, for example, France-Germany, we will see that the exchange of services between them is smaller than between Texas and Alaska. We say we are a community, but we are politically united, not economically. When Schumann and the founding fathers talked about creating a united Europe, they claimed people would unite when they had common interests. It’s true, but we did not create common interests; we only created a political community. Each European country can become an economic power if people are given freedom in this area, not intrusive regulations. What is the current situation? Companies that existed before the war still operate. When they go bankrupt—like German Opel—the government economically intervenes. It doesn’t let these companies collapse. This continuous rotation develops, making CEOs dependent on politicians, and politicians dependent on businessmen. This increases social frustration, leading to political movements such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, the National Rally in France, and something similar emerging in Poland. A sense of stagnation arises, prompting a reaction. So, what should be done? Withdraw subsidies, release companies from the grip of the state, and return everything to the market. Finally, tell ourselves the truth: Europe is becoming poorer compared to America and Asia, and soon we will have to catch up with India because they will prove to be richer than us. What do Polish and European politicians do when prosperity in Europe collapses? They start giving out more and more social benefits. At some point, most citizens will receive some social benefits. But where does this money come from? When Americans, Indians, or Chinese want to invest in Europe, they have to pay a high price for it. The last product sold by Europe is access to 440 million affluent citizens. For an internet company to enter the European market, it must be broken up, divided, taxed here and there, in all countries. Protectionism, international barriers—building a fortress, closing ourselves off, and talking about Europe’s sovereignty—are mental issues. We are sovereign. Is our lack of sovereignty due to the fact that Americans are richer and keep their army here to defend us? Is this a lack of sovereignty? They can leave. Will we become richer because of it? I doubt it. We may think we will be freer, but we certainly won’t be safer.

 

How can we change Europe for the better?

The first problem is that we are a political union rather than an economic one. We try to impose rules of living on people by force, instead of allowing these principles to emerge from within themselves. What did the Americans do that made the whole world want to emulate them? What made the world want to imitate the British in the past? The answer lies in their way of working and living, in the best and easiest manner. Therefore, we need to work on ourselves to create a wealthy and strong Europe: then, everyone will want to integrate with us. The crucial step is the depoliticization of the economy.

 

Roasting Volodymyr Zelensky in New York could be compared to an accidental firecracker explosion at a New Year’s Eve party – a lot of noise, not much sense. The theatrical performance by the President of Ukraine reminded us that even in the era of the global political stage, everyone has their moments of weakness. Zelensky is undoubtedly a talented actor, but not everyone knows that in reality, he is a leader of a country under pressure, which none of us would want to experience.

 

During World War II, Churchill drank whisky and smoked cigars, and Eisenhower read westerns. And Zelensky? Well, he seems to choose rhetorical attacks on his allies as a way to vent his emotions. It’s as if dinners with friends have turned into verbal skirmishes on the international stage.

 

If this was meant to be a roast, it seems that the president didn’t quite grasp the essence of the performance. Zelensky’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September this year resembled more an attempt to summon rain during a drought. And just like with weak jokes, if you have to explain what was supposed to be funny, it’s clear that something went wrong.

 

The reaction to Zelensky’s words, especially the suggestion that Poland is aiding Russia, was quite unequivocal – regardless of political sympathies, many Poles were downright outraged. It seems that Kyiv now expects unconditional support from Warsaw, regardless of the costs.

 

Our relations with Ukraine sometimes resemble the story of the Gauls fighting against Rome, but in the opposite direction. Although I don’t know anyone who would root for the empire in a clash with two brave Gauls, some people across the Vistula still seem to insist that Ukraine should be kept on a tight leash. Is this a reasonable approach?

 

By the way, few people in Poland probably realize that the most supporters of this approach can be found in the United States. Since February 24, 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine, sympathies have been clear: for us, Ukraine is like a village of Gauls, and any news of Russia’s failures arouses positive emotions in us, whether in Poland or on the other side of the Atlantic.

 

Kyiv seems fully aware of this support and uses it as a diplomatic tool in a rather original way. Zelensky’s recent statements could be seen as an attempt to throw sympathy straight in the face of an ally, while also demanding additional assistance.

 

Poland’s and Ukraine’s interests don’t always align. Kyiv has not signed an agreement obliging it to act in line with Warsaw’s expectations. Even if such an obligation existed, Ukraine would expect it more from the United States, which surpasses other countries in providing military aid to Ukraine.

 

Some may consider this heresy, but the fact is that not all of Poland’s and Ukraine’s interests align perfectly. We are dealing with cultural and economic differences, as well as differing perspectives on Ukraine’s future membership. Polish-Ukrainian relations in the future may sometimes resemble a blank verse – full of white spaces and questions about what comes next. However, if Kyiv expects a partnership with Warsaw, it’s worth taking the principle of reciprocity seriously.

 

The roast of Zelensky in New York may not have been great, but it reminded us that Ukraine has its aspirations and dreams that may differ from those of the Poles. It is worth lowering expectations on both sides and trying to build relationships based on mutual understanding. Because in the end, in politics, as in life, it’s not only what unites us that matters, but also how we deal with our differences.

Luca Franchetti Pardo took the position of the Italian Ambassador to Poland in February 2023. In his diplomatic career, which began in 1989, he has held various roles in Italy and abroad, including as Deputy Chief of Mission in Tel Aviv, at the Permanent Representation of Italy to the Atlantic Council in Brussels, and later in Washington. He has also served as Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the EU and most recently as Deputy Director-General for Political Affairs and Director for Security at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In Warsaw, Franchetti Pardo had a challenging start with the arrival of representatives from the highest Italian state institutions: President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella, followed by two visits from Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Minister of Made in Italy Adolf Urso, Minister of Sport and Youth Andrea Abodi, Minister of Culture Gennaro Sangiuliano, not to mention the organization of an impressive celebration of the Italian Republic – Festa della Repubblica Italiana – with the participation of around a thousand guests.

“Indeed, it must be acknowledged that it was an intense time, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visiting just five days after the start of my term. This visit was important from a symbolic point of view, as it took place on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Then, a month later, it was the turn of Minister of Entrepreneurship and Made in Italy Adolf Urso in Warsaw, and after less than two months, a significant state visit by President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella. It was a long and important mission that brought President Mattarella to Krakow and Auschwitz on the day of the ‘March of the Living,’ in which 10,000 people participated, including many school delegations and several Italian Holocaust survivors.”

What impression did the Italian community in Poland leave on you?

Although I know the vitality and vigor of our community, I must admit that I am very positively impressed by it. There is a thriving network of Italian entrepreneurs rooted in Polish society, not just here for business purposes, but genuinely integrated into the community. There is an intense cultural interdependence supported by many initiatives and events, showing that we continue the legacy of historical centuries-old relations between Italy and Poland. In this regard, I would like to mention the recent visit of Minister of Culture Sangiuliano, who participated in the inauguration of a very important exhibition currently taking place at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, focusing on the beginnings of the Italian Renaissance.

Considering its current central geopolitical position, is Poland becoming an increasingly strategic country for Italy?

Poland is one of the five most important countries in Europe in terms of size, demographics, and economic growth, particularly central due to its influence among countries in the Baltic-Black Sea region. The conflict in Ukraine has only highlighted this crucial fact. Poles are becoming increasingly aware of this, and I believe that, by taking on this central role, they are seeking allies. Italy is certainly a friendly country to Poland, both because of historical and cultural ties and due to a lack of conflicts of interest and complex relations with other countries. This mix of positive factors connecting Rome and Warsaw has allowed both countries to develop exceptional economic relations in recent years, leading to a trade exchange of 34 billion euros. These numbers, which exceed those with large countries like Brazil and India, show that the path of Euro-Atlanticism is a roadmap for our development. Let me explain: the pandemic, along with disruptions in value chains, has shown that the era of globalization is coming to an end. Today, our internal market is Europe, and in this context, it is essential to continue investing here, as value chains will be safer in terms of distance and these very “values.” This means that we are dealing with countries that also share ethical standards similar to ours. However, this does not mean that we need to build a “European fortress.” On the contrary, Italy has a highly internationalized economy and has always prospered through international trade. We must continue to prioritize developing relationships with our European neighbors.

What do you think will happen on the long-awaited day when the war in Ukraine ends?

First, we will celebrate the end of this nightmare and, I am convinced, a just peace for Ukraine. From this perspective, it is clear that a massive effort is needed to rebuild the country, both in terms of infrastructure and regulations, to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union, which is its natural goal. Poland and Italy can play a significant role in the country’s reconstruction, and they are already heading in that direction. While we are aware of the close Polish-Ukrainian relations, it should be noted that Italy is also active and close to Kiev. We were, in fact, among the promoters of Ukraine’s candidacy for EU membership. There is also the matter of organizing Expo 2030. Due to the war, Odessa’s candidacy has been withdrawn, but since Rome was chosen (as the only European candidate and the capital of a country that is openly allied with Kiev), efforts are being made to develop an effective formula for cooperation with Odessa in this regard. All of these issues seem to me to be excellent reasons to build hope that we can also count on Poland’s support here.

What do you think about the growing number of members in AIRE (Registry of Italians Resident Abroad) in Poland?

The presence of Italian citizens in Poland is indeed increasing, and I hope this phenomenon will contribute to a revival of relations between both countries. We are well aware that the actual numbers associated with the Italian presence in Poland far exceed official data. As an ambassador, I strive to develop what Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tajani called “growth diplomacy,” which involves diplomatic actions that help Italians prosper economically in the country and around the world, wherever there is a “demand” for our culture, economy, and language. These three synergistic pillars of Italian identity abroad. Therefore, we are focusing on the prospect of increasing the number of Italian language classes in Polish high schools and, why not, establishing an institution conducted entirely in Italian.

 

Is there any specific goal that is close to you and that you want to achieve during this mandate?

 

The role of diplomacy, and therefore mine, is to focus on initiatives that strengthen relations between Italy and Poland in various fields and areas. I would like to see more exchanges and collaborative projects between Italian and Polish universities. Italy takes pride in its education system, both at the primary and specialized levels, which is of the highest standard. We are a country that invests in research and innovation, and, therefore, we aim to attract companies and young people from abroad, including from Poland