Jędrzej Morawiecki – a journalist, essayist, professor at the University of Wrocław, lecturer, PhD in Slavic philology and sociology, author of books about Russia. His latest work, “Szuga. Landscape after the Empire,” was published in 2022 by Czytelnik.
Russia: The Demons Have Been Unleashed
Why did you focus on Russia? How did it all begin?
I used to be called a Russophile, although I didn’t think of myself that way. Since I can remember, this term had negative connotations. Andrzej Drawicz wrote in “A Kiss in the Frost” that being fascinated by French or British culture seems normal, but if you’re a Russophile, people look at you with pity. I got used to it. In high school, I hitchhiked to Moscow and later traveled further to Siberia. The first reason was, as Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote, the need for initiation. The prevailing narrative in Poland at the time spoke of a macho, patriarchal, masculine, and cowboy-like Russia. When I returned from there, people would ask, “Tell us, how terrible is it there?” Russia was simply rejected because it was a land of oddities, something we fear, something we disdain – a place that improved our self-esteem.
However, it is essential to know that Russia did undergo a more brutal transformation, experiencing more inequalities, but at that time, we didn’t differ from them as much as everyone thought. Our sense of superiority stemmed, among other things, from Western aspirations. Back then, I wasn’t fully aware of these things.
I was fascinated by Russian culture. I learned to write based on French and Russian literature and from Russian journalists. I was fortunate to see a Russia that no longer exists, a brighter Russia – it was a short time, just a window.
Back then, we felt superior. Now, after February, we feel contempt.
Exactly, after February. Earlier, people didn’t want to hear much about the war in Donbas. When I was looking for a publisher for “Szuga,” I received signals that the book was “too sad, and people, especially after COVID, don’t want to hear about armed conflicts.” It was then that I realized we start to be interested in such topics when we begin to be afraid. And we started to be afraid on February 24, 2022.
Is it true that Russians love Putin?
Unfortunately, this is largely true. It must be said clearly – externally, Russia has lost any legitimacy to say anything to anyone. And it will be like this for several generations. What about internally? I can’t enter Russia now, like almost nobody can. It’s challenging for formal reasons, and most importantly, going in is one thing, but coming back is another unknown. Therefore, it’s difficult to talk about real moods among Russians. However, when I do my “Kremlin press reviews,” checking propaganda messages every day, I still see that someone has been arrested, sentenced. It doesn’t change the statistics; the proportions are consistently reported – about 15-20 percent of Russians openly say they do not support Putin or the war, which, considering the current conditions, is an act of courage. Today, in many ways, the repression resembles Stalinist ones – in terms of the length of sentences and the judicial system.
On the other end, there is the “hardcore electorate” – people who support Putin. They make up about one-third. The rest are “transient” – those who, in the longer term, can change something, although not necessarily people we imagine as pro-European or pro-democratic in our understanding.
We would like to see them that way.
They are mainly pragmatic – those who want to live somehow, took out mortgages, some have experienced the taste of the middle class. Pro-democratic people, understanding the role of independent media, are scarce in Russia – most of them have left, and journalists have been silenced or fled. I interview them, checking what is happening with their identity.
They must be going through a drama.
They experience depressive states, feel immense torn emotions, great loneliness, shame for the country – strategies and attitudes vary. Some say, “Leave me alone, I left, and I have nothing to do with the war.” Others apologize and know that the world will not forget. Some are aware of this, but we must remember that 71 percent of Russians do not have a valid passport, 69 percent have never been abroad. The perspective for many people will be to be fed what is in the media. And there is only one channel – the same thing is shown every day in all agencies, press, and television, following the agenda of the day.
You have been following the war from the beginning; whose arguments are stronger now?
It is said that the course of the war can only be predicted until the first shot. And that’s exactly how it is. Those who see Ukrainians on the front lines say it’s not good. But, on the other hand, if we change our perspective and look from the February point of view, then we would say it’s great because Ukraine is resisting for a long time and fighting.
We in Poland are very fortunate that it’s not happening here, and the front will not move – of course, because of NATO. One thing is certain – Putin has done incredibly much to lay Russia down and destroy it for generations. Russia is bankrupt. As for Ukraine and the identity of the Donbas residents – it has been awakened because people saw the choice between freedom and going to Moscow as a guest worker from a colonized territory where corruption and crime are rampant, and there is no freedom of speech and political freedom.
What does Putin want?
If we put aside personal stories, which are challenging to analyze…
There are speculations that he is mentally ill.
Yes, but others say it is precisely the opposite, and he thinks very rationally. What does he want? I have various answers based on my conversations with Russians and visits to the country. A change was happening before my eyes, and it was already very noticeable from 2016. In a country where special services have solidified their position, stricter control was beginning. Friends from Russian universities said, for example, that they have to pass on all their correspondence with me to avoid accusations of contact with a spy. That was the moment when I began to realize that Russia is different – and it’s not just about Putin. Once, I heard from an acquaintance, “It’s unclear who the frog is here – us or Putin and who created whom.” On the one hand, we can say that he represents 19th-century thinking, that his behaviors are like a child’s play, rearranging blocks on a map. And there is some truth in that.
Conspiracy theories suggest that Putin is not alive.
I think this is highly unlikely. I assume that the reasons behind Putin’s behavior stem from psychology, biology, personal ambitions, and perhaps a mid-life crisis – not the average mid-life crisis but the next one. Instead of another Ferrari, he annexed Crimea. I also think he is disappointed. We can observe a similar attitude in our political landscape, for example, in the case of Kaczyński, whose personal animosities influence the entire politics. I assume that these elements also matter for Putin. We have a person who has a significant influence on reality, has his surroundings, builds visions, and can decide to narrow the circle of trusted individuals. We wondered about the condition and situation of Kaczyński, right? Now, imagine what must be happening there and what questions Russians must be asking themselves.
In my opinion, Putin’s animosities have led him to the other side of the mirror, from where there is no turning back. This is clearly one of the reasons. And how did it happen? One of the heroes of “Szuga,” Mikołaj Karpicki, a liberal through and through, says that it was known from the beginning, from the moment Putin came to power. On the other hand, his friend Kuziczkin, who was the head of the culture department in the Tomsk region and once supported Putin, tells a different story. On the day he was told to return his passport, he packed up and left. He says he knew Putin and that Putin changed. He got scared of Khodorkovsky, of Maidan. In crisis moments, we return to settling accounts in our lives; that’s when we start testing another option, the one we didn’t choose. Kuziczkin claims that Putin once believed he was a pro-European Peter the Great, maybe even imagined that Russia would co-create the EU. I don’t exclude this possibility – he might have genuinely thought that this path was possible, but later he got scared and disappointed. As a former KGB man, he returned to the harshest KGB methods. Intelligence services think in paranoid terms; they must operate in the enemy category – otherwise, their existence makes no sense. As a result, we have what we have. Karpicki claims he has always been like that. Kuziczkin says he changed. And I think both can be true because we have several layers of our identity.
But the fact is that over all these years, unfortunately, Russians have also changed a lot, as seen in surveys. This year, only 8% of Russians declare feeling fear or disgust towards Stalin (for comparison: in 2001, 43% of Russian citizens negatively assessed Stalin). In 2023, 54% of respondents consider him a Great Leader, new monuments to Stalin are being erected in Russia, and Stalin Centers are planned in million-person cities. The demons have been unleashed. This was not visible 10-20 years ago when I regularly traveled there. Today, it’s not just about Putin; it’s about the whole apparatus of which he is a part – if he gives up a piece, he will lose everything. That’s why Russia needs to be humiliated, and I believe it will eventually happen. They must unequivocally know that it didn’t pay off.
How will the war unfold?
I’m not a great optimist, but we have to try from all sides to prevent Russia from winning. This monstrous, imperial identity must be destroyed. Certainly, it will not be that suddenly a peace agreement will be signed, and the war will end. Today, it seems that a spectacular victory for either side is not possible. Remember that war legitimizes Putin’s power. When it ends, what will be the new fuel? Russia has an interest in fueling the conflict. Any change potentially could result in a change of power and settling scores.
However, Ukraine is also not capable of winning. Many problems are piling up there, which we don’t talk about – there is massive corruption, and there is a shortage of people.
Morale is declining.
Yes. But Ukraine is genuinely fighting for its life. Some time ago, many Ukrainians said that Donbas could be given up, but that was before February. Today, now that the pro-European course is possible, Ukrainians want to go our way – something unimaginable and, paradoxically, owe it to Putin.
Many commentators emphasize that Putin is just waiting for Trump to return to power.
Speculating about Trump is probably even more challenging than speculating about Putin. But the facts are that Trump is liked in Russia. Kremlin propaganda is evidently pro-Trump, and it’s clear that his re-election would make them very happy. I’m not saying Trump is purely pro-Russian, but they share many characteristics – contempt for democracy, pluralism, and the idea and belief in a tough, strong, hard hand. It seems to work on this principle, and it’s very possible that Russia had a hand in Trump’s victory. What if Trump won again? I try not to imagine this scenario because it could be unsettling. Then the entire burden of assistance would shift to Europe, which would probably seek a truce and a freezing of the conflict.
I still believe that Russia can be very dangerous, but generally, we are witnessing the fall of the empire. Russia has such an outdated way of thinking, it is blind to itself, to its history, that it must end, we are observing a similar process to the fall of colonial states.
Importantly, Russia is losing influence. It has completely subordinated only Lukashenko, who from our perspective was already on their side. And what about the role of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Armenia? It is not obvious; these countries have stopped aligning with Russia because they see that it has little to offer. And as a superpower, it is falling apart.
How long can this collapse last?
A long time, at least a decade. We must remember that there is no mass resistance movement there; only 10-15% oppose Putin.
It is difficult to imagine today that these 10-15% suddenly gain subjectivity and start fighting.
Yes, but over the decade, that can change. Remember that many people fled from there; we have a historically unprecedented emigration. These people, potentially, can be a factor for change. We showed Ukrainians that it is possible to build a different world, to fight corruption, that elections matter, that the state can function more efficiently, better.
Are we teaching them democracy?
Yes, those are big words, but it is happening. Not through lectures, but because they can see how it works here. And I believe that when it comes to Russians, it should be the same. Those who have clearly opposed Putin, who do not legitimize evil, should receive our support. Those who try to have both – to have Europe and at the same time one foot in Russia – should be deprived of such support. Russia is like the Third Reich – those who co-create it should be excluded; those who pay a huge price for renouncing it should be supported